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Abstract 
This thesis examines the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality and 
the effect of asset price changes and financial sector development on income inequality. 
The actions of monetary authorities in the U.S and elsewhere during the financial crisis 
period have had a major impact on financial markets. Given that financial asset prices 
respond quickly to new information about monetary policy shifts, the Fed’s low interest 
rate policy stance that started in August 2007 led to a significant increase in asset prices, 
particularly stock prices. Stock prices appreciation transfers wealth to those households 
who already own stocks; generally speaking, the wealthier American households. 
Consequently, it is important to examine empirically the dynamics of monetary policy, 
asset prices and financial development on income inequality. First, we examined the 
response of monetary policy to income inequality. We tried to provide empirical 
answers to the following questions; is there any evidence that monetary policy responds 
to income inequality?  If there is evidence of such a response, what is the nature- 
symmetric or asymmetric?  Secondly, is there any significant relationship between 
changes in stock prices and income inequality? Thirdly, what are the implications of 
financial sector development on income inequality? 
This area of literature draws from monetary economics, financial economics and 
welfare economics disciplines, and has become increasingly important given the 
massive levels of income inequality that is witnessed around the world. Chapter 2 of 
this thesis looks at the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality using data from 
the U.S. We provided evidence of a positive and significant reaction of monetary policy 
to income inequality measured using the income share accruing to the top 1 percent 
income earners. We also found evidence of asymmetric reaction of monetary policy to 
the income of the top 1 percent between 1960 and 2009. In chapter 3 we focused on the 
role of asset prices on income inequality using data from the U.S. We found that stock 
market developments and income of the top 1 percent wage earners are well integrated 
with the direction of causality running from stock returns to top 1 percent income share. 
One of the practical policy implications of this finding is that monetary policy stance 
that is directed towards the propping up of asset prices will have a concomitant effect on 
the income of the top 1 percent income earners.  
Also in chapter 3 we used the Generalized Methods of Moment GMM to 
examine the reaction of inequality measured using the income share of the top 1 
percent, the bottom 90 percent and the lowest fifth percent households to changes in 
asset prices. Our task here is to examine whether changes in both financial and non-
financial assets affects everyone in the top and bottom of the income distribution the 
same way, or if there are remarkable differences on how these variables affect 
individuals within the top and bottom income percentiles. Our results detected 
widespread and subtle effects of asset prices on income at the selected percentiles of the 
income distribution. These findings hold practical implications for policy makers 
because the distribution of stocks and homes has important consequences on who 
benefits from asset prices appreciation and who is hurt by its depreciation. Finally in 
chapter 4 we analysed the distributional consequences of financial sector development 
on income inequality using a large unbalanced dataset of 91 countries, classified 
according to World Bank’s income categories. The results in almost all the models 
suggested that increasing access to credit for households will reduce income inequality. 
This finding is important in the light of the potential for using financial development as 
a policy tool to reduce the widening income inequality around the world.   
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Monetary policy transmission channels: Theoretical foundation 
 
(Stock prices and inequality transmission channels) 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Economic models that evaluate the effects of monetary and financial sector policies 
mostly focus on the aggregate implications of these policies while paying little or no 
attention to the distributional implications. From a practical perspective we reckon that 
distributional consequences deserve attention given that financial markets are imperfect and 
usually incomplete and household’s access to them is often limited. These 
imperfections1limit economic agents’ access to financial markets to insure against 
idiosyncratic and systematic shocks thus exacerbating the distributional effects of aggregate 
macroeconomic fluctuations and associated policy responses. The impact of monetary and 
financial sector policies in both emerging market economies and advanced economies are 
subject to a unique set of constraints such as political economy constraints2.  
Prasad (2013) noted that the political economy that surround distributional effects of 
macroeconomic policy choices for advanced countries can sometimes lead to policy 
measures that reduce aggregate welfare3.Indeed, the choice of monetary policy stance can 
                                                          
1
If financial markets were complete, distributional consequences of monetary policies will not be a problem 
given that monetary policy will affect macroeconomic variables such as inflation and growth with few 
distributional implications. In addition, if households can effectively insure against household-specific income 
risk, then specific policy choices may have aggregate welfare consequences and limited distributional 
consequences. 
2
The political economy constraints as was noted by Prasad (2013) for a developing economy range from-lack 
of central bank independence, the need to maintain exchange rate stability and weak transmission 
mechanism as a result of shallow financial markets. 
3
This proposition is evident in the United States were wealthiest Americans exert more political influence 
than their low income counterparts, Page et al (2013) thus having decisive power over certain 
macroeconomic policies. Page et al (2013) provided documented evidence which seems to suggest that the 
U.S political system is increasingly dominated by wealthy interests and that this tilting of political life toward 
business and the wealthy has served to undermine economic mobility and policy making process. Prasad 
(2013) highlighted some policies with significant distributional consequences. According to him, certain 
policies have serious implications for small politically powerful groups; an example is in trade theory, where 
the benefits of free trade distributed broadly amongst the population but the costs of opening up to foreign 
competition are borne by a relatively small group. He therefore, argued that in the absence of redistributive 
 
2 
 
have differential impacts on net borrowers relative to net savers; if there is a market where 
households can insure against this source of income shock, then the distributional effects 
would be reduced. Given that such markets do not exist even in advanced economies with 
well-developed financial systems; macroeconomic fluctuations that may initially have only 
small distributional effects will tend to be magnified. In addition, financial sector policies 
such as the legal changes in the U.S and elsewhere that allowed financial institutions to 
compensate for higher risk by charging higher interest rates to so called ‘sub-prime’ 
customers is one example of financial policies with huge distributional implications. While 
this policy improved access for those households that were previously shut out of these 
markets, the high level of leverage within the low income households led to an unsustainable 
path which resulted in default and financial crisis. The crisis period (2007-2009) witnessed 
significant increase in credit card debt and home foreclosure rates as a result of the inability 
of households particularly low income households to service their debt obligations as they 
fall due. In addition, these households are the worst hit in periods of significant financial 
crises. 
This view is supported by both old and recent empirical literatures which showed that 
crises tend to have asymmetric effects on households at different spectrum of the income 
distribution. For instance, Baldacci et al (2002) posits that balance of payment and banking 
crises lead to large increases in poverty and income inequality. Recent studies such as Dijk 
(2013) show that banking crises have large social costs, including adverse effects on health, 
education and poverty. A survey of literature have also shown that it is not only crises and 
recessions that have asymmetric impact on households at different parts of the income 
distribution but also policies that are adopted to counteract these adverse macroeconomic 
events may also have significant distributional effects, Domac (1999) and Prasad (2013). 
In most developed economies, monetary and financial sector policies have become one 
of the main lines of defence against macroeconomic shocks; this is especially true in the 
light of the 2007-09 financial crises were national central banks employed different ranges 
of conventional and unconventional monetary and fiscal policies to counteract the effects of 
the crisis. In addition, the crisis witnessed the re-design of financial sector regulation and 
supervision that are aimed at strengthening the resilience of the financial sector by 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
mechanisms that mitigate the losses of those hurt by more open trade, the political clout of the potential 
losers can lead to policy choices that have adverse aggregate welfare consequences. 
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improving the quality and quantity of capital as well as introducing additional capital 
requirements4. These policy prescriptions employed by monetary and financial authorities 
around the world have expanded, necessitating an analytical examination of more than just 
the aggregate effects of these policies5. This thesis focuses on monetary and financial market 
policies that have distributional consequences from a short-term or business cycle 
perspective6 rather than on the determinants of longer-term changes in income inequality. 
This thesis has three main goals. First it attempts to provide detailed analysis of the 
effects of monetary policy actions on income inequality in the U.S. We achieved this 
objective by estimating a forward looking augmented Taylor Rule using GMM estimation 
approach. We sought to provide empirical answers to the question of whether the Federal 
Reserve reacts to income inequality; and if they do, is there a possibility of asymmetric 
reaction with respect to income inequality. We employed three measures of income 
inequality namely; the income of the top 1 percent, the 90/10 wage differentials ratio and the 
GINI index of income inequality. Our results suggest that the Fed does not only react to 
income inequality measured using the income of the top 1 percent; we also found the 
presence of asymmetry in the response of monetary policy to the income of this group. 
This is because although monetary policy tightens during periods of prolonged income 
increases, the Fed did not increase interest rates high enough to curb the increase in income 
as they would cut rates in the event of a decline in income. This sort of asymmetric reaction 
is similar to Fed’s reaction to stock prices. For instance, Ravn (2011) found that a 5percent 
drop in the S & P 500 index increases the probability of a 25 percent basis point interest rate 
cut by one third, while no significant reaction to stock price increases was identified. The 
                                                          
4
The global financial crisis exposed the shortcomings of regulation and supervision by showing that regulators 
and supervisors were not fully able to detect the accumulation of risks in the financial system, Claessens and 
Kodres (2014). Consequently, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, endorsed proposals that are aimed at strengthening global capital and 
liquidity regulation referred to as Basel III. Basel III has new capital ratio standards that require banks to keep 
an amount of capital as a percentage of their exposure, as well as a risk in minimum capital requirements. 
5
Although we did not study the distributional consequences of conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy directly; however, we analyzed the response of monetary policy to changes in three measures of 
income inequality. We found a positive and significant reaction of the policy rate to changes in the income of 
top 1 percent of the earnings population in the U.S. This study provides important insight on how monetary 
policy reacts to changes in income inequality. We reckon that changes in monetary policy stance of the 
Federal Reserve can have distributional effects through its impact on asset prices particularly stock prices. 
6
The distinction between short-term fluctuations and long term trend is not always a very clear one. For 
example, extreme macroeconomic events such as financial crises might have both short and long term effects 
in terms of the distribution of income and indeed wealth in an economy. 
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lack of reaction to other measures of income inequality in this study could suggest an 
indirect reaction to stock market. This is because the income of the top 1 percent exhibits 
high level of correlation with the S&P500 stock index. In addition, the income of the top 1 
percent is closely tied to the peaks and valleys of the stock market-see figure 3.1 in chapter 3 
of the present study. The guiding intuition is this; since monetary policy affects financial 
markets particularly stock market and stock market in turn affects the income of households 
within the top end of the income distribution, it seems plausible to suggest that the reaction 
of monetary policy to the income of the top 1 percent measure of inequality could be an 
indirect reaction to the stock market. Plethora of both empirical and theoretical papers 
supports the notion of a statistically significant reaction of monetary policy to equity prices 
while the response of income inequality to changes in stock return is a less explored area.  
This leads to our second objective, the role of asset prices on the income of top 1 
percent, lowest fifth percent and bottom 90 percent income earners in the United States. 
Specifically, we tried to determine whether there is some sort of endogeneity in financial 
market development and the income of the top 1 percent by conducting pair wise Granger 
causality tests. The focus on top 1 percent income earners allows us to evaluate a special 
subset of questions regarding the extent to which asset prices are particularly pro-rich. Our 
central hypothesis is that developments within the financial asset markets particularly stock 
markets can explain in part the dynamics behind the growth in the income of top 1 percent 
income earners in the United States.  
In addition, we analysed the relationship between asset prices and income inequality. 
We studied this question empirically by looking at how income of the top 1 percent responds 
to changes in both financial and non-financial assets. Using the GMM estimator we analyzed 
the relationship between income inequality measured using the income of the top1 percent, 
lowest fifth percent and bottom 90 percent of the earning population and financial and non-
financial variables. Our analysis allows us to examine whether changes in both financial and 
non-financial assets affects everyone in the top and bottom of the income distribution the same 
way, or if there are remarkable differences on how these variables affect individuals within the 
top and bottom of the income spectrum. The analysis expands our understanding of what is 
driving the changes in the income share of the rich in the United States. 
The finding of a unidirectional causality from stock returns to top 1 percent income 
earners seems to suggest that the reaction of monetary policy to the top 1 percent variable as 
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was established in chapter two of this thesis could be a reaction to financial market 
development as opposed to a direct reaction to changes in the income of this group of 
individuals. This finding in part motivates the third objective of this thesis; the link between 
financial market development and income inequality for a large unbalanced dataset of 
91countries classified according to the income categories defined by the World Bank (high 
income, middle-income, and the lower-income countries). We employed three measures of 
income inequality namely the GINI index of gross and net income, and income share of top1 
percent of the population. 
We tried to provide answers to the following questions; does financial market 
development reduce income inequality? Is there any evidence that financial market 
development favours high income earners more than the low income earners? Can we spot 
major differences within countries based on their stage/level of economic development? Or 
is the effect the same around the world, irrespective of country peculiarities? Specifically, 
the null hypothesis tested in the analysis is that well developed financial markets reduce 
income inequality since efficient credit allocation will allow household choices and 
decisions to be made based on economic optimality rather than inherited wealth i.e. the 
linear negative influence hypotheses of Galor and Zeira (1993).  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows; in section 1.1 we analysed the asset price 
channel and its role in monetary policy transmission. Section 1.2 is a brief survey of existing 
theoretical literatures on monetary policy and stock prices Sections 1.3 analyzed in great 
detail the optimal monetary policy in the presence of asset price misalignments from their 
economic fundamentals. In section 1.4 we looked at optimal interest rate rule in the presence 
of asset price disequilibria. Section 1.5 presents the analysis of the inequality channel of 
monetary transmission and in section 1.6 we presented an overview of findings from the first 
empirical chapter of this thesis. Sections 1.7 and 1.8 are the summary of previous empirical 
literatures on stock prices and income inequality and financial sector development and 
income inequality respectively. 
 
1.1 Asset price channel and its role in monetary policy transmission 
Asset prices such as stock prices and property prices may not be the main goal or 
instrument of monetary policy in the U.S or elsewhere, they are nonetheless important for 
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its realization, given that they are a component of its transmission mechanism7. Changes in 
stock market prices can affect the aggregate economy via its effect on investment 
spending. For instance, According to Tobin-Q-model, higher stock prices will lead to high 
investment spending thereby, increasing aggregate demand and output. Consequently, an 
understanding of how monetary policy induced changes in asset prices affect income 
inequality and propagates to other parts of the economy is fundamental to a successful 
implementation of monetary policy.  
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in most advanced and developing economies 
central banks set the short-term interest rate8 at which the central bank deals with the money 
market. The decisions about this short term interest rate affect the economic activity and 
inflation through several channels, which are described collectively as the “transmission 
mechanism” of monetary policy .In this section we study the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism with particular focus on the asset price or wealth channel of monetary 
transmission.  
The special focus on the asset price transmission channel is because we believe that the 
connection of income inequality (measured using the income of the top 1 percent of U.S 
earning population) to monetary policy may be via the link between interest rates and asset 
prices. According to the discounted cash flow model, stock prices are calculated as the 
present value of expected future net cash flows. Changes in the stance of monetary policy 
play a critical role in determining stock returns by altering the discount rate used by stock 
market participants in the discounted cash flow model or by influencing their expectations of 
future economic activity. 
                                                          
7
 Different authors have defined the monetary policy transmission mechanism in different ways, for instance 
Taylor (1995) describes the monetary policy transmission mechanism as the process through which monetary 
policy decisions are being transmitted to the real sector defined as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
inflation. Ireland (2005) sees the monetary policy transmission mechanism as the process through which 
policy induced changes in the nominal money stock or the short-term nominal interest rate impact real 
variables such as aggregate output and employment. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in their own 
definition describes the monetary policy transmission mechanism as comprising series of channels that 
transmit monetary policy decisions through a cause-effect function to the real economy. According to them, 
policy actions and announcements affect expectations about the future course of the economy and the 
confidence with which these expectations are held, as well as affecting other market interest rates, exchange 
rates, equity prices, real estate prices, amongst others. These changes in turn affect the spending, saving and 
investment behaviour of individuals and firms in the economy. 
8
 Short term interest rate is one of the main instruments of central banks’ monetary policy oriented on price 
stability, the changing of which can have an impact on the level of consumer prices by means of its effect on 
asset prices. 
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Policy-induced interest rates increases imply both higher discount rates and lower future 
cash flows, therefore, contractionary monetary police regime should be associated with a 
reduction in the price of stocks because of  the higher discount rate used to discount the 
expected future returns and/or lower expectation of future economic activity. In contrast, 
expansionary monetary policy environment which is associated with low interest rates is 
generally seen as periods of increased economic activity, and higher earnings for businesses 
in the economy. Furthermore, expansionary monetary policy will result in increase in the 
value of stocks because financial market participants tend to re-balance their portfolios in an 
environment of sustained low interest rates.  
The basic idea is straightforward: expansionary monetary policy which lowers interest 
rates will make bonds less attractive relative to stocks. The resultant effect will be increased 
demand for stocks thus increasing stock prices. This was precisely the mechanism at work in 
the United States and most advanced economies at the start of the recovery from the global 
recession. Stocks have been a huge beneficiary of the low interest rates environment in the 
U.S.  
The top 1 percent income earners have enjoyed the benefits of rising corporate profits 
and stock prices orchestrated by the low interest rate regime. According to Saez (2013), the 
top 1 percent of U.S families captured as much as 93% of the income gains reported since 
2009. But how might monetary policy affect income inequality? Monetary policy actions 
can trigger changes in financing conditions in the economy as well as on market 
expectations. These changes may lead to adjustments in asset prices e.g. stock market prices. 
Given that the ownership of stocks is largely concentrated within the top income spectrum, 
monetary policy stance that results to a rise in stock prices will benefit those households 
with large portfolios of equities thus increasing their pre-tax income, further widening the 
gap between them and the non-stock market participants. Monetary policy induced stock 
market fluctuations have important impacts on household wealth and must be monitored 
closely to evaluate the stance of monetary policy. In what follows is a succinct analysis of 
the major transmission mechanisms that have been highlighted in the literature.  
The interest rate channel is the main monetary transmission channel at work in 
conventional macroeconomic models. The operating procedures of most central banks are 
similar, although institutional details may differ slightly from country to country. The key 
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point is that the central bank9 chooses the price (interest rate) at which it will lend high-
powered money to private sector institutions. A change in this rate known as the official rate 
is transmitted to other short-term wholesale money-market rates. Banks will therefore, adjust 
their standard lending rates (base rates), usually by the same amount of the official rate. This 
action will affect the interest rates that banks charge their customers on different products. 
The basic idea in the interest rate channel is that given some degree of price stickiness, an 
increase in the nominal interest rates will translate to an increase in the real rate of interest 
and the cost of capital. These changes are expected to result to a delay in consumption or a 
reduction in investment spending, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999).  
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) however, suggested that the macroeconomic response to 
policy-induced interest rate changes is considerably larger than that suggested by traditional 
estimates of the interest elasticities of consumption and investment. They argued that 
mechanisms other than the interest rate channel may also be at work in the transmission of 
monetary policy. Other alternative mechanisms include the wealth or asset price channel and 
expectations and confidence channels. The asset price or wealth channel is built on the life-
cycle model of consumption developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963). In this model, 
households’ wealth is a major determinant of consumption spending. According to Ando 
and Modigliani, the connection of households’ wealth to monetary policy comes via the link 
between interest rates and asset prices.  
A policy-induced interest rate increase reduces the market value of securities, such as 
bonds, equities and real estate, reducing household resources and leading to a fall in 
consumption. Asset prices also play a critical role, albeit in a different manner from that of 
the wealth channel in the broad credit channel developed by Bernake and Gertler (1989).In 
this model, asset prices are particularly important given that they determine the value of the 
collateral that firms and consumers may present when borrowing a loan.  
According to Bernake and Gertler (1989), in “frictionless” credit markets, a reduction in 
the borrowers’ collateral will not have any effect in investment decisions: however, in the 
presence of information or agency costs, deteriorating collateral values will increase the 
premium borrowers must pay for bank financing; this in turn will reduce consumption and 
                                                          
9
 A central bank derives the power to determine a specific interest rate in the wholesale money markets from 
the fact that it is the monopoly supplier of high powered money known as “base money” comprising notes 
and coin plus bankers’ deposits at the central bank. 
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investment.  Consequently, monetary policy induced changes in market interest rates may be 
exacerbated through this “financial accelerator” effect. 
The bank lending channel is another monetary transmission path. Banks play a more 
central role in this channel and they rely on reservable demand deposits as an important 
source of funds. The bank lending channel was first conceived by Roosa (1951) and was 
explored and developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), according to this channel, a 
contractionary police stance that results in the reduction of aggregate volume of bank 
reserves, will reduce the availability of bank loans. Given that a larger population of 
households and firms rely heavily or exclusively on bank financing, a reduction in loan 
supply will reduce aggregate spending.  
The expectations and confidence channel is hinged on the premise that changes in 
monetary policy stance can influence expectations about the future course of real activity in 
the economy, as well as the confidence with which those expectations are held. Such 
expectations may affect other sectors of the economy through, for instance, changes in 
expected future labour income, unemployment as well as sales and profits amongst others. 
In addition, such changes in perception will also affect participants within the financial 
markets. The direction of the effect of policy changes on expectations and confidence are 
somewhat ambiguous and hard to predict.  
For example, a tightening of monetary policy rate could be interpreted as an indication 
that monetary policy makers believe that the economy is likely to be growing faster than 
initially thought thus giving a boost to expectations of future growth and also increasing 
confidence. On the other hand, the same policy stance could be interpreted as signalling that 
policy makers recognizes the need to slow the growth in the economy in order to maintain 
the inflation target, this could weaken expectations of future growth and lower confidence.  
 
1.2 Theoretical background: monetary policy and stock prices 
We will now focus our attention on the asset prices or wealth channel of monetary 
transmission mechanism. To set the stage for our discussions in this section, we will provide 
a brief analysis of the “dividend discount cash flow model” which provides important 
insights on the stock market effects of changes in monetary policy stance. A fundamental 
principle of this model is that rational stock market participants expect to get two types of 
cash flows from their investments- dividends during the holding period and an expected 
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price at the end of the holding period. Given that this expected price is determined by future 
dividends, the price of a stock is the present value of expected future dividend. Following 
the notations in Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006), the discounted cash flow model predicts 
that the stock price  is the present value of expected future dividends 	
. Under the 
assumption of constant discount rate , the stock price at time  can be written 
mathematically as: 
 
 =  ∑  	 		  +                                                               (1) 
 
Where,  is the conditional expectation operator based on information that is available 
to stock market participants at time ,  is the rate of return used by the stock market 
participants to discount future dividends, and  is the agents time horizon i.e. stock holding 
period.  To derive equation (1) above, Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006), assumed that there 
exist an investor with two alternative investments opportunities over a single period horizon: 
either to invest in a stock with expected gross return; 
 
   !                                                                                                                   (2)  
 
or a risk-free bond with constant nominal gross return, 
 1 +                                                                                                                                       (3) 
 
The law of arbitrage implies that for the investor to be indifferent between the two 
alternative investments, both must yield the same expected return given as, 
 
   ! = 1 +                                                                                                          (4) 
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solving forward the resulting expectational difference equation (4) yields equation (1) above. 
According to the standard transversality condition10, as the horizon  increases the second 
term in the right hand side of equation (1) vanishes to zero i.e. a situation of no rational price 
bubbles, 
 
lim→'     = 0                                                                                             (5) 
 
Consequently the present value model is obtained; 
 
 =  ∑  	 		                                                                                                (6) 
 
 Eq. (6) implies that a change in monetary policy will affect stock returns in two 
major ways. First, it will have a direct effect on stock returns by changing the discount rate 
used by stock market participants in the model eq. (6). Contractionary monetary policy that 
results in a raise in interest rate will increase the rate at which the future values of firm’s 
cash flows are capitalised leading to a reduction in stock prices. Fuhrer (1995) showed that 
the U.S monetary policy instrument the federal funds rate constitutes a source of major 
change for many long term market interest rates. Since the discount factors used by market 
participants are linked to market interest rates, a shift in the central bank’s policy rate will 
also affect the discount factors because the central bank is able to influence market rates.
 The second is an indirect effect via the relationship between interest rates and firms’ 
future cash flows. A change in monetary policy rate is expected to affect a firms’ stock value 
by altering expected future cash flows.  
For instance, monetary policy easing is expected to increase the overall level of 
economic activity and stock prices will increase because of the expectations of higher 
expected future cash flows. This second channel assumes the existence of a link between 
monetary policy, the stock market and the real economy. Monetary transmission mechanism 
                                                          
10
 According to Kamihigashi (2006), transversality conditions are optimality conditions that are generally used 
with Euler equations to characterize the optimal paths of dynamic economic models. Kamihigashi (2006) 
suggests that a transversality condition enables an individual to single out the optimal path among those 
satisfying the Euler equation. Euler equation on the other hand is the condition that no gain can be achieved 
by slightly deviating from an optimal path for a short period of time. 
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literatures highlight four different channels through which fluctuations in the stock market 
may impact aggregate demand, the four channels are discussed in turn below;  
Stock market effect on investment: Tobin’s q11 is defined as the ratio between a 
physical asset’s market value12 and its replacement value. Essentially, it is the market value 
of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital, Tobin (1969). This theory provides an 
important mechanism for how changes in stock prices can affect the economy. According to 
Tobin (1969), if q is high, the market price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost 
of capital, and new plant. In other words, high Tobin’s q provides an incentive for 
companies to invest more in capital because they are worth more than the share price they 
paid for them. Companies can then issue stock at a high price relative to the cost of the 
facilities and equipment they are buying. Investment spending will therefore rise because the 
company can buy more new equipment with a small issue of stock. 
 The main point of Tobin’s q13 model is that there is a relationship between stock 
prices and investment spending.  Monetary easing that make stocks more attractive than 
other alternative risk-free assets like bonds will result in an increase in stock prices, higher 
stock prices will lead to higher investment spending, aggregate demand and output thus 
leading to the transmission mechanism described by the following representation: ) ↑⟹ ,- ↑⟹ . ↑⇒ 0 ↑⇒ 1 ↑  where ) ↑ indicates monetary easing, resulting to a rise in 
stock prices ,- ↑, this rise will increase Tobin . ↑, resulting to an increase in investment 0 ↑, thus leading to increase in aggregate demand and output 1 ↑. 
Firm balance sheet effect or credit view
14:  this transmission channel operates via the 
impact that improved firm’s balance sheets have on investment. The presence of asymmetric 
information in credit markets implies that the ability of firms to borrow money depends on 
the value of the collateral they can offer. As the value of collateral increases, the ability to 
borrow and invest increases and vice versa. Expansionary monetary policy ) ↑ that causes 
an increase in stock prices,- ↑ along the lines described in this section increases the net 
                                                          
11. = 23456 839:6 ;< =-3996> ?3@396@93?6A6= ?;- ;< ?3@39  
12
 For company whose stocks are quoted in the stock market, the market value of equity is calculated for a 
specific point in time by BCDEFG HI JℎLGFJ × ℎF NHDOLBPQJJℎLGF OGRNF. 
13
 Tobin q assumes that firms finance investment by issuing equities (common stocks). In an environment of 
increasing stock prices, it becomes cheaper for firms to finance their investment because each share that is 
issued produces more funds. Therefore, a rise in stock prices will lead to increased investment spending. 
14
 For a good survey of the credit view see- Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995), Hubbard (1995 
and 2001) and Bernanke , Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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worth of firmsST ↑, which reduces adverse selection and moral hazard problems and so 
leads to higher lending U. Higher lending will result to higher investment spending and 
aggregate demand and output 1 ↑. 
Household wealth effects: This channel has been suggested by Modigliani (1971) and 
operates through the impact of wealth on household consumption. Modigliani’s life cycle 
model states that consumption is determined by the lifetime resources of consumers.  
According to Modigliani (1971), an important component of households’ lifetime resources 
is their financial wealth. Therefore, expansionary monetary policy) ↑ which raises stock 
prices,- ↑raises the value of household wealthT ↑, thereby increasing the lifetime 
resources of consumers resulting to an increase in consumptionV ↑. In an intertemporal 
model where households smooth consumption over time, wealth effects results to higher 
current and future consumption, stimulating aggregate demand and output. 
Household liquidity effects: This is another way of looking at the balance sheet 
channel of monetary transmission. In the household liquidity channel, balance sheet effects 
work through their impact on household’s desire to spend rather than on the lenders desire to 
lend, Mishkin (1976). In this channel, the possibility of households finding themselves in 
financial distress coupled with the asymmetric information about the quality of illiquid 
assets such as properties and consumer durables pushes households to hold more liquid 
financial assets like stocks which they could easily sell in the event of a negative income 
shock for their full value and raise cash.  
As stock prices increases, the value of financial assets for households with large 
quantities of corporate stocks increases as well; consumer durable expenditure and 
investments residential home will also increase because these households have a more 
secured financial position and the possibility of finding themselves in financial distress is 
less likely. ) ↑⇒ ,- ↑⇒ WRBLBNRLX YJJFJ ↑⇒ V> ↑, [ ↑⇒ 1 ↑, where V> indicates a rise in 
consumer durable expenditure and [ ↑ a rise in residential housing spending. 
Plethora of empirical evidence has provided documented evidence on the stock price 
transmission channel. Thorbecke (1997) using different types of methodologies analyzed the 
relationship between monetary policy and stock prices in the United States. He found that 
expansionary monetary policy has a large and statistically significant impact on stock 
returns. In addition, Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006), in a panel study found that in most of 
the countries examined a restrictive monetary policy stance decreases expected stock 
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returns. Rigobon and Sack (2001) employed an identification technique based on the 
heteroskedasticity of stock market returns to identify the reaction of monetary policy to the 
stock market. Their result suggested that monetary policy reacts significantly to stock 
market movements, with a 5% rise (fall) in the S&P 500 index increasing the possibility of a 
25 basis point tightening (easing) by about a half.  According to them, this reaction is 
roughly of the magnitude that would be expected from estimates of the impact of stock 
movements on aggregate demand. In addition, Wadhwani (2008) have argued that central 
banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting to asset price misalignments 
over and above their reaction to inflation forecasts. According to him, countercyclical 
monetary policy has the ability of offsetting the impact of such bubbles on output and 
inflation. 
 Our analysis thus far suggests that monetary policy has both direct and indirect 
effect on stock prices. The low interest rates environment since 2007 has encouraged 
investors to shift out of cash and into risky assets particularly equities. Monetary policy can 
affect wealth/income inequality through changes in asset prices and income flows.  Majority 
of households in the U.S and elsewhere rely predominantly on labor incomes while for some 
other households, financial income, business income or transfers may be more important. 
Expansionary monetary policy that increases profits more than wages, will favor 
disproportionately families whose primarily source of income comes from business. As long 
as there is heterogeneity in economic agent’s holding of financial assets, shifts in their prices 
will have an indirect effect on wealth distribution. Wolff (2012) in his analysis revealed that 
the richest 1 percent of American households held about half of all outstanding stock, 
financial securities, trust equity and business equity and 36 percent of non-home real estate 
in 2010.  
In that same year, the top 10 percent owned more than 91 percent of all stock and 
mutual fund value as well as owning the vast majority of all the other investment asset 
categories. The remaining 9 percent were owned by the bottom 90 percent households. 
Given the uneven distribution of financial asset holdings, it seems inevitable that a rebound 
in stock prices would disproportionately favor wealthier income households. For instance, 
Fry and Taylor (2013) reported that the mean net worth of U.S households in the upper 7% 
of the wealth distribution rose by an estimated 28%, while that of households in the lower 
wealth spectrum dropped by 4% during the first two years of the nation’s economic 
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recovery. According to them, these significant variations were driven by the fact that the 
stock market rallied during the 2009 to 2011 period while the housing market remained flat. 
In addition, the annual report from the Federal Reserve of St Louis reported that 62 percent 
of the wealth recovery through the end of 2011 has been the result of rising stock markets.  
Wealthy households usually have their assets concentrated in stocks and other 
financial assets, while less affluent households have their wealth more heavily concentrated 
in the value of their residential homes. According to Fry and Taylor (2013) the differences in 
the performance of financial asset and housing markets from 2009 to 2011 explain most of 
the variances in the trajectories of income/wealth among high income and low income 
households. 
 
1.3 Model of optimal monetary policy and asset price misalignments 
 In this section, we look at literatures that analysed the theoretical relationship 
between monetary policy and asset prices within the context of optimal policy rules. This 
analysis forms part of the theoretical foundation of the first empirical chapter of this thesis. 
As we alluded in the previous section, low interest rate environment can foster stock price 
bubbles, due to excessively optimistic expectations of higher expected future cash flows. 
However, the negative macroeconomic consequences from bubbles bursting and financial 
imbalances unwinding has led some commentators to question the monetary policy 
orthodoxy of exclusive focus on price stability, with its role in preventing financial 
instability restricted to policies that mitigate the fallout when it occurs, Greenspan (2002).  
The aftermath of the sub-prime mortgage collapse and the wider correction to stock 
value and other asset prices at the peak of the collapse has seen the re-emergency of the 
debate on whether it is appropriate for monetary policy to react to asset price movements 
and/or financial imbalances over and above their effects on inflation expectation. Large 
numbers of both empirical and theoretical papers have tried to provide answer to this 
question by developing macroeconomic models where aggregate demand is affected by both 
household consumption wealth and balance sheet effects.  Cecchetti et al (2006) and 
Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) argued that reaction of interest rates to asset price 
misalignment from fundamentals can reduce overall macroeconomic volatility. Indeed, 
Crockett (2003) suggested that monetary regime with an exclusive focus on short-term 
inflation control may be insufficient protection against the build-up of financial imbalances 
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which forms a fundamental element of financial instability. In his view, monetary authorities 
should tighten monetary policy sufficiently pre-emptively to lean against excessive credit 
expansion and asset price misalignments. 
In addition, empirical evidence by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004), using data 
from the United Kingdom and Chadha et al (2003) in a panel analysis of United Kingdom, 
United States and Japan provided evidence in favour of the inclusion of asset prices as 
elements of central bank’s reaction function. Majority of the empirical papers sighted above 
based their analysis on the augmented Taylor rule, where the nominal interest rate responds 
positively to inflation, demand pressures and asset prices. Our thesis is that monetary policy 
induced asset price inflation can feed-back into further income and wealth inequality. This is 
because households within the top spectrum of the income distribution constitute bulk of 
financial market participants. Consequently, an additional monetary response to asset price 
movements which in turn affect the income of the top 1 percent can narrow the income gap 
and reduce inequality, albeit in the short-run. 
                 Using a structural backward-looking model of a closed economy where asset 
prices affect future inflation indirectly, through wealth effects on aggregate demand, 
Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006) showed that optimal monetary policy should 
systematically respond to the non-fundamental component of asset prices. Their model 
expanded the standard Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997) specification by including asset 
prices which are assumed to evolve stochastically via the influence of fundamental and non-
fundament (momentum trading) factors. The model is represented by the following 
equations: 
 \ = \ + LP + ],                                                                                                (7) 
 P = ^P − `^R − [\] + ^c. + d,                                                          (8) 
 . = .∗ + .fg = .∗ + EΔqjk,                                                                                       (9) 
 .∗ =  −lR − [\] + l`[P] + C,                                                                (10) 
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Equations (9) to (10) represent the structure of the economy. Where P is the 
deviation of log output from its steady-state level (output gap), \ is the deviation of 
inflation rate from target, R is the monetary policy instrument (one-period nominal interest 
rate), . denotes log of real asset prices and .∗ the fundamentals. In Kontonikas and 
Montagnoli (2006) . is defined as an equity index. ], d, C represent exogenous 
random shocks to aggregate demand, inflation and asset price fundamentals. The random 
disturbances in this model are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated R. R. m processes with 
zero means and constant variances. 
Equation (7) is a standard accelerationist backward-looking “Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment” (NAIRU) type Philips Curve where the change in 
inflation is a positive function of lagged output gap and the inflation shock. Rudebusch 
(2002) considered a hybrid Philips curve:\ = no\ + 1 − no[\ + 2] + LP +],  he opines that accelerationist Phillips curve no ≈ 1 can be derived from models of 
price-setting behaviour. The inclusion of inflation inertia in the inflation equation means that 
disinflations will be costly with respect to the output losses; therefore, there exists a trade-
off between inflation and output in the short-run. Equation (7) implies a vertical long-run 
Phillips curve since lagged inflation enters the model with a unity coefficient. Equation (7) 
provides no role for expected future inflation in the inflation adjustment equation. The 
sensitivity of inflation to excess demand is captured by the parameter L which is a positive 
constant. 
Equation (8) the demand side equation posits that aggregate demand is a positive 
function of past level of asset prices via consumption wealth effects and investment balance 
sheet effects. For instance, a consistent increase in asset prices will reduce the perceived 
level of households’ financial distress resulting in a boost in consumption spending. In the 
aggregate demand equation, parameter ^c is very important because it indicates the size of 
asset price movements’ effects on output. The absence of no wealth/balance sheet effects 
will result to ^c = 0 and equation (8) will look like the conventional dynamic IS curve. In 
this model, monetary authority takes into account the impact of asset prices on aggregate 
demand; in other words, they take the effect of . on P and its magnitude into 
cognisance. This implies an assumption of symmetric information between financial market 
participants and the central bank. By conditioning P on ., the model allows the output 
 
18 
 
gap to be affected by both the fundamental .∗ and the non-fundamental .fg component 
of the asset price. 
The dynamic evolution of asset prices . , and their underlying fundamentals .∗, is 
represented by equations (9) and (10). This dynamic evolution follows a partial adjustment 
mechanism where the observed asset prices are not always equal to their fundamental value. 
Equation (9) posits that actual asset prices is made up of two components namely, the 
fundamental . and the non fundamental component .fg = E∆.k. The non-fundamental 
component stipulates that, if asset prices have increased in the past ∆.k > 0 there is a 
positive “momentum” effect on their current level E > 0. Essentially, market participants 
bid up the demand for stock holdings in expectations that past capital gains will continue in 
the future. The size of  E is crucially important in determining the divergence of . from its 
fundamental value .∗. For instance, if the value of E is very high, the stronger the effect 
from past asset price changes and therefore . can diverge15 significantly from its 
fundamental value, .∗  albeit in the short-run.  
However, once the asset prices revert, at some unknown future date, the downward 
effect on aggregate demand could be bigger. According to Kontonikas and Montagnoli 
(2006) stability of the asset price path requires that the parameter E satisfies: 0 ≤ E < 1. 
Equation (10) represents the fundamental component of the asset price in line with the 
dividend asset pricing model. Therefore, the model postulate a positive effect from expected 
future dividends which is assumed to depend on expected output and a negative effect from 
real interest rates. A random disturbance term C is included in the fundamentals’ process to 
account for uncertainty. 
 
1.4 Optimal interest rate rule 
 The interest rate setting of the central bank in the model is such that the bank chooses 
the nominal interest rate R, that affects contemporaneous real asset prices, next period’s 
output gap, and two-period ahead inflation while contemporaneous inflation and output gap 
are predetermined by the bank’s previous interest rate decisions and current exogenous 
shocks. Once the model is solved, equations (7) to (10) can be written compactly as 
 
                                                          
15
 Note that in this model, the divergence of .  form .∗ is not regarded as an explicit bubble because the 
authors did not assign any probabilistic structure to its evolution, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006). 
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P = v + w,                                                                                                         (11) 
 \ = x + ],                                                                                                          (12) 
Where v ≡ zP − z`R − \ + zcEΔ.k is the control variable of the central bank, as \, P are predetermined when R is chosen and x ≡ \ + LP is the state variable at time . 
The central bank’s intertemporal quadratic loss function U in this model is assumed to 
penalize both inflation and output gap volatility: 
 
U = `  ∑ {' [\` + zP` ]                                                                                        (13)  
 
Where z ≥ 0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output 
stabilization. { is the discount factor, 0 < { < 1.  Equation (13) which is the central bank’s 
loss function reduces to a weighted average of the conditional volatility of inflation and 
output in the absence of the discount factor. It is apparent from equations 11 and 12 that at 
time  when the interest rate is chosen, the only state variable is x. Consequently, 
Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006) defined the value function in terms of x only, }x. 
Substituting equations 11 and 12 the constraints in the value function and applying 
Bellman’s dynamic programming principle they obtained: 
 
}x = min  ` [x + ]` + zv + `] + {}x                                (14) 
 
The optimal path for the control variable v is derived as: 
 
v = −  33 x +  3 [v]                                                                              (15) 
 
The solution to the model equation (15) is of this form v = Nx.  In terms of the 
interest rate that is set by the policymaker, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), used the 
definitions of v, x , z, z`, zc, and . to derive the optimal rule for the nominal interest rate R: 
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R = Io\ + I<P + Ik∗. − .∗                                                                                   (16) 
 
Where  Io = 1 − ?k , I = L + k?3k , Ik∗  are the weights on 
interest rate, inflation, output and asset price misalignments from their fundamentals 
respectively. According to the “Taylor principle” the inflation coefficient, Io, should exceed 
the value of 1, to be sure that the real interest rate responds adequately to inflationary 
pressure. 
 Equation (16) is the rule for adjusting nominal interest rates that is the augmented 
Taylor rule; this rule predicts that the central bank should react to asset price misalignment. 
In the presence of wealth effects ^c > 0 monetary authorities should raise interest rates in 
response to higher misalignments Ik∗ > 0
 in addition to their reaction to inflation and 
output. Based on the discussions so far, it is evident that the optimal monetary policy 
reaction to asset prices depends on first the role of asset prices in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and secondly the source of the asset price changes. For instance, if 
asset prices increase is as a result of pure economic fundamentals ∆. = ∆.∗,  monetary 
policy will not react directly to asset price however, if the movement is as a result of non-
fundamental factors such as excessive expectations of future economic developments or the 
so called “irrational exuberance” then optimal monetary policy will systematically respond 
to the non-fundamental component of asset prices increase.  
Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006) analysis shows that within the context of optimal 
central bank behaviour, asset price disequilibria should be an element in the monetary 
authority’s feedback rule. In the absence of a relationship between aggregate demand and 
asset prices ^c = 0 there will be no reason for monetary policy to react directly to asset 
prices misalignments Ik∗ = 0
 therefore the feedback rule which implements optimal 
policy takes the form of a standard Taylor rule with the interest rate being an increasing 
function of inflation and output gap. 
 R = Io\ + IP                                                                                                   (17) 
 
Where the inflation and output gap weights are Io = 1 − ?! > 1, I = L + k?3 ! > 0 
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Furthermore, if financial markets are efficient and observed asset prices are equal to their 
intrinsic value E = 0, there will not be any direct reaction of monetary policy to asset 
prices. In such a situation, monetary policy takes into account asset prices, indirectly with a 
lag through their demand wealth effects. 
 The analysis so far suggests that asset price misalignments should be given an 
explicit role in the central bank’s reaction function and not just be considered as instruments 
to help predict future output and inflation. As stock prices are highly positively correlated 
with the top 1 percent income and since large ownership of equities is skewed toward the top 
of the income distribution, it seems plausible to argue that the top 1 percent can be used as 
proxy for the stock market. This view is consistent with some aspects of the heterogeneous 
agent, incomplete market model of Favilukis (2011) that showed that the observed pattern of 
stock prices has played a major role in increasing wealth inequality. In his model stock 
returns are positively correlated with changes in inequality since stock market participants 
are wealthier households and benefit disproportionately from a stock market boom. Taking 
these points into consideration, we conducted a formal test on the empirical relationship 
between top 1 percent household income and stock price returns in chapter three of this 
thesis. The result from the analysis showed that stock price changes can explain significantly 
variations in the income of the top 1 percent earning population in the United States. 
Consequently, it seems that the reaction of monetary policy to the income of the top 
1 percent, a segment of the population that is critical to understanding inequality in the 
United States could be a reaction to the stock market. The idea is that if interest rate is raised 
high enough to curb asset price misalignments from their fundamental values it will affect 
the income of these households thus narrowing the income distribution at least in the short-
run. Furthermore, the assertion that the reaction of monetary policy to the top 1 percent 
income could be seen as a reaction to the stock market is further buttressed by the fact that 
the reaction of monetary policy to this variable is similar to that seen in most Taylor rule 
models augmented with asset prices see- Borio and Lowe (2002), Cecchetti et al (2000), 
Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) and Chadha et al (2003) amongst others as well as 
empirical literatures on asymmetric monetary policy reaction to stock prices.  
In the case of asymmetric monetary policy reaction to asset prices, the central idea 
according to Greenspan (2002) is that monetary authorities should not respond to asset price 
bubbles but should stand ready to implement policies to mitigate the fallout from financial 
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imbalances typical of asset price booms unwinding when it occurs and, hopefully ease the 
transition to the next expansion-the so called “Greenspan put.”  In other words, it is not 
desirable for the central bank to increase interest rate in the presence of asset price 
disequilibria as suggested in the model we discussed above however, it is desirable for them 
to step in and provide liquidity in other to prevent stock prices from falling below the levels 
justified by the underlying fundamentals of the economy. Hoffman (2009) found evidence of 
asymmetric policy reaction to stock prices; according to her, the Fed lowered interest rates 
when stock prices fell, but did not raise interest rate in the boom period. In the case of the 
present study, we found a similar sort of asymmetry to the top 1 percent proxy for 
inequality. 
 
1.5 The inequality channel of monetary transmission 
Although our view is that the response of monetary policy to the income of the top 1 
percent could be an indirect response to asset prices as opposed to a direct response to the 
income of this segment of the population. Some theoretical literatures have argued in favour 
of the inclusion of inequality in the central bank’s reaction function. This school of thought 
hinge their argument on the premise that the choice of monetary policy rules such as 
inflation targeting, nominal GDP targeting, Taylor rule amongst others has effect on the 
variances of real GDP and inflation and therefore, has differential consequences for 
households in the  different levels of the income spectrum. Furthermore, distributional 
outcomes affect the business cycle and influence the aggregate trade-offs faced by monetary 
authorities, these trade-offs, includes the rate of growth of aggregate output/unemployment 
as well as price stability.  
Extending, Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1986), efficiency wage model to incorporate 
inequality, Furman and Stiglitz (2004) showed that higher unemployment results in greater 
inequality; and the marginal contribution to inequality from a given increase in 
unemployment is rising in the degree of initial inequality. According to them, the 
consequences of these relationships is that if there are adverse business cycle fluctuations, 
then a higher initial degree of inequality will exacerbate the adverse social and economic 
consequences of business cycle fluctuations. Therefore, the representative agent models, by 
assuming no inequality, may have significantly understated both the welfare cost of 
fluctuations and their implications for economic policy.  
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The theoretical paper of Areosa and Areosa (2006) provides insights into the 
inequality channel of monetary transmission. They incorporated inequality into the general 
equilibrium model with sticky price by introducing agents with different productivities, 
wages and financial market accesses into the model. Their model showed that there is a 
channel from interest rate to inflation through inequality and that the welfare-based 
objectives of monetary policy include inequality stabilization. In addition, they showed that 
higher levels of financial exclusion are associated to bigger welfare losses and to smaller 
interest rate variability. Thus providing explanation to why the observed interest rate paths 
are less volatile than optimal policies implied by most theoretical models of the monetary 
transmission. In what follows is an abridged analysis of Areosa and Areosa (2006) 
inequality channel of monetary transmission. 
 
1.5.1 Model economy 
The model economy comprises households, firms and the governments. There are 
two infinitely-lived household agents: financially excluded (FE) agents who do not own any 
assets and financially included (FI) agents that have access to financial markets. At time 0, 
financially included agents are endowed with capital stock of the economy and human 
capital; the financial excluded agents are endowed with only human capital. Financially 
excluded agents are assumed not to save. Therefore, financially included agents hold all of 
the capital the economy possesses in every period. Economic agents that are excluded from 
the financial system in this model are also unable to buy stocks and they receive differential 
treatment from the government. Consequently, only financially included consumers receive 
dividends and pay lump-sum taxes. 
This assumption is in line with the evidence presented in this thesis. Using data from 
the Survey of Consumer Finance and PSID16, Wolff (2000) showed that about one-third of 
U.S. households hold no investment assets at all, while another third holds only a minimum 
amount of liquid assets. The remaining third holds more than 90 percent of all investment 
assets. In this model, money is explicitly seen as a unit of account and therefore, does not 
appear in either the budget constraint or utility function. In addition, monetary policy is 
                                                          
16
PSID is panel study of income dynamics by University of Michigan. It is a longitudinal survey of a 
representative sample of U.S individuals and families which started in 1968 
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specified in terms of an interest rate rule; as a result; money is not introduced overtly in the 
model. The Gini index for consumption is used in this economy as the inequality variable.  
 
1.5.2 Households 
The model assumes a continuum of infinitely-lived agents indexed in the unit 
interval. A fraction of households z ∈ 0,1 called financial excluded (FE) agents do not 
own any assets while the remaining fraction known as financially included (FI) agents 1 − z 
of households has access to financial markets. The letters "F" and "R" are used to index 
variables associated to FE and FI consumers. 
The type x representative household preferences are represented by: 
 
5 ≡  ∑ ^' 
k − 
  , x ∈ F, R,                                                           (18) 
 
Where 0 < ^ < 1 denotes the discount factor, V5 is an index of consumption goods 
and [5 is the number of hours worked at period . These households offer labour in a 
perfectly competitive market with fully flexible wages. They equally buy differentiated 
goods in a retail market and combine these goods into a composite good using a Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) aggregator: 
 
V5 ≡  V5     m
   , ¡ > 1,                                                                                 (19) 
 
Where V5 is the demand for differentiated goods of type . Type x household 
minimizes the total cost of obtaining differentiated goods indexed by a unit interval [0,1], 
taking as given their nominal prices ,. Cost minimization gives a demand curve of the 
form: 
 
V5 = V5 ¢¢ k£ ,                                                                                                     (20) 
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Where the aggregate price level , is defined to be  
 
, ≡  , k£!                                                                                                       (21) 
 
1.5.3 Financially included households 
The financially included households in each period  = 0,1,2, …, make a choice for 
consumption V , labour [ and nominal bonds portfolio ^ to maximize equation (18) 
subject to a sequence of period budget constraints that must hold with equality in 
equilibrium: 
 ¥¦,§¨ ≤ § + T[ + Π − ,V − ª,                                                             (22) 
 
Where ¦, is the stochastic discount factor used for computing the nominal value 
at period  of one unit of consumption goods at period  + 1, T  is the nominal wage rate 
for financially included households, Π  denotes nominal dividend income, and ª represents 
the nominal value of the net lump sum taxes. 
 In equilibrium, the following first order conditions must hold with a positive risk-
free nominal rate of interest at period , R: 
 
1 + R = § «¬¬­­ ®k® ¢¢¯
k,                                                                               (23) 
 
V
[
° = ±­¢ ,                                                                                                           (24)     
                                                                                                    
Regarding the fact that ¥¦ ,¨ = 1 + Rk. 
 
1.5.4 Financially excluded households 
Households from this group are excluded from financial markets and do not own 
assets. These households maximize equation (18) subject to the budget constraint: 
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,V6 ≤ T6[6 ,                                                                                                                 (25)   
 
Where T6 is the nominal wage rate for financially excluded households. Economic 
agents that are excluded from the financial system in this model are also unable to buy 
stocks and they receive differential treatment from the government. Consequently, only 
financially included consumers receive dividends and pay lump-sum taxes. Given that 
equation (25) holds with equality in equilibrium, financially excluded agents just consume 
their contemporaneous labour income. The associated first order condition is equivalent to 
equation (24): 
 
V6[6 = ±²¢ ,                                                                                                             (26) 
 
Combining equations (25) and (26) yields 
 V6k = [6                                                                                                            (27) 
 
 
1.5.5 Firms 
The goods market is made up of monopolistically competitive firms indexed in unit 
interval. Each of the firms in this model economy  manufactures a differentiated good  
using Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
1 = Y[[6 ] ³[ ´k                                                                                     (28) 
 
 Where 1 denotes the level of output at period  of firm  while [6  and [ are the total number of working hours hired from each type of agent by this firm. The 
variable Y > 0 is an exogenous technology factor while . ∈ 0,1 and 1 − . are the 
productivity factors associated with each type of agent. 
  Market clearing in this model is given as 1 = zV6 + 1 − zV + µ, 
where µ represents government demand for goods produced by firm . One of the 
assumptions of the model is that government purchases an aggregate µ of form equation 
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(19) of all goods in the economy, consequently, the government’s demand for each good  
is given by a demand curve equivalent to equation (20). Thus, the following demand curve 
for each good  is obtained: 
 
1 = 1 ¢¢ k£ ′                                                                                                        (29) 
 1 ≡ V + µ ≡ zV6 + 1 − zV + µ is a composite index equivalent to those specified in 
equ. (19) that denotes aggregate demand. Given that the criterion for minimum cost is 
expressed by T6[6/. = T[/1 − .,  equations (28) and (29) are used to derive 
the number of working hours for each type of economic agent: 
 
[5 ≡   [5 m =  k 5 ±²±­ 5 ¸¹º , x ∈ R, F,                                              (30) 
 
Where zQ. = 1 − z, ., z6 , .6 = z, . − 1, and » ≡  @@ k£ m  is a dispersion 
measure for prices. 
 All firms face the same nominal marginal costs )V= given by: 
 
)V= = º ±²  ¬ ±­k®k                                                                                                 (31) 
 
To the extent that an individual’s firm production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale and input prices are fully flexible in the perfectly competitive markets, its marginal 
cost does not depend on its output level.  
 
1.5.6 Flexible-price equilibrium 
The optimal pricing decision for any firm  under flexible prices takes the 
conventional form: 
 
, = ¼ )V½,                                                                                                           (32) 
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Where n = ££k > 1 is the firm’s desirable mark-up. The subsidy for output 0 ≤ { <1 offsets the effect on imperfect competition in the goods markets on the steady state level 
of output. Combining equations (31), (24) and (26) yields the following expression for the 
real marginal cost: 
 
)V ≡ 2¾¢ = º  ¸¹º  1 − µ∆l,                                                                        (33) 
 
Where factor 
∆l ≡    kkkk  is a function of l , defined as the financially 
excluded agents’ share of total consumption. 
 
l ≡ ²                                                                                                                             (34) 
 
Combining equations (32) and (33) yields: 
 
¢¢ = ¼ º  ¸¹º  1 − µ∆l.                                                                              (35) 
 
Equation (35) shows that relative prices depend on the distribution of consumption 
characterized by l. Areosa and Areosa (2006) used a different definition of potential output 
in order to make this model comparable with the existing literature. Consequently, potential 
output, 1<, defined as the output that would prevail under flexible wages and prices and 
under equal consumption, i.e. V6 = V, given current real factors such as technology, 
government purchases e.t.c., must satisfy: 
 
1 = ¼ º ¬ ¸¿º® 1< − µ
∆z.                                                                                    (36) 
 
Inequality decreases the potential output 1< since ∆z > 1. In addition, if there is 
an excess of unqualified people z > .,  1< decreases with z. Condition z > . reflects that 
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there are more unqualified people than firms are willing to hire, increasing their costs. In this 
model, it is not possible to change the percentage of financially excluded consumers without 
changing the percentage of less qualified people. This explains why condition z > . links 
these two apparently distinct characteristics. Representing steady state values with an over 
bar, equation (36) reduces to  
 
1 = ¼ 1À∆z,                                                                                                         (37) 
 
Where Y̅ = 1 and V̅ = 1À. The equal consumption flexible-price equilibrium output level 
expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the steady state, is expressed as  
 
1Â< = ÃÂºÂ ′                                                                                                                (38) 
 
Equation (38) is the same expression for the natural rate of output in the standard New 
Keynesian framework, being Ä ≡  − ̅/̅ for all variables Q except for µÂ ≡ µ/1À. 
 
1.5.7 Dynamic equilibrium 
To analyze the transition dynamics, Areosa and Areosa (2006) derived the log-linear 
version of the model around a steady state with zero inflation, equal consumption for all 
economic agents, without government spending V̅6 = V̅ = V̅ = 1À. In the log-linear 
model, firms set prices as in the sticky price model of Calvo (1983), this allows for the real 
effects of monetary policy.  During each period, a fraction Å of firms are not allowed to 
change prices, while the other 1-Å, is allowed to change prices. 
 
1.5.8  IS curve and inequality evolution 
 An intertemporal IS equation is used to represent the demand side of the model. This 
is the log-linear version of equation (23): 
 VÄ = ¥VÄ ¨ − Æk[Ç̂ − \],                                                                                (39) 
 
Where \ is the inflation rate.  Similarly, equations (27) and (30) are used to obtain: 
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VÄ6 = k 1Â − YÄ − kk   lÄ!                                                                             (40)     
 
The log-linearization of (34) yields: 
 lÄ = VÄ6 − VÄ                                                                                                                        (41) 
 
Defining É ≡ 1Â − 1Â< as the output gap measure and using equations (39) to (41), the 
following IS curve is obtained: 
 
É = É − v³Ç̂ − \ − G<´,                                                                           (42) 
 
Where v ≡ dÆk and d ≡ 1 + kk. The real interest rate that stabilizes the output 
gap, G< , called the natural rate of interest evolves according to: 
 
G< ≡ vk  dY − Y + kÊ  ¥µÂ − µÂ¨!                                    (43) 
 
The slope of the IS curve changes from positive to negative when financial exclusion 
changes from high to low. This is in line with Bilbiie (2005). It is important to mention that d also varies with q in this model. If d > 1, the impact of the interest rate on the output gap 
is more intense than in the standard New Keynesian model. 
Equations (40) and (41) is combined to write lÄ as a function of É: 
 
lÄ =  Ë ³Æ + ÌÉ + µÂ´,                                                                            (44) 
 
Where Í ≡ Æ kk.   The Gini index for consumption given by Î = −zlÄ,    is used 
in this economy as the inequality variable17.  The evolution of the Gini index, obtained from 
                                                          
17
 If contemporaneous consumption V  is normalized to unity, or 100 percent of consumption and imposing 
that V6 < V the model yields Î = −zlÄ. If on the other hand V6 > V then Î = zlÄ. The Gini index 
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the substitution of equation (44) from the IS curve and the replacement of lÄ as a function of Î, provides an insight on how monetary policy affects inequality. 
  Î = Î + v³Ç̂ − \ − G´,                                                                         (45) 
 
Where v ≡ dÆk, d ≡ 1 − zd − 1  and G ,  the real interest rate that stabilizes Î  
is defined as 
 
G ≡ G< −  ¥µÂ − µÂ¨                                                                                            (46)    
 
If d > 1, inequality increases with the interest rate. The difference between the real 
interest rates that stabilize the output gap and the Gini index is based on the evolution of 
government spending. 
 
1.3.2 New Keynesian Philips curve 
Calvo (1983) model results to an aggregate supply of the form given in equation (47): 
 \ = Ï)VÐ  + ^\                                                                                                    (47) 
 
Where Ï ≡ 1 − Å1 − Å^/Å > 0 and )VÐ  is the percent variation of real marginal costs. 
A log-linearization of the real marginal costs expressed in equation (33) yields: 
 
)VÐ  = Ì + ÆÉ + Ë Î                                                                                                   (48) 
 
Equation (48) stipulates that marginal costs are proportional to the output gap that 
would occur if consumption of both financially included and financially excluded agents 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
thereafter, is given by ÑzlÄÑ, which assumes only positive values as a measure. In this model, it  does not 
matter for inequality measured using Gini index of consumption that agents consumes more, what matters is 
the consumption differentials amongst agents. Areosa and Areosa (2006), defines Î = −zlÄ . The sign helps 
to identify which agents are increasing their consumption. Inequality is said to be increasing if financially 
excluded agents are reducing their consumption. 
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were equal. The second term in equation (48) corrects this measure by the inequality effect. 
Combining equations (47) and (48) yields the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). 
 \ = xÉ + ^\ + xÎ                                                                                           (49) 
 
Where x ≡ ÏÌ + Æ and x ≡ ÏÍ/z 
 
Combining equations (44) and (47) yield the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in a 
more familiar format: 
 \ = x∗É + ^\ + C                                                                                               (50) 
 
Where x∗ ≡ x  Ë and the shock C is given by: 
 
C ≡ −Ï  ËË µÂ                                                                                                                 (51) 
 
Result 1 (Inequality channel) Equation (45) which shows how monetary policy 
affects inequality, with equation (48), the inequality augmented NKPC, lead to the first 
inequality channel of monetary transmission that predicts a channel from interest rate to 
inflation through-out inequality when λ ≠ q. According to this channel, if there is an excess 
of unqualified people z > ., inflation increase with inequality x > 0
. Financial 
exclusion z decreases the inequality-inflation trade-off x
. On the other hand, if z > ., 
the output-inflation trade-off is higher than in the standard New Keynesian model x∗ < x.  
Furthermore, a shock C arises as a function of the share of government spending that 
impact the real interest rate that stabilizes inequality G  but not the natural rate of interest G<. 
 
1.5.9 Optimal monetary policy 
 The policy objective function is derived by taking a second-order approximation of 
the aggregate utility of all agents given by: 
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 T = z6 + 1 − z,                                                                                                      (52) 
 
Where 6 and   are defined in equation (18).  
This yield: 
 T = −Ω∑ ^U'  + RO                                                                                           (53) 
 
Where “tip” denotes terms independent of the actual policy such as constants and terms 
involving only exogenous variables while U. The central bank’s intertemporal quadratic 
loss function, U penalizes both inflation, output and inequality: 
 U ≡ zÕÖ` + zo\× ` + zÎ`                                                                                                 (54) 
 
Where zÕ,zo and z  are functions of the structural parameters of the model and zÕ + zo +z = 1.  
 Result 2 (inequality objective) According to equation (54) the objective of a 
monetary policy that is consistent with welfare maximization should include inequality 
stabilization Î` , as well as inflation and output gap stabilization \× `  LBm É` . In addition, 
the relative importance of Î`  on loss function U decreases when the two types of agents 
(financially excluded and financially included agents) are equally represented, monetary 
authorities should not pay too much attention to variations in inequality and should rather 
direct their attentions to the evolution of inflation and output gap. The results from Areosa 
and Areosa (2006) corroborates the findings of Fowler (2005) that found empirical evidence 
that a Gini based monetary feedback rule is compatible with several features of the U.S 
economy. 
 Maximizing equation (53) subject to the constraints in equation (49) and the equation 
that determines the dynamics of Î in equation (33) provides the following criterion under 
commitment: 
 
\× = − 5∗£ xÉ − Ék − Ψ ÊÙÊ  Î − Îk!                                                           (55) 
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Equation (55) is the optimal target criterion which represents a policy rule that is 
optimal from a timeless perspective, Giannoni and Woodford (2005). This suggests that 
inflation should be accepted as long as it is negatively proportional to changes in output gap 
corrected for variations in inequality over the same period. According to Areosa and Areosa 
(2006) it is not optimal to maintain zero inflation and a zero output gap in the face of 
variations in inequality. If z > ., the coefficient on É in first order condition xx∗¡k =1 + Í¡k is greater than standard value ¡k.  
The optimal policy within this context results in greater inflation variability for a 
given level of variations in output gap in the presence of inequality. The key intuition is that 
stabilizing inflation will become more costly if z > .. As Ç̂ increases, É decreases, and this 
serves to reduce inflation. However, the direct effect in Î of the increase in the nominal 
interest rate partly makes up for the deflationary impact of a contractionary monetary policy. 
Equilibrium variations in inflation will be higher given that it is more costly in terms of the 
output gap to control inflation.  
To implement the target rule, the authors obtained an optimal instrument rule via the 
substitution of equations (42), (45), and (47)  in the optimal criterion equation (55): 
 Ç̂ = ∅o\ + ∅ÕÉ + ∅Î + ∅ÕkÉk + ∅kÎk + Û                   (56) 
 
Where the ∅Ü 	- are functions of the structural parameters of the model while composite shock Û is defined according to 
 
Û ≡ v∅ÕG< − v∅G ,                                                                                                       (57) 
 
Which is the average weight of the natural rate of interest and the real interest rate 
that stabilizes Î. In line with Evans and Honkapohja (2006), equation (56) is the 
expectation-based reaction function. According to Areosa and Areosa (2006), if monetary 
policy authority commits itself to set interest rates according to this reaction function at all 
times, then the rational-expectations equilibrium is necessarily determinate.  They opined 
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that substituting equation (55) in equation (57) will result to a similar model in Woodford 
(2003b) and therefore, the result applies. 
Calibrating the models represented by equations (42), (45), (49) and (57), and 
solving them numerically, Areosa and Aerosa (2006) showed that under the optimal plan, 
higher levels of financial exclusion are associated to bigger welfare losses and that the 
impact of the interest rate on inequality, d, and output gap, d , increases with z. 
Furthermore, they showed that inflation stabilization becomes more costly at the same time, 
since nominal interest rate generates opposite impacts on Î and É. Consequently, the 
equilibrium variation of \, É , and Î becomes very high. Their result suggests that welfare 
loss and interest rate variability evolve in opposite directions with financial exclusion under 
the optimal plan. The authors suggested that interest rate volatility is avoided in their model 
because of its impact on inequality, that increases with z that is financial exclusion. Their 
model provides explanation on why the observed interest rate paths are much less volatile 
than optimal policies implied by macroeconomic frameworks. 
From the perspective of economic agent’s decisions, an increase in interest rate 
orchestrated by the monetary shock will cause financially included (FI) agents to shift 
consumption and save. In addition, market clearing forces will cause firms to reduce their 
production and consequently, the demand for labour and wages paid to both agents. A 
reduction in wages and working hours will cause financially excluded (FE) agents to reduce 
their consumption as well since they channel all their current labour income to consumption.   
The theoretical model of Areosa and Areosa (2006) expands our understanding of 
how monetary policy may affect inequality. By incorporating inequality into the standard 
New Keynesian framework and introducing two types of agents with different 
productivities, wages and access to financial markets, they showed that monetary policy 
influences both output gap and inequality which in turn affect inflation.  In addition, they 
derived a welfare-based loss function for the monetary authority that includes inflation, 
output gap and inequality and suggested that monetary policy influences both output gap and 
inequality, which in turn affect inflation.  
An aspect of this theoretical analysis that is relevant to the current thesis is that 
monetary policy induced increase in financial asset prices will favour those agents that have 
access to financial markets and hold assets (referred to as financially included households 
FI) more than those agents that are excluded from the financial markets (financially 
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excluded households FE) thus, widening the income gap between them. Arguably, the 
FOMC’s response to low levels of resource utilization at the depths of the global recession, 
by keeping its primary policy instrument, the federal funds rate, at very low levels and by 
initiating large-scale asset purchases contributed to a strong rebound in stock prices.  As we 
showed in section 1.1.2 one of the channels through which these policies operate is by 
putting upward pressure on the prices of financial assets particularly stocks, thus benefiting 
those households with large quantities of such assets through either realized capital gains or 
high dividend payments.  The finding of a positive and statistically significant reaction of 
income of the top 1 percent to changes in stock prices confirm the  empirical relationship 
between stock prices and the income of households within the top income spectrum. This 
allows us to conclude that the reaction of monetary policy to the income of this segment of 
the population is an indirect reaction to the stock prices.  
We further sought to infer the monetary policy preferences with respect to the top 1 
percent income inequality proxy. We want to see whether the interest rate setting of Fed 
differs during periods of sustained increase and decrease in the income of top 1 percent 
income earners. Our aim is to determine whether monetary policy reacts to this measure of 
income inequality in a symmetric or asymmetric manner. Our result suggests the presence of 
asymmetry in the response of monetary policy to the income of this group. This is because 
the Fed did not increase interest rates high enough to curb the increase in income of the top 1 
percent as they would cut rates in the event of a decline in their income. This sort of 
asymmetric reaction is similar to Fed’s reaction to stock prices. This further confirms the 
high level of correlation between this variable and stock price. 
 
1.6 Monetary policy and income inequality 
Widening income inequality in both developed and developing countries pose one of 
the greatest challenges to policymakers. Although the study of income inequality-its causes, 
its consequences and its potential policy implications has a long history in economics, few 
researchers have studied empirically the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality 
and the causal relationship between inequality and asset prices. By exploring the reaction of 
monetary policy to income inequality and evaluating the causal relationship between income 
inequality and financial assets (particularly equities) our research establishes an empirical 
link between Fed’s policies and income inequality. Our focus is on the ways in which 
 
37 
 
monetary policy-fuelled asset price increases18 can feed-back into further income and wealth 
concentration. 
The guiding intuition is that sustained expansionary monetary policy stance will 
greatly benefit the upper classes because of increase in the price of their large holdings of 
corporate equities, due for the most part to low interest rates. Given that large ownership of 
equities is skewed toward the top of the income distribution, individuals at the top of the 
wealth distribution will take advantage of the strength in equity markets; therefore, steep rise 
in stock prices as a result of ease monetary policy or asymmetric reaction of monetary policy 
to stock prices will further increase the concentration of net worth and exacerbate inequality. 
Our findings bear implications for the ‘leaning against the wind’ and “mopping up” debate 
with regards to the response of monetary policy to asset price misalignments. 
Like we mentioned in section 1.1, the interest rate channel is one of the main 
channels through which monetary policy affects aggregate demand, and also net borrowers 
as well as net savers19. The interest rate channel can reduce aggregate demand by reducing 
the consumption of both savers and borrowers. In carrying out its mandate of price stability 
and maximum employment, the Fed’s action might affect households differently. This effect 
will depend amongst other things whether these households hold inflation-protected assets 
or have labour market skills that can protect them from a down business cycle and whether 
they are net savers or net borrowers, Prasad (2013). Niggle (1989) suggests that the Fed’s 
policies since the late 1970s is a major driving force behind the growth in inequality. 
Our finding in chapter two that monetary policy reacts to inequality measured using 
the income of the top 1 percent income earners in the U.S provides justification for monetary 
authorities to recognize distributional rather than just aggregate consequences when 
calibrating their policy stance. In addition, the result provides somewhat empirical support 
for Areosa and Areosa (2006) theoretically model that derived a welfare-based loss function 
for the monetary authority that includes inflation, output gap and a measure of inequality. 
                                                          
18
Asset prices are considered as a key link in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Extensive 
literature on the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices provides evidence linking 
expansionary monetary policy to equity and commodity price booms, Gerlach and Assenmacher Weshe 
(2008), Pagano, Lombardi and Lanzuini (2010) 
19
The effect of interest rate on these variables is different. For instance restrictive policy stance that results to 
a higher savings rate will benefit savers via higher returns on savings. However, if this is accompanied by 
higher cost of borrowing, it can affect the borrowing costs and therefore, affect consumption demand of net 
borrowers. 
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Specifically we observed that the estimated coefficient of income inequality is positive and 
significant, suggesting a restrictive policy stance in the face of increases in the share of 
income going to the top 1 percent and monetary easing in the presence of a decline in 
incomes of this group. However, the lack of reaction to the other two measures of inequality 
seems to suggest that this reaction to the top 1 percent could be as a result of the high level 
of correlation between this variable and the stock market. Having said that, the finding 
concurs with the conclusions of Galbraith, Giovannanoni and Russo (2007) and Coibion et 
al (2012) that inequality is not outside the scope of the issues with which the Federal 
Reserve deal with. 
As we have argued in chapter two that one of the channels through which monetary 
policy affect income inequality is via its’ impact on the value of household’s financial 
wealth changes as a result of changes in asset prices particularly stock prices20. For instance, 
a Bank of England’s report in (2012) suggests that the Bank’s policies of quantitative easing 
(QE) had benefited mainly the wealthy. Specifically, the report opines that the QE program 
had increased the value of stocks and bonds by 26 percent and about 40 percent of those 
gains went to the richest 5 percent of British households, Bank of England (2012). The same 
effect was observed in the U.S as was noted by Randazzo (2012) who argued that the Fed’s 
quantitative easing policy is a regressive redistribution program that has increased wealth for 
those already engaged in the financial market.  
According to him, wealthier households with more disposable income will have 
more ability to invest in equities than those households within the lower income 
brackets21.Wolf (2012), argues that at the start of the recovery in 2009, the S&P 500 index in 
real terms rose by 62%, whereas median home prices increased by just 2 percent in real 
terms these rebounds have helped to lift the earnings and the net-worth of those American 
households who own stocks. Coibion et al (2012) highlighted other channels through which 
monetary policy affects distribution in an economy. According to their study, the net 
implication of monetary policy on income inequality depends on the relative importance of 
                                                          
20
Heather (2011) opined that high income families benefit more from increased stock prices and corporate 
profits. Therefore, income inequality is further exacerbated when wages for workers, who do not own stocks, 
fails to increase by a similar amount. 
21
The Fed’s monetary easing after the 2007-09 financial crisis helped boost stock prices resulting in a wind fall 
for equity investors. Haltom (2012) maintains that the ultra-low interest rate environment during the pre-
crisis period had a negative effect on households that rely on interest income, such as seniors. According to 
him, these households are affected differently depending on where they stand in the wealth distribution. 
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different monetary policy transmission channels. For instance, expansionary policy stance 
that raises profits more than wages will favour households with claims to ownership of 
capital (in most cases high income households).  
The quantitative easing policy undertaken by most advanced economies is an 
example of expansionary policy stance that raises profits more than wages; the decreasing 
interest rate, as a result of QE, increased borrowing and investment opportunities for 
corporations. According to Nelson (2013), successful investments effectively resulted in 
higher profits, that typically went to top executives and shareholders, who are wealthier; 
poorer workers did not experience similar benefits, this worsens the distribution of income. 
In addition, higher inflation may also hurt households with limited access to financial 
markets (mostly low income households) and therefore hold more of cash than inflation 
protected assets. Albanesi (2007) opines that inflationary actions on the part of monetary 
authorities would represent a transfer of income from low-income households toward high 
income households. This is because low income households tend to hold more cash than 
their high-income counterparts hence this will increase both income and consumption 
inequality.  
Although, the redistributive effect of inflation is still inconclusive, in another work 
related to this point Levell and Oldfield (2011) examined the spending patterns and inflation 
experience of high and low-income households over the past decade in the U.K; they 
concluded that the main losers from inflation are low-income households and those for 
whom state benefits make up the largest component of their income. According to them, 
inflation rates in recent years have been predominantly high for goods (food and energy) that 
make up a larger share of the budget of low-income households. 
In other to infer the Fed’s monetary policy preferences and provide a good 
interpretation of the estimated parameters from the Taylor rule model, we analysed the 
interest rate behaviour of the U.S monetary authorities by taking into account possible 
asymmetry in the loss function. This leads us to the second empirical finding of this thesis 
the finding of asymmetric monetary policy reaction with respect to top 1 percent income 
earners. This sort of asymmetry seems identical to the Fed’s reaction to equity prices, Ravn 
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(2011) and Hall (2011)22 and Hoffman (2009) that found asymmetric reaction of monetary 
policy to stock prices. 
This notion suggests that monetary policy should react to asset market bursts and not 
to booms in asset prices (cutting interest rates aggressively in response to decreases in stock 
prices but not increasing as much as they would cut it in the event of a decline). Given that 
the holding of financial assets particularly stocks is highly concentrated within the top 
income class, asymmetric policy reaction to stock prices will exacerbate income inequality 
because it increases the income of those households already participating in the stock 
market. This assertion is supported by our empirical findings in chapter 3 where we found a 
unidirectional causality that runs from the stock market to the income of the top 1 percent of 
U.S. population. 
 
1.7 Stock prices and income inequality 
The discussions above point to the fact that change in financial asset prices 
particularly stock prices is a major transmission channel through which monetary policy 
stance affect income inequality. Recent empirical studies provide documented evidence in 
favour of inequality increasing effects of stock price changes. For instance Sawhney and 
Dipietro (2006) found that increases in stock market wealth have a positive and significant 
effect on income inequality across the 73 countries they studied. Their work showed that 
increasing stock market wealth will lead to increase in the income of the top quintile while it 
reduces the share of income of the bottom quintile. Kristal (2010) argues that the historic 
stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s worsened income inequality via a shift in the 
allocation of national income from labour to capital. According to Kristal (2010) the growth 
in capital income in the 1980s up until the late 2000s was much more concentrated amongst 
high income households. 
Das and Mohapatra (2003) in their panel study of 11 emerging economies 
investigated the distributional consequences of stock market liberalization over the periods 
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The study of Ravn (2011) reveals that a 5% drop in the S &P 500 index increased the possibility of a 
subsequent 25 basis point interest rate cut by 33% during the period under review (1998-2008). In addition, 
Hall (2011) using an augmented Taylor rule model with lagged stock price deflation found that stock price 
deflation led to a highly significant cut in interest rate. Her study also showed that the inclusion of stock price 
deflation led to an improvement in the fit of the Taylor rule. Finally, Hoffmann (2009) also found asymmetric 
monetary policy reaction to stock prices during the Greenspan/Bernanke period (1987-2008). According to 
her, the Fed lowered interest rates, when asset markets bursts, but did not raise them when they boomed 
during the Greenspan era. 
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1986 to 1995 and found that the gains from stock market liberalization appears to have 
benefited the top income earners more than the rest. Specifically, they observed a pattern 
that seems to indicate that income share growth accrued almost wholly to the top quintile of 
the income distribution at the expense of the middle class which they defined as the three 
middle quintiles of the income distribution. They provided evidence that showed that the 
income of those individuals at the lowest quintiles of the income distribution remained 
effectively unchanged in the event of the liberalization. The research of Das and Mohapatra 
(2003) corroborated the findings of Bekaert et al (2000c) that found an increase in the mean 
income of the top income quintiles post liberalization.  
Nguyen (2012) explored income inequality-asset price nexus under the Fama-French 
three factor model and found a significant relationship between income inequality and the 
rate of market participation which in turn influences the rate of returns on stocks. In a panel 
study of 154 countries, Zhang (2008) showed that a rise in the GINI coefficient of 
0.01percentage point is associated with up to 2 percent reduction in stock price to dividend 
ratio. She concluded that an increase in income inequality increases the rate of return in the 
stock market due to a lower overall price level. Furthermore, Zhang’s study found a 
connection between income inequality and the stock market via the interest rate channel. In 
a recent theoretical paper, Favilukis (2012) using the general equilibrium model showed that 
stock returns are positively correlated with changes in inequality because stock market 
participants are on the average rich households who benefit disproportionately from a stock 
market boom. 
Piketty (2010) opines that one of the reasons for the unequal distribution of 
household income is the decrease in the share of total income from wages and other labour 
compensation and an increase in the share from capital gains, bonuses, and stock options. 
The later are more concentrated among higher income households. The run-up in stock 
market prices from 1995 through 2000 further helped to fuel the increase in the share of 
income going to those households within the top echelon of the income distribution. In 
summary, there is no doubt that change in asset prices is one of the channels through which 
Fed’s policies affect the distribution of income. A major take away from the findings of 
chapter three is that macroeconomic policies that are targeted towards the propping up of 
stock market could exacerbate income inequality. 
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1.8 Financial sector development and income inequality 
Bulk of empirical evidence supports the notion that financial development reduces 
income inequality and poverty. Increasing access23 to credit market will expand the social- 
economic opportunities of agents’ from low income households and reduce the 
intergenerational persistence of relative income, Becker and Tomes (1986). In a panel study 
of both developed and developing countries, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) found 
that financial development disproportionately raises income of the poorest quintile and that 
it reduces inequality. In addition, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) observed that financial 
development lowered inequality and increased the average income of the bottom 80th 
percentile of the population. Townsend and Ueda (2006) in their study provided an indirect 
mechanism in which changes within the financial sector can affect inequality. According to 
them, changes in the financial system can influence both aggregate production as well as the 
allocation of credit, each of which may change the demand for low-and high-skilled workers 
with implications on the distribution of income. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) posits that financial developments can potentially 
affect the extent to which an individual’s economic opportunities are determined by 
individual skill and ability. Indeed, access to finance24 is at the core of an individual’s ability 
to realize his/her economic aspirations thus, reducing the gap between the rich and the poor 
and to some extent the degree to which the gap persists across generations. The following 
studies also provided documented evidence that financial sector development leads to a 
reduction in income inequality; Liang (2006) using a dynamic panel estimation GMM 
                                                          
23
It is important to understand what “access” means within the context of financial development and income 
inequality. Fernando (2007) discussed different dimensions of access to finance which is very helpful in giving 
us a fuller understanding of financial development-inequality nexus. According to Fernando (2007) full access 
to finance is when a person is able to use formal and semiformal financial services at any point in time 
without any inhibition. An agent could have partial access to financial services via 8 dimensions namely; 
scope dimension where the agent have access to only some products and services provided by the formal and 
semiformal sources. For instance, some people may have access to deposit facilities but no access to credit 
facilities or insurance products. Institutional dimension is a situation where an agent has access to services 
offered by only semiformal institutions but no access to those provided by the mainstream financial 
institutions. The quantity and price dimensions is where agents have access to a pre-specified small amount 
of credit which may not be able to meet their financial needs while the price dimension is a situation where a 
person has access but not at a competitive prices. Quality dimension is access to poor quality products and 
services. As Fernando (2007) articulated, financial institutions might discriminate by particular characteristics, 
such as gender where for instance only men may have access while women may not; age where youth and 
elderly agents may not have access while others may have and race and occupational dimensions. 
24
In line with literature, we define finance as the ability of financial contracts, markets and intermediaries to 
facilitate the screening of investment opportunities; the monitoring of investments after providing funding; 
and the pooling, trading and management of risk, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009). 
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approach in studying the impact of financial development on income inequality in rural and 
urban China found a negative and linear relationship between financial development and 
inequality in both rural and urban China, providing yet another empirical support to 
inequality reducing effect of financial development. 
The empirical findings in chapter four of the present thesis suggest that credit to 
private sector by deposit money bank and other financial institutions have a significant 
negative relationship with GINI index of net inequality in all the countries. This result 
indicates that increasing access to finance narrows the gap in income distribution, indicating 
that financial policies matter because financial institutions influence the ability of agents to 
obtain the capital they need to succeed and improve their standard of living, Bath et al 
(2006). Bulk of empirical research seems to be unanimous in their conclusion that 
improvements in financial markets widens economic opportunities, reduce inequality and 
narrows the distribution of income. 
That financial development seems to reduce income inequality in majority of the 
countries included in our datasets does not mean that access to finance is a magic wand 
capable of lifting low-income households out of poverty. In addition, it does not in itself 
support the use of political economy factors (especially the influence of policy makers) in 
using excessive extension of credit to middle and low income households to improve 
consumption and therefore, sustain aggregate demand in the face of stagnating middle and 
lower class income25. However, we argue in favour of the general consensus that better 
access to financial services can play a potentially key role in inclusive growth and 
development particularly within the developing countries.  
Indeed, promoting savings26 amongst low income households to achieve long-term 
goals like homeownership, ownership of financial assets or pension income may help in 
reducing the huge income differentials. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) in their review of 
                                                          
25
 This view was popularised by Rajan (2010), Reich (2010) Kumhof et al (2012) amongst others, these authors 
suggested that the political response to the insidious problem of income inequality in America and elsewhere 
was excessive extension of credit to households’ particularly low income households. According to them, easy 
access to credit was a way of boosting their purchasing power in the face of stagnating real wages. Rajan and 
others argued that increasing consumer indebtedness that supported consumption for most households in 
the face of stagnant income was largely driven by pressure to maintain aggregate consumption.  
26
  For a detailed typology of savings policies, see Pater Tufano and Daniel Schneider’s Policies Addressing 
Savings, Homeownership and Debt among Low-Income Families in  Barr and Blank (2011). They discussed 
policies such as ‘coerced (mandated) savings such as social security’, to programs that make it hard not to 
save such as ‘automatic enrolment in employer-sponsored savings plans’ amongst others 
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theories of how savings behaviour affects intergenerational income dynamics argued that 
saving is the most obvious channel through which richer households remain comparatively 
rich, since richer parents bequeath more assets to their children than do poorer ones. If the 
finding of a unidirectional causality (refer to chapter three) that runs from stock market to 
the income of the top 1 percent of the population is anything to go by, it seems plausible to 
argue that lower-income households have less-wealth than high-income families because 
they have less capacity to save. 
In summary, our results suggest that asset prices can explain in part the super 
concentration of income at the top end of the income spectrum. Therefore, monetary policy 
reaction to the income of the top 1 percent could be a reaction to asset prices because the 
ownership of financial assets is skewed within the high income households. Consequently, 
the inherent asymmetry in relying on “mopping up” (i.e. monetary authorities should not 
lean against the wind with respect to asset prices, but rather be ready to clean up in case of a 
rapid drop in asset prices by cutting interest rates aggressively) is likely to reinforce the 
income differentials between households that own financial assets and those that do not own 
such assets. Therefore, monetary authorities can improve overall macroeconomic 
performance and to some extent tighten the income distribution by reacting to asset price 
misalignments in a symmetric manner. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Monetary Policy and Income Inequality 
 
(Does Fed React to Income Inequality?) 
2.0 Introduction 
The inequality monetary policy transmission mechanism we reviewed in chapter one 
of the current thesis suggests that monetary policy influences both output gap and inequality 
which in turn affect inflation. This channel implies that the objective of a monetary policy 
that is consistent with welfare maximization should include inequality stabilization as well 
as inflation and output gap stabilization. This chapter examines the reaction of monetary 
policy in the U.S to income inequality. Given the persistent income inequalities in the U.S 
and the not so clear reaction of monetary policy to income inequality, we hypothesize that 
monetary policy observes changes in income inequality when calibrating their policy stance. 
Our second hypothesis is that monetary policy reacts asymmetrically to income inequality. 
Specifically, this chapter is concerned with what the Federal Reserve observes when setting 
monetary policy stance and whether there is some sort of asymmetry in their reaction to 
income inequality. To explore this, we specified a forward looking augmented Taylor Rule 
model by adding another macroeconomic dimension:  inequality- a topic that Federal 
Reserve officials particularly under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan have frequently 
maintained to be “outside the scope…of the issues with which we (Federal Reserve) deal” 
Greenspan (1998).   
More recently, the Federal Reserve is starting to take a greater interest in this topic. 
Some academic economists as well as analysts are asking whether financial inequality in the 
U.S will become part of the Fed’s decision-making process27. The question is, whether the 
Fed reacts to inequality.  The present chapter is an attempt to provide an empirical answer to 
this question by considering the relationship between the monetary policy rate on one hand, 
                                                          
27
 A recent research report from Credit Suisse research analysts Neal Soss and Dana Saporata published on 
CNBC stated that “the issues of growing income and wealth disparity in the U.S is gaining stature among 
Federal Reserve officials and may become the next important macroeconomic variable for monetary policy, 
Frank (2012). According to this report some members of the FOMC, have highlighted that inequality 
“undermines the ability of the economy to grow sustainably and efficiently” and could lower the long-term 
growth rate. 
 
46 
 
and inflation, output gap and inequality on the other. Finding a reaction to any of our 
measures of inequality could mean in principle that the Fed does take issues of income 
inequality into consideration when determining the monetary policy stance. Past empirical 
studies on the distribution of income in the United States report tremendous increase in the 
degree of inequality occurring since the early 1980s. Most of these studies report significant 
increase in the share of income going to the top quintile, decile and 1 percent of income 
earners at the expense of reductions/stagnations in the shares going to the bottom quintile 
and bottom 90 percent, Atkinson (2008), Argitis and Pitelis (2001), Davies et al (2009) and 
Milanovic (2011).  The fall in the share of labour wages in total income and the increase in 
the share of profits, and executive bonuses in total income which started around the 1980s 
led to widening income gap between wage earners and earners of capital income. This trend 
in inequality has brought about significant level of threat to social cohesion not only in the 
U.S but elsewhere. This is a disturbing phenomenon especially as it is now becoming 
evident that a ‘rising tide does not lift all boats28’.   
The ‘occupy protests29’ around the world is an indication of the increasing public 
displeasure against extreme income and wealth inequality.  Just recently, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report rated inequality as one of the top global risks of 
201330.  Consequently, policy makers are now realizing that the economic orthodoxy which 
asserts that increasing inequality is not only an inevitable effect of economic growth, but 
also a relevant pre-condition for growth no longer holds31, Lewis (1954). To solve the 
insidious problem of economic inequality requires that we understand the role of 
government policies particularly monetary policy in driving this trend. Most analyses of the 
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 The aphorism ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ is associated with the notion that improvements in the general 
economy will benefit all agents in that economy. Consequently, government economic policies should be 
targeted to the general macroeconomic environment first. This aphorism is mainly attributed to President 
John. F Kennedy who used it in a 1963 speech to defend a dam project. The president’s remarks is available 
on http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9455 
29
http://occupywallst.org/ 
30
 The Global Risks Report 2013 is an analysis of 50 global risks in terms of impact, likelihood and 
interconnections. This report is based on a survey of over 1000 experts from industry, government and 
academia. The report highlights the severe income disparity followed by unsustainable government debt as 
the top two most prevalent global risks, the full report is available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-
2013/ 
31
 The logic of the ‘pro-inequality’ argument is that given that savings are essential to increase productive 
capacity which will translate to higher rates of growth, income has to be redistributed towards the group that 
save and invest- the rich in order to ensure capital accumulation and growth. According to the proponents of 
this model, an economy with a high concentration of income within the top income distribution is more likely 
to grow faster than one with a more equitable distribution of income, Lewis (1954). 
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increase in income inequality have cited skill-biased technological change, changes in 
Federal and State tax systems, reduction in the bargaining power of union, globalization and 
financialization amongst others, as the causes of the phenomenon while monetary policy is 
not often mentioned as a likely source. Without denying the contributions of these factors, 
some academic economists and financial experts consider the Fed’s policies at least since 
the late 1970s32 a major driving force behind the growth in inequality, Niggle (1989). 
Researchers such as Galbraith (1998) have argued that the change in monetary policy goal 
and policy instrument from full employment to fighting inflation with the use of short term 
interest rate since the early 1970s brought about repeated sequence of recessions. According 
to him, the high unemployment that these recessions produced resulted in significant 
increase in inequality. Consequently, the Federal Reserve through its ‘reputable chairmen 
Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan stands primarily (though not solely) 
responsible for the rise in inequality’. 
A narrative which identified the role of monetary policy in propping up inequality in 
the post-crisis era considers the Federal Reserve’s policies a major force behind the recent 
surge in the stock market. According to this narrative, since the depth of the 2007 financial 
crisis the Dow Jones industrial average has more than doubled, increasing about 16 percent 
in 2013 alone. In addition, at the start of the recovery in 2009, the S&P 500 index in real 
terms rose by 62%, whereas median home prices increased by just 2 percent in real terms 
Wolf (2012). These rebounds have helped to lift the earnings and the net worth of those 
American households who own stocks. The gains in Dow Jones industrial average and S&P 
500 have benefited the wealthy disproportionately given that the richest 10 percent of 
households own more than 81 percent of stocks, as measured by value, Wolf (2012). 
This narrative seems to suggest that monetary easing drives up the prices of assets, 
especially financial assets. And most of these financial assets are owed by the wealthiest 5 
                                                          
32
 The debate over the role of restrictive monetary policy stance (high interest rate) in increasing/ decreasing 
income inequality is still open with authors piling in both positions. Researchers such as Galbraith (1998) have 
argued that the change in monetary policy goal and policy instrument from full employment to fighting 
inflation with the use of short term interest rate since the early 1970s brought about repeated sequence of 
recessions. According to him, the high unemployment that these recessions produced resulted in significant 
increase in inequality. Consequently, the Federal Reserve through its ‘reputable chairmen Arthur Burns, Paul 
Volcker and Alan Greenspan stands primarily (though not solely) responsible to the rise in inequality’. While 
Galbraith argues that disinflation will increase income inequality through the unequal income effects of the 
associated recession, Austrian economists suggests the opposite effect: according to them, income inequality 
will increase if Federal Reserve pursues an expansionary policy stance that increases inflation. Their view is 
that inflation will lower real wages and raise real profits because wages are stickier than prices. 
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percent of Americans. According to data from the Federal Reserve, the top 5 percent own 60 
percent of the nations’ individually held financial assets. They own 82 percent of the 
individually held stocks and more than 90 percent of the individually held bonds, Frank 
(2012). Consequently, the Fed's aggressive monetary easing and interest rate policies have 
helped to re-inflate the stock market in 2009 and 2010, thereby, creating a two-speed 
recovery where the wealthy have recovered much of their wealth as stocks doubled in value. 
However, the bottom income earners which depend on their houses and jobs for their wealth 
remained stuck in the recession. 
Financial Analysts such as Lowrey (2012 and 2013) and researchers such as Mishel 
and Finio (2012) found that inequality in terms of both income and wealth has widened 
since the recession. According to them, top 1 percent of earners have accounted for all of the 
income gains in the first two years of recovery. The top 1 percent witnessed an income 
growth of about 11.2 percent while the incomes of the 99 percent have declined by about 4.0 
percent.  Proponents of the Fed propping up inequality in the post-recession period have 
argued that the Fed's unconventional monetary policies33 aimed at boosting housing and 
stock prices, including buying approximately $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities each 
month has helped to reduced mortgage rates and made it cheaper for millions of families to 
either buy a house or free up some cash by refinancing.  
However, this windfall has disproportionately favoured top income earners because 
households at the top end of the income spectrum are the ones that are most likely to meet 
the credit standards to refinance and are individuals with enough cash to buy, Irwin (2013). 
Reducing income inequality may be one of a few goals which Federal Reserve agrees to. 
However, the post-financial crisis period has seen the re-emergence of inequality as a major 
macroeconomic risk. As a result, the link between monetary policy and income inequality 
has been a subject of great debate particularly within the financial press. 
The potential reaction of monetary policy to income inequality has been largely 
ignored in mainstream economics literature. Most of the empirical studies see- Powers 
(1995), Dollar and Kraay (2000), Mocan (1999), Romer and Romer (1998) amongst others, 
                                                          
33
 Irwin (2013) argues that the Fed’s policies, including the purchase of $85 billion in bonds each month using 
newly created money are directly targeted at housing. According to him, $40 billion of those purchases are of 
mortgage-backed securities, which imply that the money is being channelled directly to the housing market. 
Irwin posits that a second implication/consequence of Fed’s easing is to boost the prices of other assets, 
including stock prices. He maintains that these channels through which monetary policy affects the economy 
tend to benefit those with high income and wealth. 
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on monetary policy and income distribution have focused on the indirect effects of policy on 
income inequality via the inflation or unemployment channels none of these studies have 
analyzed how monetary policy responds to changes in personal income distribution directly. 
Two outstanding exceptions are the studies by Coibion et al (2012) they were interested in 
studying whether U.S monetary policy has significantly contributed to changes in 
consumption and income inequality and the study of Galbraith, Giovannaoni and Russo 
(2007) that relied on the term structure of interest rates as a measure of exogenous policy 
actions to quantify the effects of monetary policy on earnings inequality. 
 The study of Coibion et al (2012) provided documented evidence that suggested that 
contractionary monetary policy shock raises the observed inequality across households 
income, labour, earnings, expenditures and consumption, with the effects being largest for 
expenditure inequality. They therefore, concluded that monetary policy has played a major 
role in driving recent historical inequality patterns in the U.S. Galbraith, Giovannaoni and 
Russo (2007) on the other hand found that pay or earnings inequality in manufacturing 
reacts to the term structure, and therefore, partly to the rate-setting decisions of the Federal 
Reserve. They concluded that inequality is a direct product of monetary policy choices and 
that it is not outside the scope of the issues with which the Federal Reserve must deal.  
The present study seeks to close the gap in literature by analyzing the reaction of 
monetary policy to income inequality. To that effect this chapter used a forward looking 
Taylor rule model to examine empirically the reaction of monetary policy on income 
inequality measured using the Gini index of inequality, income share going to the top 1 
percent income earners and 90/10 income differentials. Our principal innovation to the 
standard Taylor rule specification is the inclusion of the three measures of income 
inequality. This allows us to determine whether there is any evidence that the Federal 
Reserve has reacted to changes in income inequality as well as the nature of this reaction 
(whether it is symmetric or asymmetrical).  Providing empirical answers to these questions 
has significant implications to policy makers. This will help monetary authorities in 
understanding how shifts in policy stance affect income inequality. 
 
2.1 Measures of income distribution 
The two broad measures of income distribution are – the functional distribution of 
income and the personal distribution of income. The functional distribution of income 
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examines the distribution between the main factors of production (labour and capital)34, 
Giovannoni (2010). The functional distribution of income shows the shares of wages and 
salaries (labour income) and profits, interest and rents (capital income). This measure also 
shows the sources of primary income earned through participation in economic activity. 
From a neo-classical perspective, each factor of production is rewarded according to its 
marginal productivity, International Labour Organization (2008). Consequently, shift in 
labour income share to capital income are explained as the result of either changes in factor 
productivity or as a result of changes in the labour/capital ratio used in production. In other 
words, labour shares will decline if production becomes more capital-intensive.  
However, many economists including, Krueger (1999), Diwan (2001), Bentolia and 
Saint-Paul (2003) Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) have challenged this assumption 
arguing that it provides a simplistic explanation for the failing labour share and that it 
ignores other important determinants. Explaining shifts from labour income to capital 
income from the neo-classical perspective seems to be contrary to the conventional wisdom 
in economics which suggests that the functional distribution of income is to some extent 
empirically stable, although there are variations in the explanations of the causes of this 
stability, Kramer (2010). Kaldor (1961) provided stylized facts that confirm this long-run 
stability.  However, modern Keynesian/Kaleckian theories suggest that functional income 
distribution strongly depends on political and economic factors. 
The second measure is that of personal distribution of income. This refers to the 
distribution of income among households or individuals, irrespective of the source of the 
income, Giovannoni (2010). Income can accrue to a household or an individual from both 
labour activity and capital revenues, as well as from pensions and other transfers from the 
government, Serrano (2007). In the United States changes in the share of the top income 
earners have been large enough to affect overall personal inequality in a massive way. 
According to Giovannoni (2010), the total increase of the GINI coefficient of about 8 points 
can be explained by the rise in the share of the top 1 percent alone.  His study showed that 
GINI inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes. Krugman 
(2012) provided corroborative evidence to this finding in his recent book ‘End This 
                                                          
34
 The labour share measures compensation which include benefits, pension and labour part of self-
employment while the capital share covers interest, rent, business payments and the capital share of self-
employment income, dividends and other realized investment returns such as capital gains, Giovannoni 
(2010). 
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Depression Now’ in which he argued that the top 1 percent income earners accounts for 
approximately half of the increase in the GINI coefficient during the 1980s and 2000. 
 
2.1.1 Functional and personal income distribution 
Recent evidence in the functional distribution of income suggests a significant 
decline in the share of labour in the national income in most advanced countries since the 
1980s, Guerriero and Kunal (2012). Consequently, adequate attention should be paid to the 
distributional consequences of shifts in factor shares because of its role in promoting overall 
income inequality. Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) documented the link between labour 
share and capital share of income in the national income. According to them, when falling 
labour shares are accompanied by a corresponding increase in the capital shares, then it is 
the owners of capital who will benefit from such a shift. Given that capital incomes are far 
more concentrated than incomes from labour, overall income inequality tends to increase 
when incomes from capital grow at the expense of labour incomes.  
To get a handle on the functional distribution of income, it is instructive to look at 
how the two components of labour and capital are measured and defined. Both labour and 
capital contribute to the production of goods and services in an economy; therefore, each 
will be compensated with income in return.  By definition, the labour share shows how 
much of the national income accrues to labour, International Labour Organization (2008). It 
is generally calculated as the ratio of total compensation of employees (wages and salaries 
before taxes as well as employer’s social contribution) over a product or income aggregate 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI).  
The stability of labour share has been a major foundation in macroeconomic models 
at least since the work of Kaldor (1957) indicating that workers participate fully to economic 
development. The idea is that as industrial economies became more prosperous, the total 
incomes both of workers and capital owners will grow at almost exactly the same rate 
therefore; the division of national income between labour and capital will remain constant 
over a prolonged period of time with little fluctuations. This was the case during much of the 
past century which made the subject of functional distribution of income of little importance 
in academic research. However, research has shown that labour shares are subject to 
substantial change overtime.  
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In a panel study done by Harrison (2005) for a sample of over 100 countries, she 
found that before 1993, labour’s share in national income fell on average by 1 percentage 
point per decade in poorer countries, however, this rate increased to 3 percentage points per 
decade after 1993. For advanced countries she showed that labour share grew by 2 
percentage points per decade before 1993 but then fell 4 percentage points per decade. 
Diwan (2001) provided evidence of this negative trend in labour shares in his study in which 
he disaggregated trends by regions instead of just by broad income groupings as was done 
by Harrison (2005). By his account, labour shares have been falling since the late 1970s in 
most OECD countries; since the early 1980s in Latin America and since the mid 1970s in 
Africa. 
In the U.S for instance, the share of labour income fell by 5 percentage points or 
more between 1980 and 2006-2007 before the global financial crisis. One of the major 
causes of the declining labour share and rising share of capital in the United States has been 
the growing dominance of the financial sector over the real sector of the economy as well as 
changes in corporate governance that is aimed at maximizing shareholder value, (the so 
called financialization), Milberg and Winkler (2007) and Palley (2007). Other determinants 
of failing labour share includes: technological changes, globalization, reductions in the 
bargaining power of labour amongst others, Guerriero and Kunal (2012). Research from the 
International Institute for Labour Studies (2011) revealed that the declining labour share in 
the national income have not been uniform across workers with different levels of education 
and skills. Studies on advanced economies that have disaggregated total labour 
compensation by categories of workers found that the declines in labour shares were driven 
by the falling labour shares of low and medium-skilled workers.  
The study found that the labour share in ten developed economies that were studied 
fell by 12 percentage points for low-skilled workers between 1980s and 2005, while it 
increased by 7 percentage points for highly skilled workers. According to this report, 
removing the compensation of the top 1 percent income earners will lead to a massive drop 
of the labour share, showing the sharp increase in wages and salaries (including bonuses and 
exercised stock options) of top executives within the top income distribution in the U.S and 
other English speaking countries. We will explain albeit briefly several theories that have 
been advanced in the literature to explain the fall in labour share. The three potential 
explanations are examined in turn below: 
 
53 
 
Technological change: Mainstream neoclassical economic model argues that wages 
are at least partially determined by labour productivity, i.e. the contribution of workers to 
output, while capitals are partially determined by the contribution that capital goods make to 
output. The neoclassical model used “capital augmenting” theory to explain the 
redistribution of labour income to capital income. The theory posit that a shift from labour to 
capital would result if technological change is capital augmenting that is if technological 
change improves productivity of capital more than it does that of labour-the implications 
would be a fall in labour share and an increase in wage share other things being equal. A 
fundamental flaw with this theory however, comes from the concept of “joint production”. 
The fact that most goods are produced by labour in combination with capital makes it 
difficult to determine the marginal contribution of labour and capital to output, Reed and 
Himmelweit (2010). The significance of technical change in explaining changes in U.S wage 
structure is a source of continuing debate, see- Lemieux (2006), Autor,Katz and Kearney 
(2008), Acemoglu and Autor (2012) for recent studies. The same logic is used to explain 
increase in inequality as being the result of ‘skill-biased technological change’. The 
narrative suggests that skilled workers are now relatively more productive relative to 
unskilled workers because of technological advancement; as a result, they command high 
wages, Autor et al (1999) and Card diNardo (2002).35 
Globalization: Another widely cited reason for falling labour share in many 
mainstream economic analysis has been the globalization of economic activity. Two major 
consequences of globalization has been the liberalization of product markets and increased 
mobility of capital across national borders which mean that firms can bid down wages by 
threatening to relocate production elsewhere. Another consequence of globalization that is 
advanced in theoretical literature is increased wage competition from low-wage high-skill 
economies like China and India, leading to pressure on wages in advanced economies and 
outsourcing of employment to developing economies, Rodrik (1997) and Onaran (2011).  
 Researchers often link international trade to the decline in relative wages for less 
skilled workers in most advanced economies. Economic theory suggests that international 
trade affects the prices of products in both exporting and importing countries and this also 
affects the price of labour- i.e. wages within countries by influencing the demand for labour. 
                                                          
35
 Both authors linked advancement in technology as a major contributor to increased wage inequality in the 
U.S from 1970s to the 1990s. 
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Changes in product prices as a result of competition from imports will alter the profit 
opportunities facing firms. Firms will therefore, respond by moving resources to industries 
in which profitability has risen and away from those in which it has fallen. Trade flows will 
result in a shift in the demand for labour if more workers are needed in newly profitable 
sectors. If labour supply is fixed, these demand changes will lead to an increase in wages 
given that workers will demand a premium for switching into more profitable industries, 
Slaughter and Swagel (1997). 
Financialization: Recent studies on the decline of labour share of national income 
have linked it to financialization loosely defined as the dominance of the financial sector 
over the real sector, Palley (2007). According to Karanassou and Sala (2012) this dominance 
has an impact on the functional distribution of income between labour and capital, since 
financialization made it possible for firms to invest in financial assets as an alternative to 
investment in productive capital. In addition, financialization led to the increase in 
shareholder value orientation which encouraged ‘short termism’ as managers were more 
interested in increasing the stock prices of their firm. It also led to the expansion of 
executive compensation which exacerbated income inequality.  The authors in their 
empirical study of the distributional consequences of  capital accumulation, globalization 
and financialization in the U.S argues that financialization does not influence functional 
distribution of income but instead has a direct impact on personal income. By their own 
account, financialization factor explains 83.3 percent of the increase in the GINI index 
during the 1997-2001 intervals.  
There seems to be no unanimous agreement on the relative importance of each 
explanatory factors mentioned above. Recent attempt to quantify the relative contribution of 
the different explanatory factors in explaining the fall in labour share have yielded mixed 
results. For instance a study done by the European Commission in 2008 and International 
Monetary Fund IMF in the same year revealed that technological change and globalization 
of trade and production has been the main contributors to falling labour share in the U.S and 
other OECD countries. These studies provided evidence which seems to suggest that the 
impact of changes in labour market institutions have a minor role in explaining this trend.  
In a recent panel analysis for the determinants of declining labour share for advanced 
economies, Stockhammer (2012) finds financialization to be a major culprit, although the 
study found globalization and reductions in labour bargaining power as important 
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contributors, it however, found technological effect to be marginally significant. To 
summarize, despite the fact that mainstream economists tend to favour technological change 
as the main explanation of the falling wage share, empirical evidence on this is still 
inconclusive, one thing that is clear from the literature is that falling labour share is an 
important channel of increasing income inequality.   
Another major contributor to the increasing income inequality particularly in the 
United States has been changes in the income share accruing to the top income earners. 
These changes in the share of the top income earners have been large enough to affect 
overall personal income inequality quite significantly. According to a report by Levine 
(2012) during the periods 1979-2006, about 91% of all income growth in the U.S went to the 
top 10% of income groups. Within the same period, the highest paid 1 percent of the U.S 
population more than doubled their share of total income from about 10 percent to almost 23 
percent. However, ‘the average real incomes for the bottom 90 percent of Americans over 
the periods 1973 to 2002 fell by 9 percent’ Piketty and Saez (2006). Levine (2012) opined 
that more than a quarter of all American workers in 2007 were earning poverty-level wages.  
 
2.2 Changing trends in income inequality in the U.S. 
The focus of this section is to provide a detailed analysis of the trends in the 
distribution of household income from 1963 to 2010 using data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and other sources. The levels of inequality that is been witnessed in the U.S. and 
some other industrialized economies are in fact economically damaging and could inhibit 
economic growth. This is because concentration of wealth and capital within few hands 
depresses demand, a point that Rajan (2010) used in analyzing the link between income 
inequality and financial crisis.  
There seems to be some consensus amongst scholars that income inequality in the 
United States is at historic highs, the income gap between the rich and the poor has been on 
the increase since the early 1980s. Some studies provided estimates which suggest that the 
top 1% of Americans hold nearly 50% of the wealth which is much greater than the levels 
witnessed before the Great Depression in the 1920s, Davies et al (2009), and Keister (2000).  
A substantial downward swing in inequality was witnessed in the U.S in the 1920s; 
however, since then the United States have become much more unequal Milanovic (2011). 
As was noted by Milanovic the real per capital income in the U.S was 65 percent above its 
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1980s level and inequality within the same period increased from about 35 to 40 or more 
Gini points; reflecting a significant adverse movement in income distributions.  
A 2011 analysis by the U.S Congressional budget office showed that the dispersion 
of household income rose somewhat consistently between 1979 through 2007 with the 
exception of 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions. The income share going to the top 1 percent 
income earners has accelerated following the 2007-08 financial crises. Both national and 
world leaders are now interested in finding a genuine solution to the increasing income 
disparity between the rich and the poor because they have seen that extreme income 
inequality can be economically inefficient, politically corrosive and socially divisive. This 
underscores the importance of the current empirical analysis. 
The American society has even been more unequal when it comes to wealth, 
Heathcote et al (2010). The study of Piketty and Saez (2006) reveals that wealthiest 1 
percent of Americans increased their share of corporate wealth from 38.7% to 57.5% 
between 1991 and 2003. The concentration of wealth at the top also experienced growth 
during 1962-2004, this period saw the wealth of the bottom 80 percent of the population 
decreased from 19.1% to 15.3% and this wealth was shifted to the wealthiest 5% of the 
population Piketty and Saez (2006). In addition, the Congressional Budget Office (2011) 
reports that about one in six households have no net wealth at all and nearly one-third of 
households (30%) have a net worth under $10,000. Since 1979-2007 there has been a 
widening inequality between wages and profits in the U.S economy, real output per hour 
increased by 1.91 percent while the real average hourly earnings of non-supervisory workers 
fell by 0.04 percent. This implies that there has been a transfer of income from labour to 
capital. Similarly, real profits in the corporate sector within the same period increased by 
4.6% while real employee compensation grew by only 2% Congressional Budget Office 
(2011). 
There is no single answer behind this increase in income inequality. The 2007 
Economic Report of the former President of United States George Bush categorized some of 
the possible explanation for the observed increase in income inequality into three broad 
groups namely, “supply side factors, demand-side factors and institutional factors”. Both the 
supply and demand side factors can be explained by a simple model of the labour market 
that rewards higher skilled workers more than less skilled workers. From this perspective, 
supply side factors can generate an increase in inequality if they bring about an outward shift 
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in the supply curve in the market for less skilled workers relatively more than the supply 
curve in the market for more skilled workers. Such shifts as shown in figure 2.1 have the 
tendency of making wages fall by a greater amount in the less skilled labour market than in 
the more skilled labour market, thus increasing inequality. 
 
Figures 2.1: Increasing inequality may occur because of shifts in the supply 
curve in the less-skilled and more skilled labour market 
 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2007) 
 
This disproportionate supply shift in the labour market has been largely attributed to 
the increasing numbers of immigrants in the labour market as well as women who have less 
work experience than their male counterpart. Similarly, the demand side factors will 
influence the relative wages of more and less skilled workers if they caused the demand 
curve in the market for more skilled workers to shift outward by more than that in the 
market for less skilled workers. These changes would inadvertently increase wages in the 
more skilled labour market, as shown in figure 2.2 increasing inequality.  
 
Figures 2.2: increasing inequality may occur because of shifts in the demand  
curve in the less-skilled and more skilled labour market 
 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2007) 
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Some possible explanations for this sort of asymmetry in the labour is the so called 
“skilled-biased technological change” Bound and Johnson (1992), Acemogl (2002) or 
“college Premium”. Other factors include institutional arrangements within the labour 
market, such as the reducing influence of unions, Card (2001) and a reduction in the real 
value of the minimum wage. These two factors have led to lower returns for workers in the 
lower tail of the earnings distribution. Strong unions have in the past provided wage 
premiums to such workers. Trade liberalization, demographic shifts, rising immigration 
amongst others have also been sighted as some possible causes of the increasing income 
inequality, Feenstra and Hanson (2008), however, the relative importance of each of these 
factors could be difficult to determine precisely.  
Politicians saw the distributional issues within the United States as a means of 
gaining political popularity; hence the problem of wage inequality became somewhat 
bipartisan. The debate on the appropriate response to the widening income inequality in the 
United States is a source of concern to both politicians and Central bankers alike. In the 
words of Alan Greenspan the former Federal Reserve chairman in Neckerman (2004), “you 
cannot have a market capitalist system if there is a significant mood in the population that its 
rewards are unjustly distributed” More recently, politicians and political office holders have 
continued to echo their concerns about the insidious problem of income inequality. 
 For instance in 2006 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson; was quoted as saying 
that the benefits of strong economic expansion in the U.S. has been skewed in favour of the 
rich. According to him, many Americans do not see significant increases in their take-home 
pay. Their increases in wages are being wiped out by high energy prices and increasing 
health-care costs, amongst others –; Remarks at Columbia University; August 1, 2006 in 
Bartels (2008).  
Similarly, the former president of America George W Bush in one of his State of the 
Economy Reports Jan. 31 2007 acknowledged the problem of income inequality as a major 
concern within his administration and the seeming confusion with regards to how to tackle 
it. According to him; some of American citizens worry about the fact that the economy is 
leaving working people behind. The president acknowledged that the state have an 
obligation to help ensure that every citizen shares in the country's future. Politicians in the 
U.S. admit the fact that income inequality is real; and it's been rising for more than 25 years. 
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The question according to President Bush is whether the authorities should respond to 
income inequality with policies that help lift people up, or tear others down.  
More recently, members of the World Economic Forum in a 2012 survey maintains 
that the widening economic disparities between the rich and the rest is one of the two main 
global risks over the next decade alongside the reduction in global governance. From 
looking at all these narrative evidences, it is quite clear that the government has been highly 
concerned over the continuing increase in income inequality since the 1980s; however, the 
challenge for policy makers has been on the right policy tools that can be employed in other 
to reduce its negative impact. While some level of income inequality might be helpful 
because it can signal stronger rewards to work, innovation and creativity which will 
inadvertently improve the economic prospects of both the rich and the poor; high levels of 
income dispersion may be both socially and economically harmful.  
A plethora of narrative evidence seems to support the notion that social conflicts are 
always on the increase when inequalities are seen to be increasing significantly, Stiglitz 
(2012) and Norton et al (2011). Indeed, economic researchers and commentators are of the 
opinion that the widening of income inequalities that occurred prior to the 2007-2009 
financial crises was one of the root causes of the crisis Rajan (2010). In the next section we 
will look at how income inequality has been widening in the U.S with particular emphasis to 
the share of national income going to the top income households. 
 
2.2.1 Evolution of top and middle-class income in the U.S: 
A striking feature of the income36 dispersion data reveals that the top-half 
inequality37 has witnessed a somewhat steady upward trend while the bottom-half inequality 
has stagnated over the 40 year period. The shares of aggregate household income separate 
households into income percentiles and estimate the share of income received by each 
percentile. Inequality will be said to be on the increase if the share of income going to the 
lowest percentiles is decreasing while the share of income going to the highest percentiles is 
increasing. While the average incomes of the richest households in the U.S have witnessed a 
                                                          
36
 Household income comprises primarily of wages and salaries and also includes income from self-
employment, interest, dividends, rentals, retirement and government transfers US Census Bureau (2011). 
37
 The top-half inequality refers to the 95/50 inter-percentile ratio while the bottom half inequality refers to 
the 50/20 inter-percentile ratio. 
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steady increase, the middle-class households have dwindled or at best remained stagnant- 
(see figure 2.3 decomposition of income dispersion by percentile).  
 
Figure 2.3 Decomposition of income dispersion by percentile 1967-2010 
 
Data sourced from U.S Census Bureau (2011) 
 
Figure 2.3 reveals that the income of the 95th, 90th and 80th percentiles have been in 
some sort of an upward trend during the period under review while that of the 50th, 20th and 
10th percentiles have largely remained somewhat stagnant. In addition, figure 2.4 (Gini 
index of inequality) also shows an upward trend starting from the 1970s. Between 1967 and 
2008, the average household income that accrued to the Top percentile rose from 43.6 
percent to 50.3 percent while the share of aggregate household income received by the 
bottom and middle income percentile has decreased from 4.0 percent to 3.1 percent and 17.3 
to 14.7 percent respectively within the same period.  
 
Figure 2.4 Gini index of inequality 1970 to 2010 
 
 Data sourced from U.S Census Bureau (2011) 
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An analysis of the income distribution by percentiles reveals that in 1967, the 95th 
percentile of household income was approximately 2.67 times higher than the 50th 
percentile; by 2005 it was 3.58 times higher. This was a period of rapid economic growth 
and strong job creation in America and elsewhere, however, the economic benefits from 
these expansionary periods benefited the top-income groups more than their medium and 
low income counterparts. The top income percentile received vastly more income than the 
households in the bottom percentile.   Much of the increase in income inequality was driven 
by the share of total income that went to the richest 1 percent of households.  
An examination of the share of total market income going to the top deciles (Figure 
2.5: Top deciles income share)  showed that the total income going to this group of income 
earners was as large as 48% during the period leading to the 1930s great depression. The top 
deciles income share fell rapidly during the 1930s and remained stable below 35% between 
the 1940s-1970s. It started to increase gradually since the early 1980s and is now close to 
the 50% levels that were observed during the 1920s before the Great Depression.  This 
implies that about 50% of the total income in the U.S is absorbed by the top deciles.  
 
Figure 2.5: Top deciles income share excluding capital gain 1920 to 2010 
 
Data sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez  (2009) updated 
 
One can argue that the evolution of income inequality in American has been largely 
driven by the trends at the very top of the income distribution, as households at the upper 
spectrum of the income distribution have continued to accrue a larger share of the nation’s 
total income. The 2007-2008 recessions seem not to have reversed the long run trend in the 
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top deciles income share. Although (figure 2.5 Top deciles income share) revealed a sharp 
decrease in the share of income going to the top deciles at the peak of the global financial 
crisis 2008-2009, this fall was followed by a strong rebound since 2009. This rebound seems 
consistent with the experience of the previous economic downturn. For example the income 
share of the top 10% fell between 2001 and 2002 economic downturn in the U.S this fall 
was followed by a rapid recovery to the previous trend in 2003-2007. The growing trend in 
income inequality can also be seen when we examine trends in real income growth per 
family between the top 1 percent and bottom 99 percent from 1993 to 2008 as is shown in 
Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1 Real annual income growth by groups 1993-2008 
 
(1) 
Real annual 
growth average 
income 
      (2) 
Real annual 
growth top 
1% incomes 
 
(3) 
Real annual growth 
bottom 99% incomes 
(4) 
Fraction of total 
growth or (loss) 
captured by  Top 1% 
Full Period 
1993-2008 
1.30% 3.94% 0.75% 52% 
2001 Recession, 
2000-2002 
-6.0% -16.8% -3.3% 57% 
Great Recession 
2007-2008 
-9.9% -19.7% -6.9% 47% 
Data sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2009) 
 
For instance from 1993 to 2008, average real family income grew by an annual 
growth rate of 1.3 percent but 52 percent of that growth accrued to the top 1 percent while 
48 percent of that growth went to the bottom 99 percent of US families. The drop on the 
income growth of the top 1 percent was largely as a result of the global financial crisis.  
Piketty and Saez (2008) noted that prior to the crisis from 2002 to 2007 average real family 
incomes grew by 3.0 percent annually; however, a whopping 65 percent of that growth was 
amassed by the top 1 percent while only 35 percent went to the bottom 99 percent, thus 
substantiating the fact that the top 1 percent of income earners captured more than half of the 
economic benefits of that period.  
The top 1 percent income earners were not penalized during the 2007-2008 great 
recession as much as they gained during the economic growth that ended in 2007, although 
they absorbed more loss than the low income earners. Table 2.1 shows that the average real 
family incomes contracted by 9.9% during the great recession and the top 1 percent 
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absorbed only 47% of that contraction. Finally, it is important to observe the changes in the 
composition of income for the top income earners in the U.S (see figure 2.6 income 
composition of top 1%).   
 
Figure 2.6 Income composition of top 1 percent 1917-2010 
 
Data sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2009) updated 
 
The composition of incomes for this group of households has changed between 1929 
and 2007. In both years the share of wage income which comprises salaries, bonuses, 
pensions and exercised stock options has continued to be on the increase surpassing that of 
capital income that includes rent, dividends and interest. A closer analysis of income 
composition of the top 1 percent reveals a rapid increase in entrepreneurial income (made up 
of business income as well as income from partnerships and corporations) since the early 
1940s up until the early 1950s. This was followed by a significant decrease in income from 
this source and it has remained low when compared to that of wage income. Much of the 
increase in wage income came from the different forms of bonuses both cash and stock 
options amongst others given to high performing executives who form majority of 
individuals that belong to the top 1 percent income group. 
 
2.3 The income-redistributive transmission channels: 
In this section we analyzed the different channels through which monetary policy can 
affect income inequality. There are, in principle, a number of different ways through which 
changes in monetary policy can affect income distribution both in the short and long run. 
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The impact of monetary policy on income distribution in the short run can be seen through 
the cycle in economic activity generated by the policy change and in the long run via 
changes in inflation reached at the end of the adjustment period. Furthermore, the stock 
market channel is another important channel through which monetary policy can affect 
household distribution of income. Economists posit that restrictive monetary policy leads to 
lower stock prices because of the increase in the discount rate used by market participants, 
Crowder (2006). In addition, stocks underperform during tight monetary policy periods, as 
higher interest rates restrict risk appetite and make it relatively expensive to buy stocks on 
margin.  
 Furthermore, portfolio substitution implies that investors/consumers tend to trim 
down the equity component of their portfolios in an environment of restrictive monetary 
policy in order to lock in higher rates on term deposits. Higher deposit rates induce 
investors/consumers to save rather than invest in relatively risky assets such as stocks and 
real estate, the effect of both portfolio substitution and high margin lending is depressing 
stock prices. To the extent that stock prices reduces in the short term as a result of restrictive 
monetary policy38, lower stock prices will reduce the capital gain income that accrues to 
high income earners since stock ownership tend to concentrate within the high income 
brackets thus a reduction in inequality.  
Contractionary monetary policy shocks affect income distribution through other 
different channels. First, the decrease in economic growth, aggregate income and 
employment as a result of increase in interest rates will exacerbate income inequality. In an 
open flexible exchange rate economy, the output and employment loss is reinforced by a real 
appreciation which adds to unemployment. Since unemployment tend to affect mostly low-
skilled workers since hiring and firing costs are generally higher for skilled than un-skilled 
workers, this makes inequality to increase in the short run39. The degree of increasing 
                                                          
38
 There is typically a substantial lag between the time that Federal Reserve commences tightening monetary 
policy and when equity prices falls. For instance the Federal Reserve began raising short-term interest rates in 
June 2003, U.S equities continued on an upward momentum until October 2007 almost 3 years. The lag effect 
was attributed to investor confidence that the economy was growing strongly enough for corporate earnings 
to absorb the impact of higher interest rates in the early stages of tightening while others attribute this to 
monetary policy asymmetry. The asymmetry school of thought implies that the Fed although started 
monetary tightening, did not raise interest rates high enough to curb the increases in stock prices as they 
would cut rates in the event of a recession. 
39
 In addition, the real appreciation distributes its effects on employment disproportionately among different 
sectors, mostly affecting export industries. The impact on income distribution will depend on the relative 
concentration of low-skilled labour in export industries. 
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income inequality will depend on the sensitivity of investment and consumption to higher 
interest rate and lower expected demand as well as on the elasticity of employment to output 
fluctuations amongst others. 
The increase in unemployment can be exacerbated by the presence of downward 
nominal wage rigidities, thereby making the slowdown in nominal wage rises to lag behind 
the reduction in inflation orchestrated by the monetary restriction, Leidy and Tokarick 
(1998). Given that unemployment is likely to affect low-skilled workers more than their 
highly skilled counterparts; this will further deteriorate the impact of monetary restriction on 
inequality. Another way through which monetary policy can affect income distribution is 
through the real interest rates channel at least in the short run. Given that a reduction in the 
money supply growth leads to an increase in both nominal and real interest rates, the 
increase in real interest rate will tend to make the net borrowers worse off and the net 
lenders better off, augmenting income inequality since there are more net lenders at the top 
than at the bottom of the income distribution. The worsening effect of the real interest rate 
channel on income inequality is stronger if financial institutions are more prompt to raise 
loan rates than deposit rates, Atkinson (1999).  
In the short run, restrictive monetary policy seems to have predominantly worsening 
effect on inequality. Expansionary monetary shocks will also lead to an increase in income 
inequality if it results to high inflation. This is because, high levels of inflation can erode the 
purchasing power of money and this can affect income distribution in different ways. 
According to Ferreira et al (1999), low income earners are less likely to protect their living 
standards from inflationary shocks than high income earners because of the existence of 
entry barriers in most non-money financial markets. In addition, these groups of income 
earners hold significant proportion of their wealth in cash, thus exposing them 
disproportionately to purchasing power erosion by inflation. On the other hand, restrictive 
monetary policy that results to lower inflation in the long run can improve income 
distribution by slowing down the erosion of monetary financial assets and the real value of 
non-indexed public transfers such as unemployment benefits and pensions. Since transfer 
recipients are typically low income earners this would reduce inequality. 
Furthermore, in the short run, some tension can exist between the dual mandate of 
price stability and maximum output growth and employment. For instance, in a situation 
where there is an upward pressure on prices accompanied by a slowing output and 
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employment- especially when an adverse supply shock, such as spike in energy prices, has 
occurred, an attempt to restrain inflation pressure could compound the weakness in the 
economy or an attempt to reduce employment losses could aggravate inflation. In such 
situations, monetary authorities are faced with a dilemma and must decide whether to focus 
on reducing price pressures or cushioning loss of employment and output. Also, the 
possibility that an expectation of increasing inflation might get built into decisions about 
prices and wages, could add to the inflation inertia thus, making it more difficult to achieve 
price stability. 
In other words, reducing inflationary pressure via a restrictive policy stance can 
result in slowing of employment, and moving to counter the weakening of the labour market 
by easing monetary policy stance can result to high levels of inflation. Consequently, the use 
of monetary policy to actively manage aggregate demand and maintain macroeconomic 
equilibrium has some important distributional implications. For instance, the Fed can 
stimulate demand via monetary policy with very low interest rates; however, very low 
interest rates may worsen the distribution of income if they lead to low or negative real 
returns for a large number of savers. Also, low policy interest rate environment can reduce 
the cost of borrowing for companies- which are owned disproportionately by relatively 
wealthy individuals so companies can borrow at zero real rates and invest at much higher 
returns.  
 The Austrian economists have identified some channels through which changes in 
monetary policy can affect income inequality. Three of these channels namely; income 
composition channel, financial segmentation channel and portfolio channel tend to push 
inequality in the same direction in response to expansionary monetary policy while the other 
two are somewhat ambiguous in their response. According to the Austrian perspective the 
first channel- the income composition channel is based on the idea of income heterogeneity 
across households with regards to their primary sources of income. Given that majority of 
households rely primarily on income from labour while others get larger shares of their 
income from business and financial investments, an expansionary monetary policy shocks 
that raise profits more than wages will tend to benefit disproportionately households with 
claims to ownership of firms thus leading to higher inequality in response to monetary 
policy shifts.  
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The second channel, the financial segmentation channel is developed on the premise 
that economic agents that trade in financial markets are more likely to be affected by 
changes in the money supply before other agents; therefore, an increase in money supply 
will redistribute income toward those agents that are connected to financial markets, 
Williamson (2009).  This channel also implies that income inequality should increase after 
expansionary monetary policy shocks, since households that trade in the financial markets 
have higher income on average than households that are unconnected with the financial 
markets. An additional channel pushing the response of inequality to monetary policy in the 
same direction is the portfolio channel. The portfolio channel implies that high income 
households, with large concentration of financial assets gain more from asset market booms 
orchestrated by expansionary monetary policy. 
There are two additional channels that will tend to move inequality in the opposite 
direction in response to expansionary monetary policy shifts. The first channel as was noted 
by Doepke and Schneider (2006) is the so called savings redistribution channel. According 
to this channel, an unanticipated increase in interest rates or reduction in inflation will 
benefit savers more than borrowers thus bringing about an increase in consumption 
inequality to the extent that savers are wealthier than borrowers.  
On the other hand, an expansionary policy action that involves a reduction of official 
policy interest rates or relaxation of credit controls will benefit borrowers more than savers 
to the extent that low income households can meet the credit standards thereby reducing 
inequality. Secondly, the income composition channel might lead to a reduction in 
inequality after an expansionary monetary policy. This is because low-income households 
receive a large portion of their income from transfers including unemployment benefits, 
food stamps amongst others than high-income households and given that transfers tend to be 
countercyclical, this component of income heterogeneity could lead to reduced income 
inequality after expansionary policy shocks Coibion et al (2012).   
Our discussions thus far reveal that the impact of monetary policy on income 
inequality is at best ambiguous. This is because the effects of policy shifts on top and low 
income earners depend on the channels through which the policy shift affects inflation, 
savings, borrowing, changes in asset prices as well as investments.  Having said that, a 
crucial question is whether it is optimal for monetary policy to target income inequality 
directly. A good place to start providing answers to this question is by defining a target for 
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income distribution which will be- the reduction of the income gap between the highest and 
the lowest income earners as well as the maintenance of the living standards of the poor. 
Given these two income distribution targets; the next important question is whether the 
current monetary policy instrument will be able to achieve these targets. We argue in favour 
of the use of monetary policy to target asset price misalignments which have profound 
implications to the income of high income earners40 while fiscal and financial sector policies 
can be used directly to narrow the income distribution. 
From the fiscal policy perspective, policy makers can use the progressive income tax 
scale and the use of transfer payments the so called “automatic stabilizers41” in the budget to 
narrow the income gap between those at the highest and lowest ends of the income spectrum 
as well as help the poor to achieve a minimum standard of living. The use of fiscal policy to 
target income inequality does have an advantage over monetary policy in the sense that 
increased government spending leads to an immediate increase in aggregate demand. 
Bastagli, Coady and Gupta (2012) showed that fiscal policy can influence income 
distribution directly through its effect on current disposable income and indirectly through 
its effect on future earnings capacities. This was corroborated by a United Nations report on 
trade and development (2012) that concluded that fiscal policy provides the main 
instruments for influencing income distribution.  
From the financial policy perspective, well functioning financial systems are critical 
in channelling funds to the most productive uses and in allocating risks to those who are 
well suited to bear them, hence improving opportunities and income distribution as well as 
reducing poverty.  Consequently, improving access and developing inclusive financial 
system should be a major focus of all economies at all levels of development. However, 
financial market imperfections limit access to finance thus, making the benefits of financial 
development to elude agents from low income households and small firms; thereby leaving 
much of the populations in absolute poverty. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) have argued 
that implementing financial sector policies that are targeted at reducing financial market 
                                                          
40
 The effect of asset price changes on the income distribution is examined in detail in the next chapter. 
41
 The U.S government can be able to directly affect the distribution of income through the use of 
discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers. Automatic stabilizers are structural features of 
government spending and taxation that smooth fluctuations in disposable income and hence consumption 
over the business cycle, Dolls et al (2012). In other words, automatic stabilizers are those elements of fiscal 
policy that reduce tax burdens and increase public spending without discretionary government action they 
provide income replacement immediately when unemployment starts to rise. Consequently, these stabilizers 
will increase budget deficits during times of recessions and decrease budget deficits during times of booms.  
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imperfections to expand individual opportunities will create positive incentive effects and 
reduce persistent inequality more than redistributive policies. We will analyse in greater 
details the reaction of income inequality to financial sector development in the final chapter 
of this thesis. 
 
2.4 Literature review on monetary policy, income inequality and financial crises 
The aim of this section is to provide a review of previous findings on monetary 
policy, income inequality and financial crisis. In the past, income distribution and monetary 
policy have been considered separately. However, the implementation of the Federal 
Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy stance at the peak of the financial crisis has re-
ignited the debate about the effects of monetary policy on the distribution of income and 
consumption across households. There is increasing evidence that monetary policy has 
distributional implications for income and wealth distribution. Coibion et al (2012), using 
standard deviations of log of Gini and the ratio of 90th percentile/10th percentile as 
measures of income inequality revealed that, in the United States, contractionary monetary 
policy systematically increases inequality in labour earnings and total income as well as 
expenditures and consumption inequality. According to them, monetary policy does not only 
explain fluctuation but also the rising trend in income inequality since the 1990s. 
Wong (2014) showed that monetary policy creates intergenerational inequality; he 
provided evidence that contractionary monetary policy increases inequality between young 
and old households in the U.S. In their own contribution, Brunnermeier and Sannikov 
(2012) argued that monetary policy can be used as a potent policy in reducing inequality 
after an adverse shock. The Bank of England (2012) in their analysis of the distributional 
consequences of unconventional monetary policy revealed that 40% of the wealth increase 
resulting from its asset purchase program benefited the top 5% wealthiest U.K households. 
In a related study but in a different jurisdiction, Saiki and Frost (2014) analyzed the effect of 
a decade of unconventional monetary policy in income inequality in Japan. They found that 
unconventional monetary policy led to an increase in income inequality, particularly after 
2008 when quantitative easing became more aggressive. According to them, this increase in 
inequality is largely driven in part through the portfolio transmission channel (where high 
income households, with large concentration of financial securities gain more from asset 
market booms orchestrated by expansionary monetary policy).  
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In addition, increasing inequality, whether generated by monetary policy, financial 
policy or by other factors, is of paramount concern to central banks’ policies. Kumhof et al 
(2013) posits that increasing income inequality, combined with rising household debt, can 
trigger financial crises. Financial crises pose great challenge to central banks, because such 
crises can distort their transmission mechanisms as well as price and financial stability.    
Although the adverse effects of financial crises on economic growth and poverty are well 
documented Birdsall (2005); and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2008), the fact that financial crises tend to worsen income distribution is less frequently 
considered. Income inequality literature suggests that income inequalities in most advanced 
countries have surged since the 1980s. The increase in income inequality is closely 
correlated with the increase in the incidence of financial crises over the same period, Stiglitz 
et al, (2009) and Rajan, (2010).  
Authors such as Cornia et al, (2004) and Woo, (2005) have shown that there may be 
a strong link between the rise in income inequality and the increasing frequency of domestic 
financial crises in some advanced economies. Kumhof and Ranciere, (2010) provided 
support for this view when they showed that income inequality can be traced to have played 
a role in the two major economic crises in the U.S namely; the Great Depression of 1929 and 
the Great Recession of 2007. According to them there were two remarkable similarities 
between the periods leading up to the two crises- sharp increase in income inequality, asset 
prices and household debt-to-income ratios.  
The inequality-financial crisis nexus can be categorized into two broad strands of 
literature namely- literatures that focused on whether increasing income inequality leads to 
financial crises, that is, does causality go from inequality to crises or vice versa and those 
that focused on how financial crises interact with the relationship between inequality and the 
business cycle, that is, do crises decrease/increase inequality. We will start our analysis by 
looking at recent literatures that tried to explain how income inequality can lead to financial 
fragility which could precipitate into a full blown crisis.  Increasing inequality in the U.S has 
been subjected under greater scrutiny since the 2007/08 crisis.  
The rising income gap between the rich and the poor has been suggested as one of 
the primary determinants of the global financial crisis. According to Stiglitiz et al, (2009), 
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), and Rajan (2010), the global financial crisis that started in the 
sub-prime mortgage market in the U.S has its roots in a structural change in income 
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distribution that had been going on for the past three decades. Inequality can contribute to 
financial fragility through several interrelated channels; for instance, increasing income and 
wealth inequality will reduce the purchasing power of households at the middle and lower 
spectrums of the income distribution.  
The consequence of this reduction in purchasing power from a macro-economic 
perspective is redistribution away from households with higher propensity to consume to 
households with a lower propensity to consume United Nations Development Programme 
(2011). The redistribution of income from the lowest earning 80 percent of income earners 
to the highest earning 20 percent over the past four decades meant that money was 
transferred from those who would spend it to meet basic needs to those who had more than 
they could easily spend. This scenario created a tendency toward reduction in the levels of 
aggregate effective demand Stiglitz et al (2009). To hem in the negative consequences of 
rising inequality, policy makers in most advanced economies pursued policies that made the 
financial system vulnerable to instability.  
According to Rajan (2010), policies such as loose monetary policy and legislations 
that manifested in easy credit for poor households and complex financial instruments 
coupled with the search for high-return investments by high income earners, who have 
benefited from the increase in inequality, led to the development of bubbles within the 
financial assets and real estate market. Galbraith et al (2007) opines that the declining real 
incomes and standards of living provided strong incentives for workers to borrow money 
against their homes in order to maintain their standards of living. In other words government 
felt that the only way to maintain high levels of consumption in the presence of stagnating 
income was for poor households to borrow, the so called ‘financing consumerism’.   
The economic hardship amongst the low income households provided an easy way 
for mortgage purveyors to entice people to borrow money against their homes, initially at 
low interest rates in order to meet up with their maturing debt obligations. Consequently, 
household debt in the US grew from 67 percent to about 92 percent of GDP between 1997 
and 2005. Reich (2010) showed that most of the sub-prime mortgage loans taken out 
between 2000 and 2007 were mainly by people who were refinancing their homes rather 
than for buying new homes. Rajan (2010) argued that easy credit became America’s 
substitute for decent wages. The implication of this was the creation of an economic 
environment filled with excessive liquidity. According to Reich (2010), the growth in 
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household credit and mortgage debt mirrors that of the late 1920s. Reich (2010) noted that 
the period between 1913 and 1928 saw the ratio of private credit to the total national 
economy at an all time high (nearly double) and total mortgage debt was almost three times 
higher in 1929 than in 1920, exactly the same scenario that was seen before the great 
recession. 
Overvaluation of net wealth and high asset prices created a false impression that high 
levels of both corporate and household debts were sustainable. Researchers have argued that 
the political response to income inequality helped in fuelling credit bubbles within the 
financial sector which precipitated to the real estate market, creating bubble whose eventual 
collapse led to mounting toxic loans in bank’s balance sheets and massive disruption of 
economic activities. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) model provided a good description of the 
inequality-financial crisis nexus. According to them, the financial crisis of 2007-08 was the 
result of a shock to the relative bargaining powers over income of two groups of households 
namely investors and workers. Investors accounted for 5 percent of the population with 
increasing bargaining power while workers accounted for 95% of the population with low 
bargaining power in their model. They noted that investors used part of their increasing 
income to buy financial assets which are backed by loans to workers.  
Their action allowed workers to limit the drop in consumption caused by loss of 
income, however, the increasing worker’s debt-to-income ratios brought about financial 
fragility that led to a financial crisis. A similar proposition was advanced by authors such as 
Reich (2010) and Rajan (2010) that analyzed the link between household debt, financial 
crisis and income inequality, their work emphasized the role that credit demand  or credit 
supply- see Fitoussi and Saraceno, (2010) played during the periods leading to the crisis. 
They argued that increased borrowing amongst the poor and middle class to maintain their 
level of consumption left the financial sector exposed to shocks. From a theoretical point of 
view, these authors seem to suggest that the widening income gaps between the high income 
earners and low income groups created wrong incentives which heightened the vulnerability 
of the financial system, since the massive borrowing by low income households led to an 
unsustainable path that made default and financial crisis possible.  
We will now look at the second strand of inequality literature that seeks to explore 
the link between financial crises and increase/decrease in inequality. There is no reason 
within the framework of orthodox economics to expect that an external macro-economic 
 
73 
 
shock will have distributional effects. However, both empirical and theoretical studies have 
shown that there could be a relationship between financial shocks and income inequality, in 
what follows is a review of previous findings on the subject matter. Earlier empirical 
literature that attempted to provide answers to this question has largely focused on the 
relationship between currency crises and inequality in emerging economies. Most of the 
literatures on this subject theme show that inequality has tended to increase after major 
crises.  
For instance Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), using data on currency crises between 
1970s and 1990s found that inequality increased substantially after crises, they showed that 
this increase was more in emerging than advanced countries particularly Latin America. 
Galbraith and Jiaging (1999), using data set of crises complied by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) that defined financial crisis as a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve 
changes provided support for the above study by showing that financial crises tend to raise 
inequality; however, this rise occurs the most in highly deregulated labour markets and less 
in highly regulated ones.  
This explained why financial crises have had worse effects on Latin American 
workforces than on Asians and more effects on Asians than more advanced countries like 
the U.S. that has better insulators against financial shocks and stable wage structures. 
Similarly, Lustig (2000) who used data on Latin American financial crises between 1980 
and 1989 found that both poverty and inequality proxied by GINI coefficient witnessed a 
significant increase in 40 crisis episodes. In addition, Baldacci et al (2004) that used a panel 
regression approach on some emerging countries in the 1990s found that currency crises 
resulted in an increase of income inequality. Like Lustig (2000) they used the Gini 
coefficients as a measure of income inequality however, they added the share of income by 
deciles to test the robustness of their findings. In contrast, when survey data as opposed to 
time series data was employed, an opposite pattern emerged.  
For instance, Baldacci et al (2004) found using survey data for Mexico during and 
after the tequila crisis of 1994-95 that the income gap between the top and lower deciles of 
the income distribution reduced. They interpreted their result as reflecting larger income 
losses to the highest income groups compared to the lowest groups. Their findings were 
corroborated by Lopez and Salinas (2000) that looked at a sample of 44 countries between 
1960 and 2000 and concluded that banking crises are associated with smaller GINI 
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coefficients. Honohan (2005) in his own study analyzed the relationship between banking 
crisis and inequality during the 1990s crises using data from some African countries as well 
as Indonesia, Mexico and Russia and found a similar reduction in income dispersion 
between the top and low income earners after banking crisis. 
Recent studies produce conflicting evidence with regards to the notion that crises 
penalize the income of those at the top income spectrum more than those at the low income 
spectrum. For instance, Roine et al (2009), in their panel study of 16 mostly advanced 
countries between 1900 and 2000 using the income share of the Top deciles as a measure of 
income inequality found that banking crisis have significant negative impact on the income 
share of the top deciles, as a result, they concluded that crises are likely to reduce inequality. 
However, Bordo and Meissner (2011), using historical data for up to 16 countries (both 
advanced and emerging countries) between 1880 and 2000 and employing two measures of 
inequality namely the share of the total income going to the top 1%42 and the percentage 
change in the ratio of unskilled wages to the average level of GDP per capita43 found that 
banking and currency crises led to an increase in inequality during the pre-1914 and the post 
world war II  eras, when you control for terms of trade shocks (that is deteriorating terms of 
trade). However, data on the inter war period reveals that crisis led to an improvement in 
income inequality showing nominal wage rigidity for the middle income earners. 
Agnello and Sousa (2011) in their study of how banking crises affect income 
inequality for both OECD and Non-OECD countries found that inequality increases rapidly 
at the onset of banking crises and reduces after the crises for OECD countries. For these 
countries, income inequality improves after the crisis while the reverse is the case for Non-
OECD countries. The seemingly lack of consensus as is seen from the literature review 
could be as a result of the use of different chronologies of crises, different measures of 
income inequality as well as different panels of countries.  
 
2.5 The Taylor rule specification 
In this section, we tested to see whether monetary policy takes into account changes 
in income inequality when calibrating their policy stance. If the income inequality variable is 
significant, then it means that monetary policy observe changes in inequality when setting 
                                                          
42
 This proxy is used as a measure of inequality in the post world war 11 period 
43
 This proxy is used as a measure of inequality in the pre world war II 
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their policy stance. To achieve this object, we incorporated a measure of inequality in a 
linear Taylor rule framework. In what follows is a brief discussion of the Taylor rule which 
we used as our benchmark model. 
The monetary authority's policy rule or reaction function comprise of its response to 
deviations in macroeconomic variables with the purpose of achieving its ultimate policy 
objectives. The Taylor rule is used to describe the behaviour as well as how central banks set 
their policy rate in achieving the objective of price stability and maximum output. The rule 
assumes that central banks use past or current values of inflation and output gap to set the 
interest rate. Taylor (1993), proposed a rule that characterize the monetary policy in the US 
over the period 1987-1992; 
 G∗ = G + \ + ^\ − \∗ + ÍP − P∗      (2.0) 
     
Where 
 G∗is the target short term nominal interest rate, G is the long run equilibrium real 
interest rate, \ is the inflation rate, \∗ is the target inflation rate, and P is the measure of 
the output gap.  The rule takes the nominal short term interest rate G∗ as the monetary 
policy instrument and predicts that it should increase if inflation (πt) increases above its 
target range (π*). β and γ indicates the sensitivity of interest rate policy to deviations in 
inflation and output gap respectively from their targets. In equilibrium, the deviation of 
inflation and output from their target values is zero and therefore, the desired interest rate is 
the sum of equilibrium real rate plus the target value of inflation. 
However, Clarida et al (1998) made important modifications to the Taylor rule by 
suggesting the use of a forward-looking version of the rule where policy makers target 
expected inflation and output gap instead of past or actual values of these variables. The 
forward looking Taylor rule allows the Central Bank to take relevant variables into account 
when forming its inflation forecasts. These views were supported by Sauer and Sturm 
(2007) who highlighted the importance of considering a forward looking Taylor rule in the 
analysis of the ECB monetary policy. Equally, Johnson (2002) argues in favour of the 
inclusion of forward-looking indicators in monetary response function. Kent and Lowe 
(1997) opined that the forward looking behaviour is in line with inflation targeting central 
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banks. In line with Clarida et al (1998) we assumed that the Central bank has a target for the 
nominal short term interest rate G∗ and this target is based on the state of the economy.  
In the baseline model equation (2.0) the target interest rate is seen as a function of 
both expected inflation and output.  
 G∗ = G̅ + ^[\=/Ω] − \∗ + Í[P/Ω] − P∗               (2.1) 
    
Where G̅ the target nominal interest rate, \= is the rate of inflation between periods  and  + B, P is real output and \∗ and P∗ are the desired points for inflation and output 
respectively.  is the expectation operator and Ω is the information available to the central 
bank at the time it sets interest rates. To account for the possibility of lack of direct 
information about current values of either output or the price level, they considered an 
implied target rate for the ex ante real interest rate, GG = G − [\=|ΩÞ], rearranging 
equation 2.1 gives; 
GG∗ = GG + ^ − 1[\=|Ω Þ] − \∗ + Í[P|Ω Þ] − P∗              (2.2) 
   
Where GGÀÀÀ is the long–run equilibrium real rate of interest which is determined by 
purely real factors; equation (2.2) stipulates that the target real rate will adjust relative to its 
natural rate in response to deviations of either expected inflation or output from their 
respective targets. According to the “Taylor principle” for monetary policy to be stabilizing 
the coefficient on the inflation gap ^ should exceed unity and the coefficient on the output 
gap Í should be positive. A coefficient greater than unity on the inflation gap means that 
the central bank increases the real rate in response to an expected rise in inflation, which 
exerts a stabilizing effect on inflation; on the other hand, ^ < 1 indicates an accommodative 
behaviour of interest rates to inflation, which may generate self-fulfilling bursts of inflation 
and output, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al (1998). An estimated 
magnitude of the parameter ^ therefore, offers an important benchmark for evaluating a 
central bank’s policy rule. A positive coefficient on output gap means that in situations in 
which output is below its potential a decrease in the interest rate will have a stabilizing effect 
on the economy Clarida et al (2000). 
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The specification equation (2.2) resembles the original Taylor rule; however if either 
lagged inflation or output gap provides enough information for inflation then the equation 
reduces to a simple Taylor rule. Clarida et al (1998) have highlighted the virtues of the 
forward looking reaction function arguing that explicitly incorporating expected inflation in 
the central bank’s reaction function makes it easy to separate the link between the estimated 
coefficients and central bank objectives which is usually not very clear in the simple Taylor 
specification. Furthermore, by allowing policy makers to respond to forecasts of inflation 
and output gap the model incorporates a realistic feature of policy making namely that 
central banks look at board array of information when calibrating monetary policy stance. 
Nevertheless, a simple rule like equation (2.2) has some flaws because of its inability 
to capture the tendency of central banks to smooth changes in interest44 rates. These 
characteristics have often led to criticism that policy reacts too little or too late to 
macroeconomic developments thus suggesting that monetary authorities have an additional 
objective of minimizing interest rate volatility in addition to stabilizing inflation and output. 
To capture the interest rate smoothing assumption Clarida et al (1998) assumes that in each 
period, the actual interest rate partially adjusts towards the target value. 
 Including the partial adjustment mechanism in the central banks’ reaction function 
reflects to a large extent optimal behaviour on the part of central banks whose primary focus 
is on inflation and output stabilization Goodfriend, (1991), Svensson (1997) and Sack and 
Wieland (2000). The findings from our literature review suggest four major arguments that 
might help to explain why the observed degree of interest rate smoothing may be optimal. 
These arguments presented in turn below include: Forward-looking behaviour of market 
participants, uncertainty about key macro-economic parameters, fear of disrupting financial 
markets and loss of credibility. 
Forward looking expectations: Monetary policy rules with forward looking 
expectations that are estimated in form of equation (2.2) are usually not as effective as rules 
with partial adjustment mechanism in stabilizing output and inflation for a given level of 
interest rate volatility. Forward looking market participants normally expect a small initial 
policy shift to be followed by additional shifts in the same direction. When monetary 
                                                          
44
 Interest rate smoothing refers to the tendency of central banks to change short-term interest rates in 
sequences of small steps in the same direction and a reversal of that direction is done only infrequently, Sack 
and Wieland (2000). 
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authorities exhibit high degree of partial adjustments, it increases the effectiveness of policy 
on current output and inflation without significant interest rate changes Woodford (2003). 
Data and parameter uncertainty: Central bankers face high level of uncertainty when 
making interest rate decisions because the data upon which these decisions are based 
specifically, estimates of potential output gap and the natural rate of unemployment may be 
revised years later. Sack and Wieland (1999) discussed the impact of data uncertainty on 
interest rate setting. Furthermore, the uncertainty about the exact state of the economy and 
about the key parameters of the economic structure that affects the transmission of monetary 
policy calls for caution in setting the policy rate. Soderstrom (2002) in their study discussed 
the implications of this parameter uncertainty on policy rate. According to them, when 
parameters are uncertain, contractionary policy stance which might otherwise be expected to 
offset inflationary pressure and output deviations fairly quickly are more likely to have 
unintended consequences on output and inflation. Optimal policy behaviour in such a 
situation may be to implement a gradual response of the interest rate instrument45 that would 
return output and inflation more slowly to their respective targeted values. 
Fear of disrupting financial markets: The adverse reaction of financial markets to 
regular changes in the direction of interest rates has been pointed out as one of the main 
reasons behind interest rate smoothing. Given that deposit money banks offer flexible 
interest rates on deposits and receive fixed interest payments for loans, high interest rate 
volatility may lead to bankruptcies since banks’ liabilities may be higher than its available 
assets. Hence the gradual adjustment of rates provides banks an opportunity to adjust their 
assets and liabilities portfolios in response to interest rate changes Cukierman (1991). 
Loss of credibility: Goodhart (1999) suggests that policymakers may use interest rate 
smoothing as a means of protecting their reputation. Central banks might lose credibility as a 
result of large sudden interest rate reversals. The inability of market participants to assess 
whether a change in policy reflects reaction to latest macro-economic developments or just 
the correction of an earlier policy mistake might prompt policymakers to smooth interest 
                                                          
45
 Economists such as Ball (1997) and Rudebusch (2001) have argued against the policy inertia hypothesis of 
interest rate smoothing. According to them, smoothing might be present in the data as a result of some 
omitted variables which monetary policy reacts to but which are not captured in the estimated policy 
reaction function. Rudebusch suggests that interest rate smoothing will arise if these omitted variables are 
auto-correlated. Other researchers have argued that the practice of smoothing interest rates might reflect an 
objective of lowering interest rate volatility in addition to the Federal Reserve’s mandate of minimizing 
deviations of output from its potential level and inflation from its target. 
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rates in order to reduce the need for reversals and reduce the chances of being exposed to 
criticism. In other to capture these factors it is assumed that the actual rate partially adjusts46 
to the target as follows; 
 G = 1 − ßG∗ + ßGk + w         (2.3) 
            
where the parameter ßÛ[0,1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing and w. is 
an exogenous random shock to the interest rate which is assumed to be RRm. The exogenous 
random shock to the interest rate w could reflect a pure random component to policy or 
could be introduced because of the policy maker’s inability to perfectly forecast 
idiosyncratic reserve demand and as a result fails to immediately supply reserves to offset 
the shock. Under such a condition, the interest rate tends to jump in response to unexpected 
movements in reserve demand that are orthogonal to movements in inflation and output 
Clarida et al (1998). Defining Å ≡ G − ^\∗ and É ≡ P − P∗ and rewriting equation (2.2) 
as; 
 G∗ = Å + ^[\=|Ω Þ] + Í[É|Ω Þ]             (2.4)
      
We get the target model. Combining the target model equation (2.4) with the partial 
adjustment mechanism equation (2.3) yields; 
 G = 1 − ßÅ + ^[\=|Ω Þ] + Í[É|Ω Þ] + ßGk + w            (2.5)
        
Replacing the unobserved forecast variables from the policy rule with realized variables so 
as to estimate the model we obtain a new policy rule; 
 G = 1 − ßÅ + 1 − ß^\= + 1 − ßÍÉ + ßGk + ]                      (2.6)
   
                                                          
46
 As was noted by Clarida et al (2000) introducing the partial adjustment into the reaction function means 
that the condition  β>1 does not automatically guarantee that the real rate goes up when inflation rises, only 
that it ‘eventually’ goes up. However, the expected increase may reflect immediately in real long term yields. 
On the other hand, the short term-real rate will rise immediately if inflation is expected to increase in the 
future.  
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Where the error term ] = −1 − ß^\= − [\=|Ω Þ] + w the error term is a linear 
combination of the forecast errors of inflation and output and the exogenous disturbance w, 
the set of orthogonality conditions implied by equation (2.6) is; 
 [G − 1 − ßÅ − 1 − ß^\= − 1 − ßÍP× − ßGk|à Þ]=0   (2.7) 
   
Where à is a vector of variables that are inside the policymaker’s information set at the time 
it sets the interest rate i.e. à ∈ Ω that are orthogonal to ]. Potential elements of à 
comprise of any lagged variables that help forecast inflation and output as well as any 
contemporaneous variables that are not correlated with the current interest rate shockw. 
 
2.6 Data description and summary statistics 
The data we used for this analysis are quarterly time series spanning the period 
1967:q1-2011:q4. All our data apart from the average income share of the top 1 percent, one 
year- ahead inflation expectation forecasts and the 90/10 income differentials were sourced 
from FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis. We employed effective Federal Funds rate percentage per annum as our proxy for 
monetary policy. The Federal Funds rate is used by the Federal Reserve as the operating 
target in its conduct of monetary policy. The Fed specifically targets the Federal Funds rate 
which is the rate at which central bank balances, are lent for one day. This rate serves as 
both the policy rate (the rate decided by the Federal Open Market Committee) and the 
official operating target. The 3 months Treasury bill which is a short term debt security 
issued by the government was used as an alternative stance of monetary policy. The baseline 
inflation measure we used is the annualized log of consumer price index growth rate. 
Measured as 
 
100 × XB áÉ Ékâ ã 47        (2.8) 
 
                                                          
47lnÉ = SLCGLX UHÎÉ is the value of series É at time period .  
 
81 
 
We used annualized data because it facilitates the comparison of growth rates of 
various time periods. In other words, this kind of data adjustment allows for easy 
comparison of percent changes, irrespective of the time period and is very common in 
economic analysis.  For the output gap, the difference between actual and potential output, is 
calculated via Hodrick-Prescott de-trended log of real GDP. The output gap measures how 
far the economy is from its full employment or productive potential.  
Figure 2.7 below is a plot of U.S inflation, output gap and short term interest rate. 
The U.S inflation rate and short term interest rate displays great similarities. The plot shows 
that both the inflation series and the interest rate series moved in tandem with each other 
since the 1970s up until the 2000s, although the magnitude of the increases and decreases 
were much higher in the inflation series. The plot seems to support the Barro and Gordon, 
(1983) “inflation bias” hypothesis which claim that the high inflation of the 1970s was due 
to the lack of proper incentives on the part of policymakers who chose to accept high 
inflation in order to prevent a recession.  
 
Figure 2.7 U.S inflation, output gap and short term interest rate 1970 to 2010 
 
Data sourced from the Federal Reserve banks of Philadelphia and St Louis 
 
The output gap in figure (2.7) shows significant divergence with inflation and short 
term interest rate, while both interest rate and inflation series were increasing during the mid 
1970s, the output gap defined as the difference between actual and potential GDP was 
decreasing. A potential explanation of the “output gap conundrum” was that policy makers 
relied on deeply flawed estimates of the output gap, Orphanides (2002, p.7). According to 
him, “…the error in the real-time assessment of the natural rate of unemployment meant that 
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for much of the 1970s policy decisions were based on the incorrect belief that the economy 
was operating below its full employment potential, while the opposite was true.”  
In a bid to rein in the resultant inflation the Fed reversed its policies, raising interest 
rates to some 20 percent, a number that was considered usurious for interest rate sensitive 
industries. This had a negative impact on the U.S productivity levels. Finally, the decline in 
the output gap indicates a weaker U.S economy during the global financial crisis since it is 
declining after its peak in the early 2000s. For the expected inflation we used the 
expectations for one-year-ahead annual average inflation forecasts sourced from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  
 
Figure 2.8 Actual and forecast inflation 1970q1 to 2010q4 
 
Data sourced from the Federal Reserve banks of Philadelphia and St Louis 
 
 
Figure 2.8 is the plot of actual and forecast inflation data. The plot shows that actual 
inflation has been more volatile than forecast inflation series. Both the actual and forecast 
inflation rate has tracked each other in that both series increases and decreases at almost the 
same time, however, the magnitude of the increase and decrease has been higher in the 
actual inflation series. A closer look at the plot reveals a drop in the volatility of actual 
inflation in the 1990s which saw both series almost in near perfect synchrony. An interesting 
feature of the two series that is worth mentioning is that there was no remarkable divergence 
in both series, that is they tend to move together. 
Following Sarel (1997) and Ibarra and Trupkin (2011) and Danne and Schnabl 
(2008) we used the logarithm of inflation rate so as to avoid the distortion of our regression 
results by extreme observations. Figures A2.1a and A2.1b in the appendix of this chapter 
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presents the histograms of the distribution of inflation rate and its logarithmic transformation 
respectively, as can be seen from these figures, the rate of inflation has an asymmetric 
distribution (positive skew). Using this variable will place an enormous weight on the few 
observations with highest inflation rate while the logarithm of inflation has a more balanced 
distribution, in fact by using the log of inflation rate; we obtained an almost symmetric 
inflation distribution which is comparable to a normal distribution. Finally, Ghosh and 
Phillips (1998) provided documented evidence that suggests that the log function provides a 
reasonable characterization of the inflation-growth nexus. 
 
Measures of income and consumption inequality 
 Given that inequality is a difficult concept to measure, we used three measures of 
income inequality in this chapter namely, the Gini coefficient, the 90/10 income differentials 
and the income share going to the top 1 percent households.  
Gini coefficient: The Gini coefficient is by far the most popular measure of income 
inequality. This measure is derived from the Lorenz curve framework48. We used 
continuously compounded growth rate in the calculation of the Gini index measured as: 
 ÕÕk − 1 49 × 100. Although the Gini50 index has been the most popular method for 
operationalising income inequality in economics, sociology and public health literature, 
however, the index does not contain information about the absolute national or personal 
incomes, De Maio (2007).  The index does not take into account the differential efficiency 
of use of household income and frequently ignores wealth except as it contributes to income. 
A major limitation of Gini coefficient is its inability of differentiating different kinds of 
inequalities, Cowell (1995).  
                                                          
48
 The Lorenz curve shows the percentage of total income earned by cumulative percentage of the 
population, De Maio (2007).  The logic behind the Lorenz curve is that in a perfectly equal society, the 
“poorest” 25 percent of the population would earn 25 percent of the total income, the “poorest” 50 percent 
of the population would earn 50 percent of the total income and the Lorenz curve would follow the path of 
the 45
0
 line of equality. As inequality increases, the Lorenz curve will deviate from the line of equality; the 
“poorest” 25 percent of the population may earn 20 percent of the total income and so on, De Maio (2007). 
An important property of the Lorenz framework is that it can be used to develop a single summary statistic of 
the income distribution, the GINI coefficient.  
49lnÉ
 = SLCGLX UHÎÉis the value of series x at time period t. 
50
 The Gini coefficient is equivalent to the size of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45
o
 line of 
equality divided by the total area under the 45
0
 line of equality. The Gini coefficient used in this study is 
presented as a percentage. A Gini coefficient of 1 implies that the Lorenz curve follows the line of equality.  
As the Lorenz curve deviates from the line of equality, the higher will be the resulting value of the Gini 
coefficient. 
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As was noted by Ellison (2002) and Lambert (1980), researchers working with the 
Gini coefficient need to be aware that it is most sensitive to inequalities in the middle part of 
the income spectrum thus this measure of income inequality is not “neutral or value free”.  
In addition, Lorenz curves may intersect, reflecting differing patterns of income distribution, 
but nevertheless resulting in similar Gini coefficient values, thus, making comparisons of 
Gini coefficient values difficult and complicated, Atkinson (1975), and Cowell (1995). 
Furthermore, in some situations where there may be valid reasons to emphasize inequalities 
in the top or bottom of the income spectrum this summary measure may not be appropriate. 
Consequently, the present chapter employs an alternative measure of income inequality the 
share of total income accruing to the top 1 percent, (income is defined as market or gross 
income including capital gains). This measure provides a more nuanced understanding of the 
distribution of income particularly at the top of the income distribution. 
Dispersion ratio
51
 90/10 income differential: this is defined as the percentage wage 
differential between the worker at the 90h percentile of income distribution and the worker 
at the 10th percentile. We used continuously compounded growth rate measured as:  
 
100 × XB áÉ Ékâ ã                          (2.9) 
 
This proxy is a measure of the range of the income distribution. As inequality increases, the 
difference between households at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the income distribution 
will also be growing. One of the limitations of the use of 90/10 wage differential as a 
measure of income inequality is that this ratio can be very vulnerable to extreme values and 
outliers. In addition it has no axiomatic basis: that is, it is not derived from principles about 
equity. 
Proportion of income received by the top 1 percent: The proportion of income 
received by the richest or poorest Bℎ% of the population is amongst the most intuitive 
measures of income inequality. Its intuitive appeal makes it an appropriate choice of income 
inequality measure for many audiences. Unlike the Gini index, this measure allows you to 
                                                          
51
The dispersion ratio measure the distance between two groups in the distribution of income. The most 
frequently used are the deciles and quintiles. A decile is a group containing 10 percent of the total 
population; a quintile is a group containing 20 percent of the population. 
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emphasize inequalities in any part of the income spectrum. However, this measure has its 
own limitations, in that it offers a very limited insight into the income distribution; the 
share/proportion of income received by the richest 1 percent of the population for instance 
does not inform us about how equally income is shared by the richest 1 percent52. In 
addition, this measure does not reveal anything about the nature of the income distribution 
among the rest of the population. As important as theses limitations are, proportion measures 
has been used extensively in income inequality literatures. 
In line with Bordo and Meissner (2011) we employed the income share accruing to 
the top I percent of the earning population (measured as log annualized growth rate) to 
overcome the limitations of the other two measures of income inequality; however, before 
we discuss about this variable, it is important to put the figures into perspective by 
understanding exactly what the figure means. The average annual income earned by the top 
1 percent of the population is $717,000, compared to the average income of the rest of the 
population, which is around $51,000, Dunn (2012). Dunn posits that the real disparity 
between the classes is not in income, but in net value.  He opined that the 1 percent earning 
population are worth about $8.4 million or 70 times the worth of the lower classes53.  
Wolff (2012) in his own contribution estimates the net worth of the top 1 percent to 
be around $6,616,000 or more while the bottom 90 percent has a net worth of less than 
$890,000. From this perspective, it is no surprise that the bulk of income inequality can be 
attributed to this class of income earners. Consequently, we used this variable as our main 
measure of inequality in this thesis. The data for this measure of inequality was sourced 
from ‘Top Incomes Database’, Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2007 updated 2014). 
Our reason for using this variable as the main measure of income inequality is because the 
growth in income inequality for the past 30 years has been largely driven by trends at the 
very top of the income distribution.  This is supported by some of the empirical literature on 
the distribution of income and wealth that tried to explain long-run changes in the income 
inequality data, Piketty and Saez (2003); and Piketty (2010). These studies came to the 
                                                          
52
 This limitation can be resolved through the use of quantile regressions that are used to examine the entire 
income distribution. Quantile regression was used in chapter three of this thesis to evaluate the response of 
income to asset prices. This estimation technique aids our understanding of how households at different ends 
of the income spectrum react to changes in financial and non-financial assets.  
53
 According to the Dunn (2012), corporate American executives make 62 times more money than an average 
worker in bonuses alone. He argued that ‘incentive pay’ rose by 30 percent from years before the recession 
of 2007. 
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conclusion that the changes in income distribution for most of the countries studied has been 
driven by a sharp increase in top income share. We used the following as our lists of 
instruments for the GMM estimations: lags 1 of Civilian unemployment rate sourced from 
the Federal Reserve Economic Database; M1 which is a measure of money stock: in addition 
to the lags 1 of all the regressors. All the variables used in this study are stationary variables 
given that we transformed them to growth rates. We conducted a formal test of stationarity 
of the variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with trend and intercept included in 
the test equation. The result of the ADF test is reported in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test with trend and intercept 
Parameters   − LRJRN Probability \ -3.21 0.02 \< 4.27 0.00 P -5.411 0.00 O -4.26 0.00 Î -3.91 0.00 èÎ -6.08 0.00 3_E -5.88 0.00 X -8.24 0.00 ℎ -3.51 0.00 CF -3.25 0.00 G -3.93 0.01 
Notes: 
 \ denotes the inflation rate, \< denotes the log of one-year-ahead inflation, P denotes the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended real GDP, O is the growth rate of the income share going to the top 1 percent income earners, Î 
denotes the growth rate of GINI index of inequality, èÎ denotes the growth rate of the percent wage 
differential between the worker at the 90th percentile of income distribution and the worker at the 10th 
percentile (wage gap), 3_E denotes the three months treasury bill,  X denotes the growth rate of average annual 
consumption expenditures of housholds within the lowest 20 income quintiles, ℎ denotes  the growth rate of 
average annual consumption expenditures of households within the highest 20 income quintiles, and CF 
denotes the unemployment rate, G denotes the effective federal funds rate. Lag length 5 based on AIC.  
 
Table 2.3 is the descriptive statistics of our variables.  
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Variables1967:q1-2011:q4 
 G \ P 3_O Î èÎ E CF \< 
Mean 6.14 4.33 0.01 555269 0.43 9.97 5.52 6.10 1.20 
Maximum 17.78 13.47 0.04 1003791 0.47 11.67 15.05 10.7 2.24 
minimum 0.12 -1.63 -0.10 321122 0.37 8.53 0.06 3.40 0.23 
Std. Dev. 3.51 2.75 0.02 227200 0.03 0.90 2.98 1.62 0.50 
Notes: G denotes effective federal funds rate, \ is the inflation rate, P denotes the Hodrick-Prescott detrended real 
GDP, O is the growth rate of the income share going to the top 1 percent income earners. Î denotes GINI 
index of inequality, èÎ denotes the percent wage differential  between the worker at the 90th percentile of 
income distribution and the worker at the 10th percentile (wage gap). 3_E denotes the three months Treasury 
bill and CF denotes the unemployment rate while \< denotes the log of one year ahead inflation expectation 
forecast. 
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The descriptive statistics shows the mean, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviations of each of the variables used in the estimation. The correlation matrix reveals a 
high level of positive correlation amongst the three measures of income inequality namely, 
the income share of the top 1 percent, GINI index of inequality and the 90/10 wage 
differential, defined as the income difference between the worker at the 90th percentile of 
income distribution and the worker at the 10th percentile. 
 
Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix1967:q1-2011:q4 
 G \ P O Î èÎ 3_E CF \< G 1.00 0.74 0.24 -0.59 -0.59 -0.60 0.99 0.07 0.81 \ 0.74 1.00 0.15 -0.57 -0.64 -0.67 0.71 0.01 0.85 P 0.24 0.15 1.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.58 0.08 O -0.59 -0.57 0.10 1.00 0.94 0.91 -0.60 -0.23 -0.84 Î -0.59 -0.64 -0.01 0.94 1.00 0.96 -0.60 -0.08 -0.87 èÎ -0.60 -0.67 -0.04 0.91 0.96 1.00 -0.61 -0.01 -0.85 3_E 0.99 0.71 0.22 -0.60 -0.60 -0.61 1.00 0.09 0.82 CF 0.07 0.10 -0.58 -0.23 -0.08 -0.01 0.09 1.00 0.30 \< 0.81 0.85 0.08 -0.84 -0.87 -0.85 0.82 0.30 1.00 
Notes: G denotes effective federal funds rate, \ is the annualized inflation rate, P denotes the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended real GDP, O is the growth rate of the income share going to the top 1 percent income earners. Î 
denotes GINI index of inequality, èÎ denotes the percent wage differential  between the worker at the 90th 
percentile of income distribution and the worker at the 10th percentile (wage gap). 3_E  denotes the three 
months treasury bill and CFdenotes the unemployment rate and \< denotes the log of one-year-ahead inflation 
expectation forecast.   
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2.6.1 Presentation and interpretation of results:  
 
Table 2.5 OLS estimates of benchmark and augmented Taylor Rule 1967q1-2011q4 
Parameters Column 1 
benchmark result 
Column  2 O Column 3 Î Column 4 èÎ 
∝ -0.27 
[-1.50] 
-0.28 
[-1.24] 
-0.22 
[-0.95] 
-0.21 
[0.92] ß 0.84*** 
[26.12] 
0.83*** 
[26.75] 
0.83*** 
[25.35] 
0.84*** 
[26.13] 
^\<  1.56*** 
[4.16] 
1.52*** 
[3.40] 
1.51*** 
[3.20] 
1.51*** 
[3.26] 
`^P 0.44*** 
[6.36] 
0.40*** 
[4.52] 
0.42*** 
[4.87] 
0.42*** 
[4.73] 
c^O  0.02** 
[1.83] 
  
ì^Î   -0.06 
[-0.89] 
 
í^èÎ    -0.05 
[-0.95] Ymî ` 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 _ª 0.72 0.24 0.49 0.46 
Notes: 
 ∝, ß, ^\< , `^P , c^O, ì^Î, í^èÎ represent the parameters in the 4 models, where ∝ is the constant, ß is 
the smoothing parameter, ^\<is the Log of one year ahead inflation expectation forecasts, `^P  is the 
estimated weight on output gap, c^O  is the estimated weight on the average growth rate of  income share 
going to the top 1 percent income earners, ì^Î  is the estimated weight on growth rate of GINI index of 
inequality and  í^èÎ  is the estimated weight on the percent wage differential  between the worker at the 90th 
percentile of income distribution and the worker at the 10th percentile (wage gap). .  The parameter estimates 
are obtained by OLS estimation using HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth = 5, 0000). The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The 
values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî` is the adjusted 2R ,  _ªdenotes the t-statistic for the Ramsey 
Reset diagnostic test. Column 1 contains the OLS estimates of the policy coefficients from the forward looking 
Taylor Rule given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\< + `^P + ]        (a) 
Column 2 contains the OLS estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the average income of the top 1 percent given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\< + `^P + c^O + ]      (b) 
Column 3 contains the OLS estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the GINI index of  income inequality  given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\< + `^P + ì^Î + ]      (c) 
Column 3 contains the OLS estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the GINI index of income inequality given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\< + `^P + í^èÎ + ]      (d) 
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Table 2.5 is the results from the benchmark forward looking Taylor rule and the 
augmented Taylor rule. This is an interest rate rule that specifies a target for the policy rate 
as a function of deviations of inflation from its target and some measure of slack in 
economic activities such as the output gap or level of unemployment. The ‘Taylor principle” 
which is an integral part of the rule stipulates that the Federal Funds rate should be increased 
when inflation is above its target rate. The stabilization criterion implies that the nominal 
funds rate should rise more than one-for-one with an increase in inflation above its target. 
We model the forward-looking nature of the policy rule by relating the current value of the 
federal funds rate to the one-year-ahead average expected inflation rate and the 
contemporaneous output gap. 
The results presented in table 2.5 above suggest several conclusions. First, the policy 
response coefficients in the estimated Taylor rule, namely, the smoothing parameter ß, the 
one year ahead inflation expectation forecasts ^\<, and the output gap ^P in all the models 
are all positively signed and statistically significant. The major points to note are; that the 
estimated long run inflation coefficients ^\<are well above unity, which suggests that 
Federal Reserve responded strongly to expected inflation. In addition, the estimated output 
gap ^P response coefficients in all the models are generally well below unity, suggesting 
the presence of a relatively weak response to the output gap.  
Finally, the estimated partial adjustment coefficients  ß, are well above zero, 
indicating the presence of interest rate smoothing; having said that, we move to interpret the 
results from each of the models separately. The empirical result from the benchmark model 
(table 2.5, column 1) satisfies the dynamic stability criterion since the estimated inflation 
coefficient is greater than one.  Specifically, the result shows that a one unit increase in 
inflation will cause monetary policy makers to increase interest rate by approximately (1.56) 
basis points other things being equal. This implies that the real rate increases in response to 
an expected rise in inflation thus exerting a stabilizing effect on inflation.  
In addition the output gap coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. Its estimate implies that, holding expected inflation constant, one percent 
increase in the level of output gap induces the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates by 
(0.44) 44 basis points. This result is in line with those reported by Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) who employed quarterly U.S data. The result seems to suggest that the Federal 
Reserve has put more weight on price stability than output stabilization during our sample 
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period. The estimate of the interest rate smoothing parameter is close to 1 at 0.88 which 
indicates a high level of persistence in short-term interest rate. The result supports the notion 
that the U.S Federal Reserve smoothes the adjustment of interest rates towards their target 
values. 
Table 2.5 column 2 reports the estimated parameters of the augmented Taylor Rule, 
with the share of income going to the top 1 percent ^O as a measure of income inequality. 
The results from this model is consistent with Clarida’s et al (2000) and Taylor (1999) in 
that monetary policy is found to be stable during our sample period (^\< > 1 and 
statistically significant. The policy rate is estimated to increase by about (1.55) basis points 
for every 1 percent increase in inflation holding other variables constant. A reaction of over 
a hundred basis point for a I percent increase in inflation expectations over one year. 
The coefficient for the output gap is positive and statistically significant and is below 
unity ^P < 1. This suggests that the Fed adjusts its policy rate if there is a deviation of 
output from potential; however, the Fed’s response to output deviation is relatively weak 
when compared to its response to the deviations of inflation from its desired level. 
Specifically, the result reveals an increase of about (0.46) 46 basis points in the policy rate 
for every 1 percent increase in output holding all the other variables within the model 
constant and the result is statistically significant at the 1 percent levels.  
The result from the top 1 percent augmented Taylor Rule implies a stable monetary 
policy with the inflation coefficient greater than 1. The estimated coefficient of the top 1 
percent income group ^O is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a restrictive 
policy stance in the face of increases in the share of income going to the top 1 percent and 
monetary easing in the presence of a decline in the incomes of this group. One interpretation 
of this result is that during the sample period, controlling for inflation and output gap, the 
Fed was increasing the Federal funds rate as the income of the top 1 percent increases. The 
result from this model imply that a 1 percent increase in the income of the top 1 percent 
results in an increase of (0.04) i.e. 4 basis point in the policy rate.  
Looking at the GINI ^Î and the _90_10 wage gap ^èÎ augmented model in table 
2.5 columns 3 and 4, we can observe evidence of a stable monetary policy given that the 
inflation coefficients in both models are greater than one and statistically significant at the 1 
percent levels. The coefficients on the output gap in both models are consistent with 
previous results (significant, below unity and positive) indicating an increase in Federal 
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funds rate in response to deviations of output from its potential. The coefficients on both 
Gini and the _90_10 wage gap are both statistically insignificant. This seems to suggest that 
the Fed does not take variations in these two measures of income inequality into account in 
its reaction function.  
The evidence of no reaction in the Gini and 90/10 augmented models could be as a 
result of the limitations of Gini coefficient and the 90/10 wage differentials as measures of 
income inequality. Given that the Gini coefficient measure relative, not absolute wealth, 
some authors have argued that changes in income inequality, measured by Gini coefficients 
can be due to structural changes in society such as growing and aging population, extended 
family households dividing into nuclear families, immigration and emigration as well as 
income mobility amongst others Kwok (2010), and the Fed does not react to such changes.  
As well as the inability of this summary measure in identifying where the observed income 
inequality is occurring, or that the reaction to the top 1 percent income inequality measure is 
an indirect reaction to the stock market given the high correlation between this variable and 
the S&P500. Finally, the Ramsey Reset test which is used to test for specification errors 
indicates that all the OLS models were correctly specified. We turn to look at the potential 
reaction of monetary policy to income inequality using the GMM estimation method. 
The results for the GMM estimate of benchmark and augmented Taylor rule is 
reported in table 2.6 below. The reaction function that we modelled is of this form: 
 G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß^\ + ^P/à + ]     (2.10) 
 
Where à represents all the variables in the Fed’s information set available at time t when the 
interest rate is chosen (instruments). In order to control for the simultaneity bias in the 
relationship between monetary policy and the regressors, we instrument for the 
contemporaneous values of output gap and income inequality. The benchmark reaction 
function given by equation (2.10) is estimated using the GMM and the instruments 
employed in the estimation include a constant, first lags of output gap, measure of income 
inequality, unemployment rate and M1 as well as the second lag of expected inflation. Since 
the number of instrument is greater than the number of the parameters in the model[∝, ß, ^\, P], we test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions using Hansen’s ï − JLRJRN. Clarida et al (2000) posits that a failure to reject orthogonality implies that the 
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Fed considers lagged variables in its reaction function, only to the extent that they forecast 
future inflation and output. 
 
Table 2.6 GMM estimates of benchmark and augmented Taylor Rule 1967q1-2011q4 
Parameters Column 1 
 benchmark 
Column 2 O Column 3  Î Column 4 èÎ 
∝ 0.12 
[0.77] 
0.08 
[0.87] 
0.19 
[1.31] 
0.21 
[1.51] ß 0.86*** 
[31.76] 
0.88*** 
[38.41] 
0.89*** 
[35.51] 
0.89*** 
[36.36] 
^\ 1.23*** 
[3.55] 
1.09** 
[2.90] 
0.92*** 
[2.02] 
0.94** 
[2.01] 
`^P 0.32* 
[2.40] 
0.46*** 
[3.41] 
0.44** 
[2.79] 
0.40*** 
[2.39] 
c^O   0.06*** 
[2.47] 
  
ì^Î   0.01 
[0.73] 
 
í^èÎ    -0.04 
[0.48] Ymî ` 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 OGH. î − JL 0.30 0.71 0.78 0.97 
Notes: 
 ∝, ß, ^\, `^P , c^O , ì^Î , í^èÎ , represent the parameters in the 4 models, where ∝ is the constant, ß is the smoothing parameter, ^\ is the actual future Inflation i.e one period ahead inflation, `^P  is the 
estimated weight on output gap, c^O   is the estimated weight on the average growth rate of  income share 
going to the top 1 percent income earners, ì^Î is the estimated weight on growth rate of GINI index of 
inequality and í^èÎ is the estimated weight on the percent wage differential  between the worker at the 90th 
percentile of income distribution and the worker at the 10th  percentile (wage gap). The parameter estimates 
are obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the 
estimation weighting matrix. The instruments used in the models are a constant, lag 2 of Federal Funds rate, 
lag 1of inflation, unemployment rate, income of the top 1 percent, Gini and 90/10 wage differential and M1. OGH. î − JL denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of 
observing the value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R , 
Column 1 contains the GMM estimates of the policy coefficients from the bench mark forward looking Taylor 
Rule given below   G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P/à + ]          (e) 
Column 2 contains the GMM estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the average income of the top 1 percent given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P + c^O/à + ]       (f) 
Column 3 contains the GMM estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the GINI index of income inequality  given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P + ì^Î/à + ]        (g) 
Column 3 contains the GMM estimates of the policy coefficients from the augmented forward looking Taylor 
Rule augmented with the GINI index of income inequality  given below  G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P + í^èÎ/à + ]       (h) à represents all the variables in the Fed’s information set available at time t when the interest rate is chosen 
(instruments). The instruments used in these models are a constant and lags of the endogenous variables. 
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The GMM estimation results in table 2.6 above, column 2 reveals that the benchmark 
specification satisfies the dynamic stability criterion given that the estimated inflation 
coefficient  ^\ is greater than one (1.23). Specifically, the result seems to suggest that 
holding output gap constant that a 1 percent increase in inflation will induce the Fed to raise 
interest rate by over a 100 basis point. Taylor (1999) argues that if the estimated inflation 
coefficient was smaller than the stability threshold of one, then this would entail a positively 
sloped aggregate demand, with output decreasing in response to an inflation shock. In 
addition, the estimated inflation coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent 
levels. The response of Federal Funds rate to inflation is larger in the OLS model which uses 
one-year-ahead inflation expectation forecasts. However, both the OLS and GMM models 
are consistent in revealing a stable monetary policy. 
The output gap ^Pcoefficient is positive (0.32) and also significant indicating that 
holding expected inflation constant, a one percent increase in the level of output gap will 
induce the Fed to increase interest rates by 32 basis points. Therefore, during the period 
under consideration, the Federal Reserve has put more weight on price stability than output 
stabilization. The estimated coefficient on the interest rate smoothing parameter is close to 1 
(0.86) indicating a high level of persistence in short term interest rates. Finally, the ï −JLRJRN shows that the over-identifying restrictions of the benchmark model are not 
rejected. 
As was pointed out in the previous sections, monetary policy can change the shape of 
the income distribution via five channels namely, income composition channel, (the 
difference between wages and capital income), financial segmentation channel, (the ability 
of some financial market participants to benefit more from policy shocks than others), 
portfolio / asset price channel, (the notion that high income households, who tend to hold 
more financial and non-financial assets benefit more from asset price booms created by 
expansionary monetary policy), the savings redistribution channel, (the impact of 
unanticipated inflation on nominal contracts) and earnings heterogeneity channel (the 
tendency of low income earners to be more sensitive to the business cycle). Our literature 
search in section 2.4 suggests that changes in monetary policy stance have important 
distributional implications in the U.S and elsewhere. In addition, Fowler et al (2005)  
employing the seigniorage tax rate as a measure of monetary policy and, using both 
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simulation and VAR estimation techniques reveal that monetary policy systematically 
responds over the business cycle to deviations in income inequality with a lag.  
Most of the studies we surveyed were interested in analyzing the effect/ contribution 
of monetary policy to widening income inequality. To contribute to this debate, we tested 
the response of monetary policy to income inequality within a standard monetary policy 
framework. Therefore, we considered three alternatives to our benchmark specification, by 
allowing three different measures of income inequality to enter in the Taylor rule. The 
augmented reaction function that we considered is of the form: 
 G =∝+ ßGk + 1 − ß\ + ^P + ^′Ö + ]            (2.11) 
 
Where Ö = ³É … É	´Q, and ^ = ³ ð^ … 	^´Q, denote the vector of î − LmmRRHBLX 
explanatory variables, and the relevant coefficient vector respectively. In this estimation, Ö 
contains contemporaneous measures of income inequality, namely the Gini index, the 90/10 
wage gap and average income share going to the top 1 percent.  
First, we allow annual income share of the top 1 percent to enter the reaction 
function. The results are presented in table 2.6, column 2. The top 1 percent coefficient is 
positive and highly significant. Monetary policy tightens in response to increases in the 
income of the top 1 percent. Specifically, a one percent increase in the income of the top 1 
percent increases interest rates by 0.06 basis points. A straight forward interpretation of this 
result implies that the Fed will increase interest rate if income inequality is increasing and 
reduce the policy rate if it is reducing. Another important question that arises from this 
finding is whether the Federal Reserve follows a ‘symmetric or an ‘asymmetric’ policy 
towards income inequality during the period under review. The current study provides 
empirical answer to this question. 
Secondly, we included the Gini index another measure of income inequality into the 
reaction function. The estimated coefficient is positive; however, the response of expected 
inflation does not meet the dynamic stability threshold and is not significant suggesting an 
unstable monetary policy. In addition, we included the 90/10 wage differential into the 
model and the model again failed the stability tests and is not significant, thus, confirming 
our earlier findings from the OLS estimation method. Finally, the probabilities of the ï − JLRJRN in all the models reveal that the models as well as our set of instruments are 
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valid. This implies that the models met the orthogonality condition, indicating that the 
Federal Reserve considers lagged variables in their reaction function only to the extent that 
they help in forecasting future inflation and output. 
Why would Fed react to the top one percent measure of inequality?  It is important to 
bear in mind that this reaction could be an indirect reaction coming from the Fed’s reaction 
to asset prices particularly stock prices as we have pointed out in section 2.3. Another 
possible explanation of this reaction to top income earners could be because of the big 
changes in the share of top income in America’s total income. Pervious empirical research 
on income inequality suggests that these changes had significant impact on overall measures 
of income distribution. For instance, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2009) provided 
documented evidence which shows that the 14 percentage point increase in the share of the 
top percentile group in the United States between 1976 and 2006 produced an increase of 8.4 
percent in the overall Gini Coefficient for pre-tax incomes. Most of the increases in top 
incomes in the U.S during the economic expansion up until 2007 were generated primarily 
by income from employment; stock market and performance related pay which 
disproportionately benefitted top executives and finance professionals in the 1980s and 
2000s, Bakija et al (2012). 
The study of Atkinson et al (2011) as well as reports by OECD throws more light on 
why the Fed may be concerned with the changes in the incomes of the top 1 percent. The 
incomes of this group of earners have a sizeable influence on measures of income growth of 
different population groups. According to Atkinson et al (2011), in the United States real 
household income increased by 1.2 percent on average per year in the ten years leading to 
the 2007 financial crisis, excluding the top 1 percent the average income of the bottom 99% 
grew by 0.6 percent indicating that the top 1 percent captured 58 percent of the real income 
gain. 
A 2011 report by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD 
“Divided we stand: Why Inequality keep Rising” highlighted that the increases in household 
income inequality have been largely driven by changes in the distribution of wages and 
salaries, which account for about 75 percent of household incomes among working age 
adults. According to this report, with the exception of France, Japan and Spain, the wages of 
the 10 percent best paid workers have risen relative to those of the 10 percent lowest paid; 
which was due to the growing earnings shares at the top and declining shares at the bottom. 
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In addition, another OECD report in 2008 “Growing Unequal”?, showed that inequality in 
the distribution of market incomes-gross wages, income from self-employment, capital 
income and returns from savings increased in almost all OECD countries between mid 
1980s and 2000s; as we alluded elsewhere in this thesis, top income earners are more likely 
to have access to such returns from market income given that they have better credit ratings, 
and savings and are therefore more likely to invest. Therefore, a reaction of Fed to the 
income of this group is not surprising given that increase in the share of capital income were 
due predominantly to movement in the upper part of the distribution. Reducing the income 
of the top 1 percent via reaction to asset prices could narrow the income disparity between 
the top and bottom income earners.    
Furthermore, widening income inequality is not without importance for Federal 
Reserves’ policies. For instance, Ostry and Al (2014) in their study found that increasing 
levels of inequality is correlated with slower and very fragile growth. In addition, authors 
such as Rajan (2010) pointed out that rising income inequality with excessive household 
debt, can lead to financial crises. Finally, rising income inequality is a threat to social 
cohesion; therefore, monetary authorities could be concerned with growing inequality if a 
pervasive perception of unfairness leads to political instability, thereby undermining 
economic growth and overall welfare.  
Although there is still widespread disagreement among academics and economists on 
the exact causes of inequality, the post recession recovery however, provides an anecdotal 
evidence of the monetary policy/income inequality relationship via the asset prices or 
portfolio channel54. The Fed’s aggressive policies55 aimed at propping up the economy have 
resulted to an unintended consequence-increase in inequality.  A 2007 Bank of England’s 
report posit that the Bank’s policies of quantitative easing-similar to the Fed’s has benefited 
the wealthy more than the poor, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2012). 
 According to this report, the program had boosted the value of stocks and bonds by 
about 26 percent or $970 billion, and about 40 percent of those gains went to the richest 5 
                                                          
54
 For more on the distribution of wealth in the post-crisis period in the U.S amongst households see, Fry and 
Taylor (2013), “An Uneven Recovery, 2009-2011. 
55
 The Fed’s primary monetary policy tool is its ability to influence the level of interest rates. At the onset of 
the 2007 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve policy makers pushed short term interest rates down nearly to 
zero. However, the Fed had to embark on more policy stimulus to turn the recession around. Given that the 
Fed could not push short-term interest rates down further it used the unconventional monetary policy tool of 
asset purchases the so called Quantitative easing to bring longer-term interest rates such as mortgage rates 
down.  
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percent of British households. Although the report maintains that the benefits of the 
monetary easing have also trickled down and that most households in the U.K would have 
been worse off without the Bank’s asset purchases. This report is instructive for the Unites 
States because the Fed’s monetary easing has helped to re-inflate the stock market in 2009 
and 2010 helping the wealthy to recover much of their wealth as stocks doubled in value 
while the rest of the households which depend on houses and jobs for their wealth are still 
stuck in recession. 
Monetary easing in the post-recession era has benefited asset prices and, the top 1 
percent owns an outsized share of assets-especially stocks. Although, low interest rates also 
penalize savers, and the top income earners as a group have the largest savings pool in 
American, but the benefits of monetary easing far outweighs the costs of low savings rate. 
This is because, the top income earners have only 13 percent of their investible assets in 
cash, and the rest in stocks, bonds, alternative investments and mutual funds-all of which 
benefits from monetary easing, Frank (2012). 
From the foregoing, it seems plausible to argue that the asset price channel of 
monetary policy transmission can explain in part the link between monetary policy and 
income inequality measured by the income of the top income earners.  Empirical literatures 
on monetary policy and asset prices suggest that expansionary monetary policy will lead to a 
rise in asset prices56 (particularly stock prices). Given that stock ownership is concentrated 
within the high income brackets a booming stock market will contribute to the increase in 
the income of those households that have access to the stock market via capital gains and 
stock options more than those that do not have such access.  
                                                          
56
 The present value model provides an insight on the effects of a monetary policy shifts on stock prices. This 
model stipulates that the stock price (St) is the present value of the future expected dividends (Dt+j). Under 
the assumption of constant discount rate (r) with no rational stock price bubbles we can obtain the present 
value model as: tt ES =
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 Where tE  is the conditional expectation operator based on 
information available to market participants at time t, R  is the rate of return used by market participants to 
discount future dividends, j is the investors time horizon. A change in monetary policy can affect stock 
returns by changing the discount rate used by market participants. This is because the discount factors used 
by financial market participants is assumed to be linked to market rates of interest which in turn is influenced 
by the actions of the central bank. In addition, monetary policy changes can have an indirect effect on a 
company’s stock values by changing expected future cash flows; therefore, stock prices will increase when 
there is a monetary policy easing because firms’ expects higher future cash flows as a result of increase in 
overall levels of economic activities. 
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Another explanation that is consistent with the above interpretation is that the top 
income earners are mainly highly salaried workers, Bakija (2012), that have a larger share of 
their wealth coming from wage income, capital income and entrepreneurial income (see 
figure 2.7 income composition of top 1% from 1917-2010). Thus these groups of individuals 
benefit more disproportionately in an environment of increasing asset prices than other 
households at the lower end of the income spectrum. 
Consequently, to the extent that financial asset prices particularly equity prices 
decreases following a restrictive monetary policy stance, lower stock prices will reduce the 
capital gains income from financial assets. This will reduce the income of those rich 
households with ownership of these assets thus narrowing the income gap between the rich 
and the poor. This finding is also consistent with the findings from previous studies that 
used stock market measures to augment the Taylor rule and show that the Fed rate increases 
when stock valuations increase, see-Rigobon and Sack (2003), Borio and White (2004), and 
Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2003). The idea is that higher rates (restrictive policy stance) 
would eventually cause stock prices to fall and subsequently top 1 percent income to 
decline. 
 
2.6.2 Robustness test for income inequality (measured using top 1 percent income) 
The adjustment of the short term interest rates by the Fed influences several 
economic variables including unemployment, consumer confidence and inflation amongst 
others. The Federal Reserve has at different occasions cited unemployment levels as one of 
the key factors influencing monetary policy. Recently, in December (2010),57 the Fed 
announced that the decision to keep interest rates near zero was to target unemployment. 
According to Barnichon and Figura (2010) fluctuations in the unemployment rate are 
influenced by three main factors namely: changes in labour demand, changes in labour 
supply due to movements in and out of the labour force, and changes in the rate at which 
jobs that are available in the labour market are matched to those actively searching for work, 
the so called “matching efficiency”.   
                                                          
57
  The December 14 2010 Monetary policy release suggests that the FOMC decided to continue expanding its 
holdings of securities as announced in November (2010); via the reinvestment of principal payments from its 
securities holdings and to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent. Principally, 
because of high levels of unemployment rate,  available at  
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101214a.htm 
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In addition, past empirical studies such as Taylor (1993,1999) and Clarida et al 
(1998) have suggested that changes in economic conditions, as reflected in the 
unemployment rate could induce the Federal Reserve to change the Federal funds rate. 
Given the role that the Federal funds rate plays in influencing economic activity such as 
unemployment as well as the relationship between unemployment and income inequality, it 
is important to determine if indeed the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality is 
robust in the presence of unemployment rate. 
To this end, we test the robustness of our findings by using an alternative measure 
for monetary policy- the three month Treasury bill as well as unemployment rate as a 
measure of economic activity instead of the frequently used output gap. Table 2.7a presents 
the result from the GMM estimation model. The result from this model is consistent with 
Taylor (1999) in the sense that monetary policy is found to be stable during this period. The 
coefficient on unemployment rate is negative as expected; however, it is not statistically 
significant. In addition, the response of monetary policy to income inequality is significant 
at the 5 percent levels. The result seems to suggest an increase of 0.05 basis points in the 
federal funds rate for a one percent rise in the income of the top 1 percent, confirming our 
previous findings that the Fed observes changes in income inequality measured using the 
income of the top 1 percent.  
 
Table 2.7a GMM estimates of the augmented Taylor Rule 1967q1-2011q4: robustness 
check using 3 months Treasury bill and unemployment rate 
Parameters ∝ ß ^\ `^CF  c^O OGH. î −JL) Ymî ` 
 0.26 
[0.87] 
0.89*** 
[28.07] 
1.20*** 
[2.87] 
-0.40 
[-1.23] 
0.05** 
[2.32] 
0.24 0.94 
Notes: Å, ß, ^\, `^CF , c^O  represent the parameters in the model, where ∝ is the constant, ß is the smoothing 
parameter, ^\ is the estimated weight on actual future inflation i.e. one period ahead inflation, `^CF  is the 
estimated weight on unemployment, c^O   is the estimated weight on the income share going to the top 1 
percent income earners, The parameter estimates are obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett 
Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the estimation weighting matrix. à contains the lagged values 
of the endogenous variables (the instruments). 3_E denotes three months treasury bill the proxy for monetary 
policy. The instruments used in the models are a constant, lags 2 of three months Treasury bill, lag 1of 
inflation, unemployment rate, income of the top 1 percent and M1. OGH. î − JL denotes the probability of the 
test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of observing the value of the J-statistic, if the 
null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the error 
term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The 
values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R . 3_E = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^CF + c^O/à + ]       (i) 
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Table 2.7b presents the result from the model that used Fed fund as a measure of the 
policy instrument and unemployment rate as a measure of economic activity. The aim of this 
analysis is to see if the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality will still be 
significant. The model using the Fed fund as a measure of monetary policy and 
unemployment rate as a measure of economic activity confirm our earlier findings.  
 
Table 2.7b GMM estimates of the augmented Taylor Rule 1967q1-2011q4: robustness 
check using Fed funds and unemployment rate 
Parameters ∝ ß ^\ `^CF  c^O OGH. î −JL) Ymî ` 
 -0.01 
[-0.02] 
0.89*** 
[31.36] 
1.37*** 
[3.52] 
-0.08 
[-0.22] 
0.07** 
[4.24] 
0.145 0.93 
Notes: 
 ∝, ß, ^\, `^CF , c^O  represent the parameters in the model, where ∝ is the constant, ß is the 
smoothing parameter, ^\is the estimated weight on one period ahead inflation, `^CF is the estimated 
weight on unemployment, c^O  is the estimated weight on the income share going to the top 1 percent 
income earners, The parameter estimates are obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, 
Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the estimation weighting matrix. à contains the lagged values of the 
endogenous variables (the instruments). The instruments used in the models are a constant, lag 2 of federal 
funds rate, lag 1of inflation, unemployment rate, average income of the top 1 percent and M1. OGH. î − JL 
denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of observing the 
value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% 
levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R . G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^CF + c^O/à + ]                                                           (j) 
 
Table 2.7b shows that the Taylor inflation stability threshold was met. A one unit 
increase in inflation will give rise to over a 100 percent increase in federal funds rate (1.37). 
The response of federal funds rate to inflation seems a bit stronger than the response of the 3 
months Treasury bill (1.20). The sign of the estimated coefficient of unemployment rate in 
the federal funds rate model is consistent with that of the 3 month Treasury bill model in 
Table 2.7a. In both models the measure of unemployment rate is negative and is not 
statistically significant. With regards to the measure of inequality, it is positive and 
statistically significant supporting our earlier findings 
Like we have mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, accommodative policy stance that 
results in increase in financial asset prices does have a major role to play in the observed 
income gap between the top income earners and the rest. Our literature search shows that 
about 60 percent of the top income earners are mangers, executives, financial professionals 
and supervisors and these groups of professionals can account for 70 percent of the increase 
in the share of national income going to the top 1 percent, Bakija and Heim (2009). A large 
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portion of their compensation comes in the form of stock options which implies that their 
income might be heavily influenced by financial market assets, particularly stock prices 
since their compensation is strongly tied to the stock market Philippon and Reshef (2009). 
The implication of the financial asset prices narrative is that monetary policy in a bid to react 
to stock prices misalignment from their economic fundamentals via restrictive monetary 
policy stance will affect the income of the top income earners thus narrowing the income 
distribution.  
Ronie, Vlachos and Waldenstrom (2008) provided support to the role of financial 
asset prices in influencing the income shares going to the top income earners. Their study 
found a positive statistically significant relationship between top income shares and stock 
market capitalization. Bakija and Heim (2009) in their cross-country study spanning from 
1979 to 2005 also found that stock price movement played a significant role in explaining 
the changes in the top income shares for the top 0.1 percent. We will investigate the causal 
relationship between income inequality and financial assets narrative in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
 
2.6.3. Testing for monetary policy asymmetric reaction to income inequality 
The estimations as performed in section 2.6.1 suggest that monetary policy observe 
changes in the income share of the top 1 percent. In principle, a positive  ^c coefficient (income of top 1 percent), indicates both interest rate cuts in times of 
sustained income decreases and rates hikes in times of sustained income increases. Using a 
state dependent dummy variable we want to see whether the interest rate setting of Fed 
differs during periods of sustained increase and decrease in the income of top 1 percent 
income earners. That is if the relationship between monetary policy measured using the 
Federal Funds rate and income inequality measured using the average income of the top 1 
percent differs, depending on whether the income of the richest 1 percent is below or above 
the three years moving average which we used as the threshold value. The analysis follows 
the methodology of Hoffmann (2009)58 that tested for asymmetric monetary policy reaction 
with respect to asset markets and Danne and Schnabl (2008) that tested possible asymmetric 
                                                          
58
Hoffmann (2009) study suggested that the Fed lowered interest rates after the dot-com bubble-burst but 
did not raise them during the boom years during the Greenspan tenure as Fed chairman. 
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monetary policy behaviour with respect to exchange rate changes in appreciation and 
depreciation phases in Japan59.  
In line with the above studies, we test for asymmetric monetary policy decisions with 
respect to top 1 percent income earners using a forward looking Taylor rule.  To capture this 
phenomenon, we introduced an asymmetric interaction term to isolate the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy responses in low income growth periods. Consequently, we defined a 
dummy variable  and some threshold value É∗ that takes the value of 1 when the income 
of the top 1 percent wage earners is below the 3 years moving average (the threshold value) 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
 = «0 RI É < É∗1RIÉ ≥ É∗ Þ                    (2.12) 
 
To identify an asymmetric behaviour in interest rate decisions with respect to periods of low 
income growth the interaction term is multiplied with the income share of the top 1 percent 
income earners. This yields the following specification: 
 G = ^Å + ^`ßGk + 1 − ß[^c\ + ì^P + v + dO/à] + ]                (2.13) 
 
Where ^Å is the constant in the equation, `^ßGk, represents the smoothing parameter, ^c\ denotes the long run implied coefficient of expected inflation,  ì^P long run implied  
coefficient of the contemporaneous output gap, O denotes the variable top 1 percent 
income share, d represents the periods of sustained decline in income. The coefficient d 
captures the interest rate responses in low income growth phases. If d is significant and 
positive it indicates that the Fed reacted differently in low income growth phases (with 
interest rate cuts) compared to high income growth phases. The size of the d coefficient 
(economic effects) indicates the interest rate effect which is additionally triggered by the 
income declines.  
                                                          
59
Danna and Schnabl (2008) asserts that the fear of appreciation against the dollar forced the Bank of Japan 
(BoJ) to lower interest rates in appreciation periods in the 1990s to support growth. However, the BoJ did not 
increase interest rates in depreciation periods to the same extent to keep Japanese economy competitive. 
Therefore, the Bank of Japan systematically lowered interest rate until they reached the zero bound.  
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The coefficient v represents the coefficient for periods of high income growth, i.e 
the difference to d. The total economic effect of periods of sustained income decreases is 
captured by the sum of the coefficients  d LBm v, Danne and Schnabl (2008) and Hoffmann 
(2009).  To test if this total effect is significant, we used the Wald test for joint significance 
of d LBm v. finally, à  is the instruments used in the GMM model which includes lags 1 of 
the endogenous variables and unemployment rate. The error term ] is assumed to be 
normally distributed. The results from table 2.8 below (both the GMM and OLS) estimation 
methods seem to suggest the presence of asymmetry in the response of monetary policy to 
the income of the top 1 percent income earners.  
The d coefficients (which captures the interest rate responses in low income growth 
phases) on both the GMM and OLS results are both significant at the 1 percent levels. 
Evidence of monetary policy asymmetry can also be seen from the magnitude of the Fed’s 
response to income inequality when the average income of the top 1 percent is below the 3 
years moving average d (periods of low income growth). This is because although monetary 
policy tightens during periods of prolonged income increases, the Fed did not increase 
interest rates high enough to curb the increase in income as they would cut rates in the event 
of a decline in income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
Table 2.8 GMM and OLS estimates of state dependent model 1967q1-2011q4 
Parameters Column 1 GMM Column 2  OLS 
^Å 0.10 
[0.67] 
-0.29 
[-1.38] 
`^ß  0.89*** 
[37.60] 
0.84*** 
[26.07] 
c^\ 1.03*** 
[2.52] 
1.52*** 
[3.19] 
ì^P  0.58*** 
[3.47] 
0.10*** 
[5.89] v 0.04** 
[2.09] 
0.03* 
[1.92] d 0.18*** 
[2.74] 
0.08** 
[2.19] Ymî ` 0.94 0.94 OGH. î − JL 0.76  _ª  0.58 
Notes: 
 ^Å is the constant in the equation, `^ß , represents the estimated weight of the smoothing parameter, c^\ 
denotes the estimated long run implied coefficient of expected inflation,  ì^P  estimated long rum coefficient 
of the contemporaneous out gap, v denotes the estimated coefficient on periods of sustained income growth, d∗O represents the estimated coefficient on periods of sustained decline in income and à is the instruments 
used in the GMM model which includes lags 1 of the endogenous variables and unemployment rate. The 
parameter estimates are obtained by OLS and GMM estimation using HAC standard errors & covariance 
(Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5, 0000) as the estimation weighting matrix. OGH. î − JL 
denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions. Ymî `is the adjusted 2R ._ª 
denotes the t-statistic for the Ramsey Reset diagnostic test. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The inflation used in the OLS model is the one year ahead inflation expectation 
forecast ^\<  G = ^Å + `^ßGk + 1 − ß[ c^\ + ì^P + v + dO/à] + ]                                      (k)  
 
The result presented in table 2.8 column 1 (GMM) reveals an increase of about 
(0.18) 18 basis point in the policy rate for every 1 percent decrease in income of the top one 
percent, however, the Fed’s response to income inequality when the average income of the 
top 1 percent is above the 3 years moving average (periods of high income growth), v 
coefficient reveals an increase of only about (0.04) 4 basis point for a 1 percent increase in 
income. The Fed’s response to periods of sustained income gains seems relatively weak 
when compared to its response to the periods of prolonged income declines. In addition, the 
strength of the significance levels can also be used to judge the strength of Fed’s response. 
While the response of Fed during periods of income declines is significant at the 1 percent 
levels, its response during periods of income growth is significant at 5 percent levels. Both 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and strength of the levels of significance are 
confirmed by OLS model (table 2.8 columns 2).  
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To test the hypothesis that the Fed has put more weight on their reaction to income 
inequality during periods of sustained decreases in income of the top 1 percent than during 
periods of sustained increases we performed an Wald test for the null hypothesis that the 
value of the coefficient d in equation 2.12 is equal to the value of the coefficient on v. The 
null hypothesis is d = v. That is equal reaction of Fed to sustained increases versus declines 
in the top 1 percent income. 
 
Table 2.8.1a Wald test for coefficient magnitude 
Test Statistic Value probability  − JLRJRN 1.99 0.05 W − JLRJRN 3.97 0.05 VℎR − J.CLGF 3.97 0.05 
Notes: Null Hypothesis: Vd = Vv. Model standard error=0.007 
 
Based on the Wald Test result (table 2.8.1a), the null hypothesis was rejected at 5 
percent levels. According to the Wald test, the Fed’s reaction to a decline in the income of 
the top 1 percent is not equal to their reaction during periods of sustained income growth 
indicating support for asymmetric reaction. We also used the Wald test to determine the 
joint significance of the two coefficients d LBm v i.e. the total economic effect in low 
income growth phases, the null hypothesis is d = 0, v = 0. 
 
Table 2.8.1b Wald test for joint significance of ñ òóô õ 
Test Statistic Value probability W − JLRJRN 5.64*** 0.00 VℎR − J.CLGF 11.27*** 0.00 
Notes: Null Hypothesis: d = 0, v = 0 
 
The result in table 2.8.1b shows that d LBm v  are jointly significant at the 1 percent 
levels. The interaction term provides strong evidence that the Fed responded asymmetrically 
to income declines in periods of low income growth. This implies that the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy contributed to some extent to the high income disparity between the high 
and low income earners. The Fed lowered interest rates during the low income growth 
periods more than they increased it during the income boom periods.  
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This sort of asymmetry seems identical to the Fed’s reaction to equity prices, Ravn 
(2011) and Hall (2011)60. According to Issing (2009) ’the "pre-crisis" consensus’ or  the 
"Jackson Hole consensus" with regards to monetary policy and asset prices is that central 
banks should not lean against asset price movements; because of the difficulties involved in 
doing so. Instead, they should stand ready to cut the interest rate in response to decreases in 
asset prices. In other words, monetary policy should react to asset market bursts and not to 
booms in asset prices, Stark (2011). As we pointed out in the previous sections of this 
chapter, the holding of financial assets particularly stocks is highly concentrated within the 
top income class. Therefore, the implicit partial insurance (cut in interest rate during periods 
of decreases in stock prices) against stock price drop might lead to moral hazard problems 
by covering part of the downside risk faced by investors in the stock market which are 
mainly top income earners. This seems like a destabilizing policy. 
To confirm the internal stability of our findings, we estimated a forward looking 
Taylor rule, cutting off the 1970s to mid 1980s that is periods of aggressive ant-inflationary 
stance as well as the post financial crisis era (i.e. the sample stopped in 2007 Q2 onset of the 
crisis) . The results and discussions from these models are presented in the next section. 
 
2.7 Sub-sample stability test: 1984q1 to 2007q2 
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a major shift in the emphasis of 
macroeconomic policy toward combating inflation as opposed to maintaining full 
employment. This was accompanied by tight monetary policies in the U.S which saw 
interest rate increased to unprecedented heights. Monetary policy during this period61 gave 
rise to higher real and nominal rates of interest. These rates of interest as was argued by 
Niggle (1989) brought about a major shift in the functional distribution of income toward 
                                                          
60
 The study of Ravn (2011) reveals that a 5% drop in the S &P 500 index increased the possibility of a 
subsequent 25 basis point interest rate cut by 33% during the period under review (1998-2008). In addition, 
Hall (2011) using an augmented Taylor rule model with lagged stock price deflation found that stock price 
deflation led to a highly significant cut in interest rate. Her study also showed that the inclusion of stock price 
deflation led to an improvement in the fit of the Taylor rule. Finally, Hoffmann (2009) also found asymmetric 
monetary policy reaction to stock prices during the Greenspan/Bernanke period (1987-2008). According to 
her, the Fed lowered interest rates, when asset markets bursts, but did not raise them when they boomed 
during the Greenspan era. 
61
 The monetary policy stance in the U.S during the late 1970s was in disarray. In 1974 and 1980 inflation 
peaked above 10 percent leaving many central bankers questioning the potency of monetary policy in 
reducing inflation. Economist such as Okun (1979) suggested that the Federal Reserve would need to reduce 
employment and output by 10 percent for one year for each permanent percentage point reduction of 
inflation that it wished to achieve. 
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capital at the expense of labour income.  According to Niggle (1989), financial capital’s 
share of income increased at the expense of industrial and labour incomes. Given that the 
ownership of interest bearing financial assets is concentrated within the high income earners, 
this shift in the functional distribution of income has contributed to the shifts in personal 
distribution of income.  These periods (1979 to 1984) of aggressive anti-inflationary policy 
stance urshed in the so called ‘great moderation’ era which saw inflation reduced from 12 
percent per annum to around 3 percent per annum, Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013). 
However, workers particularly low skilled workers borne a heavy cost due to increased 
unemployment as policy interest rates were increased, Ball (1993).  
After the volatility of the 1970s and early 1980s, the great moderation was seen as a 
welcome end to inflation volatility. A prominent feature of this period was persistently low 
inflation without compromising unemployment and economic growth. This period saw also 
massive financial deregulation which encouraged financial institutions to take on more risk. 
Another prominent feature of the great moderation period was increasing asset prices 
especially house and equity prices accompanied with rising income inequality. Some 
researchers have argued that the increase in stock prices coupled with the so called 
financialization of the 1980s were major forces behind the high income gap between the rich 
and the poor.  
The above events provide a major motivation for us to test the structural stability of 
the earlier findings by splitting the sample from 1984 to 2007 that marked the periods of the 
great moderation characterized by low inflation, strong economic growth, low 
macroeconomic risk and high income inequality. The sub-sample analysis considers the 
potential reaction of monetary policy to the income of the top 1 percent during the ‘great 
moderation’ era until the on-set of the global financial crisis in the second quarter of 2007.  
Table 2.9 columns 1 and 2 present the results from the GMM and the OLS 
estimations. Evidence from the sub-sample analysis implies a stable monetary policy regime 
during the period under investigation. The results from the GMM model suggests that the 
Fed during the great moderation periods and before the start of the 2007 great recession did 
observe changes in our measure of income inequality in setting the policy rate. . This result 
reveals that a one unit increase in the income of these groups of income earners will result in 
a 4 basis points increase in Fed funds rate.  
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Table 2.9 GMM and OLS estimates of sub-sample stability 1984q1-2007q2 
Parameters Column 1 GMM Column 2  OLS Å 0.13 
[0.68] 
-0.04 
[-1.38] ß 0.86*** 
[25.92] 
0.78*** 
[17.05] 
^\ 1.05** 
[2.19] 
1.21*** 
[3.41] 
`^P  0.56*** 
[3.47] 
0.44*** 
[6.27] 
c^O  0.04** 
[5.18] 
0.01* 
[1.83] Ymî ` 0.97 0.94 OGH. î − JL 0.89  _ª  0.58 
Notes: 
 Å is the constant in the equation, ßGk, represents the estimated weight of the smoothing parameter, ^\ 
denotes the estimated long run implied coefficient of expected inflation,  `^P  estimated long rum coefficient 
of the contemporaneous out gap, c^Odenotes the estimated coefficient on the income of the top 1 percent, ] is 
the error term and à is the instruments used in the GMM model which includes lags 1 of the endogenous 
variables and unemployment rate. The parameter estimates are obtained by OLS and GMM estimation using 
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5, 0000) as the estimation 
weighting matrix. OGH. î − JLdenotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions. Ymî `is the adjusted 2R ._ª denotes the t-statistic for the Ramsey Reset diagnostic test. The 
asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The inflation used in the OLS 
model is the one year ahead inflation expectation forecast ^\< G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P + c^O/à + ]                                                       (l) 
 
While the OLS model table 2.9 column 2 shows a minimal increase of about 1 basis 
point in Fed funds rate in response to an increase in income inequality. The dynamic 
stability criterion in both models were not compromised in that ^\ > 1 and statistically 
significant and the coefficients of the output gaps in both models were positive `^P > 0 
indicating that the Federal funds rate increases if the Federal reserve observes an increase in 
output i.e. excess demand.  
To sum up, the results from the models that used the income of the top 1 percent as a 
measure of income inequality within a forward looking monetary policy rule, seems to 
suggest a positive relationship between the monetary policy rate and the income of the top 1 
percent measure of income inequality. In addition, we observed evidence of asymmetric 
policy response to the income of the top 1 percent wage earners in the U.S. These results 
seem to suggest that monetary policy regime between 1967 and 2011 have accommodated 
increases in the income of the top 1 percent income earners. 
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2.8 Consumption inequality and monetary policy 
Earlier empirical studies that have looked at consumption based measures of 
inequality suggests major divergence from income based measures. For instance, Cutler and 
Katz (1991) in their work found that consumption inequality increased less sharply than 
income inequality between 1960-61 and 1988. Slesnick (2001) in his own contribution 
found that consumption inequality has been somewhat constant between 1970 and 1995. 
Blundell et al (2008) maintained that the divergence in income and consumption inequality 
can be partly explained by the nature and durability of shocks to labour market earnings. 
According to them, households may temper the effects of an adverse economic shock on 
consumption by borrowing and saving more or by delaying the decision to replace durable 
goods. The fact that economic agents can borrow and save to smooth their living standards 
can explain the reason behind the small disparities in consumption when compared to that of 
income.  
Blundel et al (2008) highlighted four insurance mechanisms between income received in 
the labour market and consumption which may help to reduce the impact of an adverse 
economic shock on consumption to include number of work hours, family labour supply, 
taxes and transfers as well as the ability of households/individuals to borrow and save. These 
insurance mechanisms are discussed in turn below: 
• Number of work Hours: Give that an hourly wage that an individual receive has a 
direct link to the number of hours worked; economic agents might decide to increase 
their income in the face of a negative income shock by increasing the number of 
hours they work. 
• Family labour supply: the number of eligible/potential earners in a household is 
another mechanism that households could use to increase their income and maintain 
their consumption levels. Decisions concerning who and how many of the potential 
earners can work as well as the number of work hours that each earner can commit 
will be made jointly. Therefore, if income is falling, households with two eligible 
workers for instance might decide to not only take up employment but also increase 
the number of hours and over time they work. 
• Taxes and Transfers: Many governments particularly in Europe (countries such as 
Sweden or Netherlands) use their tax and transfer systems to counteract high 
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inequality in income before taxes and public transfers. Households can use transfers 
such as unemployment benefits, child and family allowances, social retirement e.t.c. 
to augment failing income. Blundell and Pistaferri (2003) showed that national 
programs like food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program SNAP) in 
the United States were effective in easing the effects of income shocks on 
consumption.  
Given that one of the key mechanisms between earnings and 
spendable/disposal income is taxes and transfers, a well designed social security 
system can help families to reduce consumption inequality and shield themselves 
from fluctuations in income. According to Blundel et al (2008) low-income 
households would temper the effects of an adverse income shock on consumption by 
using one or a combination of the above mentioned insurance mechanism. He 
maintained that the rise in income inequality has been more pronounced than the rise 
in consumption inequality because of the increased borrowing for the purpose of 
consumption.  
This narrative was corroborated by Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) in their 
study which showed that the rise in aggregate household leverage has been due to an 
increase in leverage for the bottom 95% of the income distribution. To account for 
the potential reaction of monetary policy on dispersion in household consumption we 
estimated a similar model of forward looking Taylor rule but this time we used 
average annual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles starting from 
1984 to 2011. Specifically we used the growth rates of average quarterly 
expenditures of the highest and lowest 20 percent income quintiles spanning from 
1984 to 2011 as our measure of consumption inequality.   
Table 2.10 is the descriptive statistics for the variables in the consumption 
inequality models. The data for this analysis was sourced from the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey. The table reports the average, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviations of the Federal funds rate, inflation, output gap, 
average annual consumption of the lowest and highest 20 income quantiles as well as 
unemployment rate. 
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Table 2.10 Descriptive Statistics for the consumption inequality 1984 to 2011 
 G \ P X ℎ CF 
Mean 4.43 2.86 0.00 2.60 3.02 6.02 
Maximum 9.73 6.09 0.02 180.70 8.60 9.90 
minimum 0.07 -1.63 -0.03 -163.72 -2.89 3.90 
Std. Dev. 2.60 1.22 0.01 436 2.76 1.49 
Notes: G denotes effective federal funds rate, \ is the annualized inflation rate, P denotes the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended real GDP, X denotes the average annual consumption expenditures of households within the lowest 
20 income quintiles, ℎdenotes the average annual consumption expenditures of households within the highest 
20 income quintiles and CFdenotes the unemployment rate. 
 
Table 2.10.1 below reports the correlation matrix of all the variables included in this part 
of our analysis. The table reveals a positive correlation between Federal funds rate, inflation, 
output gap and average consumption expenditures of households at the highest 20 percent 
income quintiles. 
 
Table 2.10.1 Correlation matrix for the consumption inequality 1984 to 2011 
 G \ P X ℎ CF G 1.00 0.55 0.50 -0.03 0.54 -0.49 \ 0.55 1.00 0.51 0.11 0.42 -0.29 P 0.50 0.51 1.00 -0.03 0.36 -0.50 X -0.03 0.11 -0.03 1.00 -0.16 0.00 ℎ 0.54 0.42 0.36 -0.16 1.00 -0.45 CF -0.49 -0.29 -0.50 0.00 -0.45 1.00 
Notes: G denotes effective federal funds rate, \ is the annualized inflation rate, P denotes the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended real GDP, X denotes the average annual consumption expenditures of households within the lowest 
20 income quintiles, ℎ denotes the average annual consumption expenditures of households within the highest 
20 income quintiles and CFdenotes the unemployment rate. 
 
A negative correlation was observed between the Federal funds rate, output gap, and the 
income of the lowest 20 percent income quintiles. The table also shows a negative 
relationship between the incomes of the lowest and highest 20 percent income quintiles at 
approximately 16 percent 
The results from both models in table 2.10.2 show that the responses of monetary policy 
on the consumption expenditures of households within the lowest and highest 20 percent 
income quintiles are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the results from both models 
showed that the Taylor stability criteria were not met and inflation had a negative sign and is 
not significant in model 1. The output gaps in both models were positive and statistical 
significant. The probabilities of the ï − JLRJRNJ in both models show that the lists of 
instruments used in the estimations met the orthogonality conditions.   
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It seems to be the case that including a measure of consumption inequality in the fed’s 
reaction function, results in coefficients on inflation that no longer consistently imply a 
stable monetary policy. The evidence of no reaction of monetary policy to consumption 
inequality seems consistent with the narrative that households can employ one or more 
combination of any of the previously discussed insurance mechanisms to temper the effects 
of adverse economic shocks on consumption.  In addition, given that monetary policy in the 
U.S have a dual mandate of price stabilization and sustainable long term economic growth, it 
seems plausible to argue that inequality in consumption that does not result in a decline in 
aggregate demand or consumption might not attract the Fed’s attention.  
 
2.10.3 GMM estimates of consumption inequality 1984 to 2011 
Parameters  ℎ Column 1 X Column 2 Å 0.49 
[1.48] 
0.40 
[1.47] ß 0.94*** 
[18.56] 
0.97*** 
[16.46] 
^\ -3.83*** 
[-1.01] 
-5.21 
[-0.78] 
`^P 0.65* 
[1.78] 
1.42** 
[1.91] 
c^X 0.33 
[1.61] 
 
ì^ℎ   0.003 
[0.27] OGH. î − JL 0.59 0.17 Ymî ` 0.96 0.96 
Notes:  ∝ ß ^\ `^Prepresent the parameters in the  models, where ∝ is the constant, ß is the smoothing 
parameter, ^\ denotes the estimated long run implied coefficient of expected inflation,  `^P estimated 
long rum coefficient of the contemporaneous out gap, c^X denotes  the average annual consumption 
expenditures of households within the lowest 20 income quintiles, ì^ℎ  denotes the average annual 
consumption expenditures of households within the highest 20 income quintiles. The parameter estimates are 
obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the 
estimation weighting matrix. The instruments used in the models are a constant, lag 2 of federal funds rate, lag 
1of inflation, unemployment rate, average income of the top 1 percent and M1. OGH. î − JL denotes the 
probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of observing the value of the 
J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% 
levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R . G = Å + ßGk + 1 − ß ^\ + `^P + c^X + ì^ℎ/à + ]                                                 (m)   
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2.9 Conclusion: 
Our main contributions to the existing literature on monetary policy and income 
inequality are two folds; first the study found a significant reaction of monetary policy to 
income inequality measured using the share of income going to the top 1 percent income 
earners. We suspect that this reaction may be linked indirectly to the reaction of monetary 
policy to financial assets. The study found that interest rate tightens when the income of the 
top 1 percent is increasing and loosens during low income growth phases. Secondly, this 
chapter found evidence of an asymmetric monetary policy reaction, with stronger response 
to the top 1 percent variable when it is exhibiting sustained declines. The finding is related 
to the existing augmented Taylor rule literature that found asymmetric monetary policy 
reaction to stock market measures (stronger reaction to stock markets when they are down) 
the so called “Greenspan-Bernanke put”.  
Officially, income inequality targeting is not an objective of the Fed. However, our 
estimation results from the forward looking Taylor Rule of the United States in the period 
1967 to 2011 seems to suggest that the Fed actually takes into account changes in income 
inequality in its reaction function. We found that a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of 
the average income going to the top one percent in our OLS model brings about an increase 
of 2 basis points in the interest rate in the same period. This reaction is consistent when a 
different estimation method (GMM) is used. The result from the GMM model reveals that a 
1 percent increase in the growth rate of the income of the top 1 percent will lead to an 
increase of 7 basis points in interest rate.  
 The result from the state dependent model seems to suggest some sort of asymmetric 
reaction to the income of the top 1 percent.  In the sense that the Fed responds strongly to 
inequality in periods of sustained decreases in the income of the top 1 percentage, given that 
the estimated implied long term coefficient d which captures phases of sustained income 
increases is 0.18 as opposed to the relatively weak response of 0.04 in periods of sustained 
increase in income. This sort of policy adjustment seems to be destabilizing. The result has 
important policy implication because understanding of the relationship between monetary 
policy and income inequality will help monetary authorities in gaining a better insight into 
how shifts in their policy stance affect income distribution so that a discretionary policy 
stance does not become an independent cause of macroeconomic instability. 
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The analysis so far shows that some aspects of monetary policy as conventionally 
defined- the ultimate goals, intermediate policy targets, policy instruments and operating 
procedures chosen by the monetary authorities respond to changes in income inequality 
measured using the income share going to the top 1 percent. The logic seems compelling 
especially if it is interpreted within the context of past empirical works that augmented the 
Taylor rule with financial assets. The processes connecting distribution of household income 
to changes in monetary policy through the transmission mechanism of the level of interest 
rates are not that simple. Past empirical studies reveal that changes in policy interest rates 
will change the market values of financial assets, thus affecting capital gains and losses with 
either positive or negative implications for holders of such assets.  
Our literature search reveals that the long-run increase in the income of the top 1 
percent earners reflected a strong rise in asset prices, specifically stock prices and home 
prices during the boom/ great moderation periods; this was partially reversed in the recent 
financial crisis. The distributional effects of interest rates are different and sometimes 
complex. If interest rates are kept too low, domestic price inflation will eventually pick up. 
This erodes the value of deposits and loans. At the same time, low interest rates will lead to 
an increase in asset prices such as stocks and house prices. This implies a shift in favour of 
those who are already well positioned within the affected markets (real estate or stock 
market). Our point of view is that asset prices could be one of the transmission channels of 
monetary policy to income inequality. Therefore, policies that are targeted towards the 
reduction of asset price bubbles might help in reducing income inequality.  
Finally, changing the trend and pattern of income distribution in a manner that 
ensures that society as a whole shares in the overall progress of the economy should be a 
major preoccupation of both monetary and fiscal policy. In addition to achieving their dual 
mandate of promoting maximum sustainable employment and stable prices, monetary policy 
makers should also strive to develop appropriate incomes policy that can help in achieving a 
socially acceptable degree of income inequality. This is an area which requires continuing 
research. 
 
115 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Role of Asset Prices on Income Inequality 
 
           (Does the top 1 percent respond to changes in stock prices?) 
 
3.0 Introduction: 
The empirical findings from the previous chapter suggests a strong positive and 
statistically significant relationship between monetary policy and income inequality 
measured using the income share of the top 1 percent within a Taylor rule framework. We 
suspect that this reaction to the income of the top 1 percent and a lack of reaction to other 
measures of income inequality namely the GINI index of inequality and the 90/10 wage 
differentials used in the last chapter could be an indirect reaction to the stock market. This is 
because of the close correlation between the income of the top 1 percent and the S&P500 
index. The chapter also found an asymmetric monetary policy reaction with respect to the 
income of the top 1 percent62. Such asymmetric policy reaction can be linked to that of the 
stock market63. The two findings from the previous empirical chapter provide a major 
motivation for the present chapter.  
The present chapter seeks to determine whether there is some sort of endogeneity in 
financial market development and the income of the top 1 percent. Specifically, we want to 
determine if the developments within the stock markets have any causal effect on the 
income of the top 1 percent income earners and the direction of this effect if any. The focus 
on top 1 percent income earners allows us to evaluate a special subset of questions regarding 
the extent to which asset prices is particularly pro-rich. Some authors have evaluated some 
aspects of this effect in the past.  
For instance Sawhney and Dipietro (2006) found that increases in stock market 
wealth have a positive and significant effect on income inequality across the 73 countries 
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The findings implied that the Fed reacted differently in low income growth phases (with interest rate cuts) 
compared to high income growth phases. 
63
 See, Hoffman (2012) who found that the Fed’s policy differed depending on the chairman. Her study found 
that the Fed policy during the Greenspan era lowered interest rates when the stock prices fell but did not 
raise it during the boom period. Ravn (2011) also found that the reaction of the Federal Reserve was 
asymmetric between 1998 and 2008. According to him, a 5% drop in the S&P 500 index is shown to increase 
the probability of a 25 basis point interest rate cut by one third, while no significant reaction to stock price 
increases was identified. 
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they studied. Their work showed that increases in stock market wealth led to an increase in 
the income of the top quintile while it reduced the share of income of the bottom quintile. In 
a recent study Roine et al (2009) were interested in studying the long-run determinants of 
inequality, they found that financial development measured as the relative share of the 
banking and stock market sectors increased the income share of the top percentile. 
Our first objective in this chapter is to use Pair wise Granger (1969)64 causality tests 
to explore unidirectional causality, bidirectional causality or absence of directional causality 
between stock returns and changes in the income shares of the top 1 and bottom 90 percent. 
The essence of this test is to determine if changes in stock prices is useful in forecasting 
changes in the income share of the top 1 percent and vice versa. A finding of unidirectional 
causality from stock returns to top 1 percent income earners may imply that the reaction of 
monetary policy to the top 1 percent variable as was established in the previous empirical 
chapter could be a reaction to the financial market as opposed to a direct reaction to changes 
in the income of this group of individuals. The current paper is the first study that has 
studied the causal effect of stock prices and the income of the top 1 and bottom 90 percent 
and therefore, brings a huge insight into the issue, as well as filling the gap in the literature 
on top income earners which has so far focused on the contribution of the top 1 percent 
income earners to overall income inequality. The results of our analysis hold practical 
implications to policy makers and regulators alike who are interested in narrowing the gap 
between the top income earners and the rest. 
Secondly, we analyze the relationship between asset prices and income inequality. 
We study this question empirically by looking at how the income of top 1 percent of the 
earning population responds to changes in both financial and non financial assets. We used 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to study the reaction of inequality to changes 
in asset prices. To achieve our second objective, we specified a parsimonious model for the 
income of the top 1 percent as a function of six factors (6 covariates): financial assets (stock 
returns), non financial assets (returns on house prices), bond yields, macro-economic factors 
(unemployment rate and inflation), and education premium. Our task here is to provide 
empirical evidence on which of the two variables (asset prices and education premium) 
provides better explanatory power to changes in income of the top 1 percent. 
Examining whether changes in both financial and non-financial assets affects 
everyone in the top and bottom of the income distribution the same way, or if there are 
remarkable differences on how these variables affect individuals within the top and bottom 
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 For an application of Granger Causality Tests see Huang and Kracaw (1984), Swanson (1987) and Cochran 
and Mansur (1991). 
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income percentiles, will be an important contribution in understanding what is driving the 
changes in the income share of the rich in the United States.  Our central concern is to 
determine empirically whether stock prices can explain variations in the income of top 1 
percent, bottom 90 percent and lowest fifth percent households. We achieve this by 
specifying 3 GMM models with the income of the top 1 percent, the income of the bottom 
90 percent and the share of aggregate income of the lowest fifth percent households as our 
measures of income inequality (the dependent variables).  
Previous studies on income inequality link the increasing income inequality to labour 
market, Fortin and Lemieux (1997), demographic changes, McCall and Percheski (2010), 
technological changes, Autor et al (2003), politics and social policy, Domhoff (2012) and 
Iverson and Wren (1998), education/skill premium, Mankiw (2013) and Goldin and Katz 
(2008) amongst other factors. However, these changes alone cannot fully explain the 
growing concentration of income at the very top of the income distribution. Our central 
hypothesis is that developments within the asset markets particularly stock markets can 
explain the dynamics behind the growth in the income of top income earners in the United 
States. 
Consequently, this chapter empirically examines the relationship between income 
inequality and stock prices, house prices, bond yields, unemployment rate and inflation. 
While some of these variables are not direct measures of typically suggested causes of 
changes in income distribution, studying their relation to inequality seems an important step 
towards understanding how wealth65 affects the distribution of income. This is because the 
distribution of stocks and homes has important implications for who benefits from asset 
prices appreciation and who is hurt by its depreciation. The present paper departs from 
earlier work in that we study the relationship between our three measures of income 
inequality and the covariates using a dynamic GMM model.  To our knowledge, this is the 
first study that has undertaken a detailed analysis of the relationship between the incomes of 
the top 1 percent, bottom 90 percent and lowest fifty percent household income on one hand 
and stock and house prices using this estimation method.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: section 3.1 develops a 
financialization perspective of income/ wealth distribution and mechanisms to show the way 
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 Stocks (equities) have long been acknowledged as an important form in which people hold wealth.  Fry and 
Taylor (2013), using data from the U.S. Census Bureau showed that among households with net worth of 
$500,000 or more, 65% of their wealth comes from financial holdings, such as stocks, bonds and 401(k) 
accounts and only 17% comes from their home. Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) in their own contribution 
estimated that the household sector’s equity holding increased to nearly 100 percent between mid 1994 and 
1997, representing a gain of over five trillion. 
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in which financialization might affect the distribution of income between the top income 
earners and the rest and also elaborates on the different theories of rising top income share. 
In section 3.2 we present a review of past literatures on asset prices and income inequality. 
Section 3.3 is the data analysis section as well as the causal effect of stock prices on top 1 
percent income earners. In section 3.4 we present a detailed analysis of the estimation 
method used in this study as well as the presentation and interpretation of results. In section 
3.5 we test the robustness of our findings by including a measure of skill/education 
premium. The idea is to test whether the stock price-income inequality increasing hypothesis 
will continue to be significant if we control for education premium in the model while 
section 3.6 is the summary of findings and conclusion. 
 
3.1 Concept of financialization and income inequality 
According to an accumulating body of research in economics and income inequality 
literatures, the significant increase in wage inequality is one of the main drivers of the 
increased upward distribution of household income to the top income earners. Wage 
inequality is defined as the increasing wage gaps between higher and lower paid workers; 
this has been on the increase since the late 1970s both in the UK and U.S., Schmitt (1995) 
and Machin (1996). Those at the bottom of the income distribution have been experiencing 
large falls in their earnings since the late 1980s. The proximate causes of rising wage 
inequality have been attributed to the growing inequality of capital income as well as the 
increasing share of income going to capital rather than wages and compensation, Mishel and 
Bivens (2011).  
These developments fall within the ambit of the concept known as financialization. 
Authors such as Epstein and Jayadev (2005), Skot (2008), Foster and Magdoff (2009), and 
Duenhaupt (2010), amongst others have all acknowledged the role of financialization66 of 
the economy, the performance of financial markets and the alignment of top executive 
compensation to stock price movements via share options to the widening income gap 
between the top and low income earners. These studies emphasized the tremendous growth 
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 Epstein (2005) defines financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. 
Others see it as a situation in which profits are made through financial channels rather than through trade 
and commodity production. Epstein and Jaydev (2005) define it as a situation in which industrial corporations 
channel a large part of their resources to financial activities at the expense of their main activity. 
Financialization as a concept can be seen as a phase of capitalist development in which rent extraction and 
profit making occurs primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production. In other words, financialization can be seen as the changing role of the financial sector for the 
real sector as well as the changes within the financial sector itself. 
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in capital income, decline in the share of labour income as well as the stagnation of real 
wages as important determinants of inequality in most industrialized economies.  
Financialization covers a wide range of phenomena including the deregulation of the 
financial sector, the increasing importance of finance and financial markets for firms and 
households, Orhangazi (2008), the increase in both corporate and household leverage, the 
proliferation of new and complex financial instruments, Krippner, (2005), the boom and bust 
cycle in asset markets, the shareholder value orientation and changes in corporate 
governance, Stockhammer (2010), as well as the rapid rise of incomes in the financial sector 
amongst others. In this section, we explore how some of these changes have affected the 
income of the top income earners in the U.S.  
The effect of financialization on income inequality can be understood within the 
context of financial assets67 because they contribute to an individual’s stock of wealth. 
Financial assets held by households form an important part of overall income and an 
important source of revenue either through their sale or refinancing. Keister (2002), argues 
that changes in the rules and practices68 governing financial markets can have a significant 
impact on the distribution and disposition of wealth/income in the society. Much of the 
1980s in the United States were marked by prosperity and strong economic growth that 
came in the form of financial activity and speculation in the financial market. Coming at the 
expense of the three decades-long process of financialization is the real sector of the 
economy which employs millions of middle-class Americans while most of the wealthiest 
individuals were employed by large investment firms in the financial sector, Mishel and 
Sabdish (2012), Bakija, Cole and Heim (2012).  
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act69 in 1999 was the culmination of 
financialization and pursuit of neo-liberalism in America.  Another development that 
                                                          
67
 Financial assets are assets that derive their value because of a contractual claim and can be readily 
converted into cash. Financial assets include stocks, bonds, certificate of deposit amongst others. Firms in the 
financial services industry usually prefer to use financial assets to measure an individual’s wealth because this 
reflects what the individual currently has to invest.. 
68
 The financialization of the U.S economy that started in the 1980s brought a lot of changes in both the 
regulation and operations of financial firms. The financialization got to the peak in the 1990s which led to the 
deregulation of the financial services industry. The deregulation initiatives of the 1990s culminated to the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 that provided the environment that aided financial firms to make 
huge amount of profits in the face of little regulation, Arnum (2011). According to Johnson (2012), financial 
profits for most U.S businesses went up to a little over 40 percent nearly twice the post-world war II average. 
69
  The Glass-Steagall Act is the Banking Act of 1933 that separated banking according to the types of banking 
business- commercial and investment banking. The Act also amended the Federal Reserve Act to institute the 
system of federal deposit insurance and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) owned by 
the Federal Reserve System, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS): Banking 101. 
The primary purpose of the 1933 Act was to make banking safer by prohibiting speculation in securities. 
Specifically, the Act prohibited commercial banks from owning securities brokerage firms. Most banks at that 
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occurred as a result of the advent of the broad phenomenon called financialization was the 
pre-dominance of the shareholder value orientation70 in American corporations, Orhangazi 
(2008).  The shareholder value concept led to a new corporate governance strategy that 
emphasized the alignment of shareholder and manager’s interests, Stockhammer (2010) and 
Orhangazi (2008).  This phenomenon also led to a focus on short-term profits and gave 
organizations an incentive to cut labour cost, while rewarding top executives that focused 
solely on maximizing the value of their stock (rising stock prices) with generous 
compensation packages, Khurana (2002).  
The new focus on stock prices as the most important metric of appraising 
management’s performance led to a major change in the investment priorities of American 
corporations and in turn gave rise to the stock market boom of the 1980s. The historic stock 
market boom of the 1980s and 1990s worsened income inequality via a shift in the 
allocation of national income from labour to capital, Kristal (2010). The growth in capital 
income in the 1980s up until the late 2000s was much more concentrated amongst high 
income households since the ownership of financial assets is concentrated within this group 
of household.  
According to the financialization thesis, its impact was seen in three interrelated 
aspects namely; the elevation of the significance of the financial sector, the transfer of 
income from the real sector to the financial sector and increases in income inequality via the 
effect of financialization on wages and financial assets, Stockhammer (2010) and Orhangazi 
(2008).   The financialization literature maintains that the rapid developments within the 
financial sector brought significant changes in macro-economic patterns and income 
distribution in the U.S. These developments led to a relaxation of credit standards and 
increased the influence of the financial sector over the non-financial sector. In this chapter 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
time had to abandon the securities business and focused on banking because they were only permitted to 
receive not more than 10 percent of their income from the securities markets, which they considered to be 
too small, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (2013). President Clinton on November 12, 1999 signed into 
law the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  The emergence of Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act of 1999 allowed banks to engage in securities trading and insurance underwriting, increasing 
the wealth of financial services companies Mamum et al (2005). According to the report of U.S Department of 
Treasury, the top five banks in third quarter of 2007 held approximately 97.2 percent of total derivatives 
contracts in the U.S, (U.S Department of Treasury 2007), the report highlights the new focus of banks- 
derivative trading as opposed to core banking functions. 
70
The proponents of the shareholder value argued that firms in America in the 1970s witnessed stagnation in 
profits because they were overly bureaucratic and inefficient and had placed too much emphasis on satisfying 
multiple groups of stakeholders including employees, creditors, suppliers, consumers alongside owners 
(shareholders) instead of focusing on the bottom line (profit), corporate strategy and investment,  Davis 
(2009).  
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our focus is on the effect of financialization in promoting income inequality through the 
asset price channel. We did not study other aspects of financialization in this chapter. 
The notion of financialization has been frequently employed in analyzing the 
increasing wage gap between the high and low income earners. Its theoretical appeal lies in 
its ability to connect the increasing income differentials between these two groups of income 
earners to the growth of finance in recent years. In a general term, financialization can give 
insight into the structural transformation of capitalist71 economies during the last three 
decades with its resultant economic and social implications, Lapavitsas (2011). Epstein 
(2001) defined financialization as the increasing importance of financial markets, motives, 
institutions and financial elites in the operation of the economy as well as its regulatory 
institutions, both at the national and international level, from this perspective, one can argue 
that one of the impacts of financialization at the macroeconomic level is the dominance of 
the financial sector. This dominance was marked by rapidly rising debt to household ratios, 
corporate debt to equity ratios, increase in stock and house prices, increase in wage and 
compensation of finance and finance-related occupation, as well as the increase in the use of 
stock-option as a means of compensation for top executives in both the financial and non-
financial sectors of the economy amongst others.  
These developments led to the strong economic growth of the 1980s; however, they 
also increased financial fragility. Another factor that exacerbated the macroeconomic 
concerns of the impact of financialization on the economy is concerns about income 
distribution. The period of financialization of the U.S economy experienced a disconnection 
of wages from productivity growth, this, raised serious concerns with regards to the 
stagnation of wages and growing income and wealth inequality, Mishel et al (2007). 
Conventional economic theory has also played a critical role in promoting financialization 
and growing income dispersion.  
One area where economic theory has been particularly important is the application of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) ‘agency theory’. This theory was formulated to tackle the 
lacklustre performance of most U.S firms during the stagflation of the 1970s, a period of 
poor stock market performance, Dobbin and Jung (2010).  The agency theory came as a 
solution to the agency problem whereby the challenge was to get the firm’s managers to 
maximize profits on behalf of shareholders. Proponents of this theory argued that the 
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 A capitalist economy is an economic system based on private ownership of capital; some of the core 
elements of a capitalist economic system include free market operation in which the invisible hand of pricing 
mechanism coordinates supply and demand in markets in a way that is to the best interest of the society, 
Scott (2007). 
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economic malaise of the 1970s was a result of executive obsession with corporate stability 
over profitability. The theory therefore, challenged the way that firms were being managed, 
maintaining that the interest of principals (shareholders) and their agents (executives) were 
misaligned, Whitley (1986) and Useem (1984).  
According to Agency theorists, executives were serving their own interest rather than 
those of owners, given that they were more focused on maximizing corporate size by 
building large diversified empires that could shield them from downturns in any particular 
industry rather than profitability. To solve the corporate governance problem, the theorists 
prescribed changes in corporate governance and strategy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that one of the ways of aligning the interest of managers with those of the 
shareholders would be by making managers to focus on increasing the value of their firms 
through increase in stock prices. Stock options72 were used to guarantee that managers 
focused on increasing their firm values. Another prescription of the theory was the use of 
debt in financing new projects; this was aimed at putting an end to the executive practice of 
spending profits to buy new businesses, Davis et al (1994). The use of debt in financing new 
endeavours meant that profits were returned to shareholders through share buybacks and 
stock options were structured to reward executives for short-term price gains without 
penalizing them for losses, Dobbin and Jung (2010).  
Some elements of this theory had important distributional consequences. For 
instance, the short-term pay-for performance systems favoured CEOs, money managers and 
security analysts because it increased their income. As was noted by Lounsbury (2007), 
some components of the agency theory aligned CEO interests with fund manager interests, 
because fund manager bonuses were based on short-term increase in stock value. In 
addition, borrowing to finance new projects and the use of profits to buy back stock meant 
that companies could raise stock price and boost CEO and fund manager’s compensation. 
The increase in stock prices will also favour high income earners via capital gains. Hall and 
Liebman (1998) noted that the spread of stock options in the 1980s increased executive 
compensation and caused total compensation to be closely aligned with firm performance. 
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 Stock option is a call option on the common stock of a company that enables executives to buy a certain 
number of shares at a specified future date, typically three years at the market price of the stock at the date 
of issue, Karmel (2004). The objective of compensating managers with stock option is to give them an 
incentive to behave in ways that will boost the company’s stock price. A recipient of a stock option will gain if 
the company’s stock market price rises above the call price; the employee could exercise the option, pay the 
exercise price and would be issued with ordinary shares in the company. The original objective of stock 
option was to align CEO and shareholder interests; however, options even more closely aligned executive and 
fund manager interest, given that fund managers earned bonuses based on increases in the value of the 
portfolios under their management just as CEOs made more money based on increases in the value of the 
firms they managed. 
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Dobbin and Jung (2010) showed that median CEO compensation of big American firms rose 
seven times from 1984 to 2004, to over $3,500,000 much of these increases came in the 
form of stock option grants and bonuses. 
Another area in which economic theory lent support to financialization is on the 
importance of financial markets expansion on economic efficiency. Proponents of the 
importance of financial sector argue that economic growth in any modern economy hinges 
on an efficient financial sector that mobilizes both domestic and foreign savings for 
productive investments. Therefore, expanding the scope of financial markets and the range 
of financial assets will increase efficiency and improve the ex-ante allocation of resources 
within an economy; this in turn will help economic agents in assembling portfolios that 
provide better risk/reward ratio. In other words increasing the number and range of financial 
assets will help businesses to hedge risk. Conventional economic theory suggests that the 
financial system as a whole plays a super important role in promoting economic growth and 
efficiency.  
However, it did not suggest ways of mitigating the distributional consequences of the 
dominance of the financial sector over other sectors of the economy. While financialization 
of the 1980s brought with it strong economic growth, income growth was stagnant for 
middle income earners in the 2001-07 period and as is common, declined in the recessions at 
the end and beginning of the decade. While those at the top of the income distribution 
witnessed strong income growth during these periods, many in the middle and at the bottom 
have struggled. The financialization thesis have argued that many of the factors (e.g. rising 
CEO pay, prevalence of shareholder value orientation, high interest rates that prevailed in 
the 1980s due to Federal Reserve policy amongst others) that led to the stagnation of wages 
and increase in income inequality can be linked to a new economic configuration that has 
been explicitly promoted by financial sector interests, Wolff et al (2007).  
Documented evidence with regard to the composition of wage share between 
managerial and workers wages suggests that there has been a shift in the wage share from 
workers to managers. Mishel and Sabadish (2012) showed that CEO pay has increased from 
thirty-eight times average worker pay in 1979 to two hundred and sixty-two times worker 
pay in 2005. According to them the wages of higher paid workers in the top half of the wage 
distribution increased much faster than those in the bottom half of the wage distribution. 
Using a measure of CEO compensation that includes the value of stock options granted to 
senior executives, the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was 18.3-to-1 in 1965; it increased 
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to an all time high of 411.3-to-1 in 2000 before dropping to 209.4-to-1 in 2011, Mishel and 
Sabadish (2012). 
The wages and compensation of CEOs as well as workers in the financial sector 
reveal much about the rise in income inequality. Mishel and Sabadish (2012) showed that 
the rise in the income of top 1 percent income earners was largely driven by households 
headed by someone who was either an executive or was employed in the financial sector. 
According to them, these group of workers accounted for 58 percent of the expansion of 
income for the top 1 percent and 67 percent of the increase in income for the top 0.1 percent 
from 1979 to 2005. In addition, CEO compensation increased by more than 725 percent 
from 1978 to 2011 while compensation of workers recorded only 5.7 percent over the same 
period. For this reason, high stock prices and the adoption of pay for performance increased 
the pay of some workers (executives, managers and supervisors), indirectly; financialization 
of (pay) contributed to redistribution of income upwards.  
The question is: to what extent can changes in the prices of financial and non 
financial assets, particularly equities explain the super concentration of income in the top 
spectrum of the income distribution? We attempt to provide answer to this question by 
looking at different theories from related literature on the causes of rising top income share 
in the U.S in the next section and modelling the influence of asset prices on the conditional 
income distribution. 
 
3.1.1 Theories and causes of rising top income share in the U.S 
The rising top income shares that has been going on for the past three decades in the 
U.S has been attributed to many factors. Researchers such as Piketty and Saez (2003, 
updated 2010), have shown that salary income73 and business income account for the 
majority of the incomes of top income earners in the U.S. According to them, 63 percent of 
the increase in the share of national income (including capital gains) going to the top 0.1 
percent of the income distribution between 1971-1980 and 2001-2010 came from both 
salary income and business income. 
Globalization defined as the free movement of goods, services and capital across 
borders has also been pointed at as one of the explanations for rising income inequality, 
Heshmati (2004). Globalization brings with it rapid changes in trade relations, financial 
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 Salary is defined for the purposes of income tax as every payment made by an employer to his employee 
for service rendered; this would be chargeable to tax as income from salaries while business income is 
income received from the sale of products or services. It is any income that is realized as a result of business 
activity, Mahesh and Shukla (2006). 
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flows and mobility of labour across the world. Several scholars have studied the wage links 
between globalization and inequality; for instance Ethier (2002) in his study of the impact of 
globalization on the skill premium, unemployment and countries social policies arrived at 
the conclusion that skill-biased technical change has played a major role in the rise of skill 
premium more than globalization. In this regard, it is assumed that the advancement of 
technology compliments the skills of highly-skilled workers and substitutes the skills of 
low-skill workers, Garicano and Hubbard (2007). Other researchers such as Miller (2001) 
and Krugman (2008) provided evidence in support of the globalization thesis.  
Their research showed that a significant increase in the wage differential between 
skilled and low skilled workers in the U.S during the late 1970s can be attributed to rapid 
globalization. According to this narrative, most of the increase in wage inequality is as a 
result of structural change in production process that involves the outsourcing of low skilled-
intensive production process to low-income countries. This implies that low-skilled workers 
in the U.S will now have to compete with abundant low-skilled workers from the rest of the 
world while the demand for the labour of highly-skilled workers in the U.S is on the 
increase, since highly-skilled workers are scarcer in the rest of the world than in the U.S. 
This situation will arguably depress the wages for lower-skilled workers.  
A second narrative that is closely related to the globalization narrative is the 
economic theory of ‘superstar’ suggested by Rosen (1981). According to him, reward for 
high flying performers in any field of endeavour increases over time relative to reward for 
others because of globalization and advancement in technology which enables them to 
sell/offer their skills to a wider market over time. In other words, the concentration of output 
among a few individuals is generally marked with skewness in the associated distribution of 
income and significant large rewards at the top. The basic insight of this theory is that sellers 
of a particular service e.g. entertainers, financial-traders in an investment bank e.t.c. are not 
perfect substitutes; therefore, consumers of such services will prefer to patronize the 
extraordinarily talented individual than another person that is almost as good. In the case of 
investment banks, they will be willing to pay a substantial premia for the services of few 
exceptional financial traders. 
Another explanation of rising income inequality is the major shifts in economic 
structure in recent decades as well as the declining share of national income going to wages. 
The growing importance of financial services sector is a key contributor to the decade long 
decline in the share of national income accruing to wages. A study by Reed and Himmelwelt 
(2012) showed that the share of national income going to wages in most developed 
 
126 
 
economies has fallen from 59 to 53 percent over the last thirty years, whereas the proportion 
going to profits has increased from 25 to 29 percent. One of the major reasons has been a 
significant reduction in the number of manufacturing industries that spend a high proportion 
of turnover on wages and the expansion of financial services industries that have a far higher 
profit margin. Philippon and Reshef (2009) and Mishel and Sabadish (2012) provided 
documented evidence on the role of financial sector pay and executive compensation in 
explaining the concentration of income at the very top of the income distribution.  
According to Philippon and Reshef (2009) financial sector workers have been 
capturing rents that account for between 30 and 50 percent of the difference between 
financial sector wages and wages in non-financial sector jobs. The discussions so far seem to 
suggest the existence of ‘superstars’ in the financial sector and top managerial74 cadre as one 
of the major contributors to the extreme wage inequality. Therefore, theories about executive 
compensation75 and financial market asset prices could be important contributing factors to 
rising top income shares. We tested the financial asset price hypothesis empirically using 
causal inference analysis and quantile regression. In addition, we checked the stability of our 
findings by including a proxy for skilled and low skilled wage differential in the quantile 
regression model. 
 
3.2 Literature review on income inequality and asset prices 
Das and Mohapatra (2002) in their panel study of 11 emerging economies 
investigated the distributional consequences of stock market liberalization over the periods 
1986 to 1995 and found that the gains from stock market liberalization appears to have 
benefited the top income earners more than the rest. Specifically, they observed a pattern 
that seems to indicate that income share growth accrued almost wholly to the top quintile of 
the income distribution at the expense of the middle class which they defined as the three 
middle quintiles of the income distribution. They provided evidence that showed that the 
income of those individuals at the lowest quintiles of the income distribution remained 
effectively unchanged in the event of the liberalization. The research of Das and Mohapatra 
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Gabaix and Lander (2008) applied the superstar theory in explaining the significant increase in CEO pay over 
the last two decades. According to their study, ECOs differ in their managerial ability and are matched to 
firms in accordance to their ability in a competitive manner. If the managerial impact of CEO’s ability 
increases with the value of the firm under his management, then the best CEO manages the best firm. They 
found in their calibration that small differences in ability can result in large differences in wages. 
75
 There is a long debate on the effect of executive compensation in explaining rise in top income share. 
Kaplan and Rauh (2013) have argued that executives of publicly traded firms represent too small of a share of 
top income earners in the U.S to be able to explain much of the rise in top income shares. 
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(2002) corroborated the findings of Bekaert et al (2000) which found an increase in the 
mean income of the top income quintiles post liberalization. 
Sawhney and Dipietro (2006) tested the relationship between stock market 
valuations proxied by stock market capitalization and four different measures of income 
inequality (GINI, share of income of bottom quintile, top quintile and the ratio of bottom 
and top quintile). Their study found that the stock market wealth has a positive and 
significant effect on income inequality across the countries. Specifically, an increase in 
stock market capitalization increases the Gini coefficient, income share of the upper quintile 
and lowers the share of the bottom quintile. Similarly, Ronie et al (2009) in their study of the 
long run determinants of inequality using panel of 16 countries and focusing on the rich 
(P99-100), the upper middle class (P90-99) and the rest of the population (P0-90), found that 
periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile income 
share at the expense of the rest of the top deciles and that financial development also favours 
the super rich more than the others. 
Nguyen (2012) studied the effect of income inequality measured by the share of 
national income going to the wealthiest 10 percent of the U.S population in explaining stock 
returns in the U.S from 1927 to 2012. His study explored income inequality under the asset 
pricing model. He employed the Fama-French three-factor model76 to obtain the inequality 
beta coefficient as well as the inequality risk premium. His study found a significant 
relationship between income inequality and the rate of market participation which in turn 
influences the rate of returns on stocks. In addition, Zhang (2012) in a panel study of 154 
countries from 1950 to 2008 showed that a rise in the GINI coefficient of 0.01 percentage 
point is associated with up to 2 percent reduction in stock price to dividend ratio. She 
concluded that an increase in income inequality increases the rate of return in the stock 
market due to a lower overall price level. Furthermore, Zhang’s study found a connection 
between income inequality and the stock market via the interest rate channel. According to 
Zhang (2012) the risk-free rate measured using interest rate on T-bill was found to increase 
by 0.18 percent for a unit increase in income inequality measured using the GINI 
coefficient. 
Recent theoretical studies on income/wealth inequality and stock returns provide 
evidence of a positive correlation between measures of stock market development and 
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 The Fama and French three factor model is a model that expands on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) by adding size and value factors in addition to the market risk factor in CAPM. This empirical model 
considers the fact that the value and small capitalized stocks outperform markets on a regular basis; 
therefore, the inclusion of these two additional factors adjusts for the outperformance tendency which is 
thought to make it a more superior tool for evaluating manager performance, Fama and French (1993). 
 
128 
 
income of the top income earners.  For instance, Favilukis (2012) using equilibrium model 
showed that stock returns are positively correlated with changes in inequality because stock 
market participants are on the average rich households who benefit disproportionately from 
a stock market boom. Solving for a heterogeneous agent incomplete market model where 
workers are subject to uninsurable labour market shocks77 and are able to invest in a risk-
free asset as well as the aggregate stock market if they are willing to pay a participation 
cost78, with an ad hoc borrowing constraint that prevents wealth from falling below some 
level, showed that a positive stock market return, increases inequality because it benefits 
households that are already wealthy. According to him, allowing for a simultaneous change 
in wage inequality, loosening of borrowing constraints and drop in stock market 
participation costs allows the model to qualitatively match the pattern of changes in 
inequality, stock market participation and asset prices observed in the data. 
Favilukis (2012) showed that a reduction in participation costs results in an increase 
in stock market participation and a fall in equity premium. On the other hand, an increase in 
labour income inequality induces households to save more, which in turn causes wealth 
inequality to fall. While loosening of borrowing constraints will have the opposite effect, i.e. 
a reduction in saving. The combination of increased precautionary saving because of an 
increase in labour market income risk and a decrease in precautionary savings due to the 
easing of borrowing standards results in a 0.015 increase of the Gini wealth coefficient in 
the model; which is  smaller to the 0.056 rise over this period in the data. 
According to Favilukis (2012) allowing for these three exogenous changes namely 
increase in wage inequality, a loosening of borrowing constraints and a drop in stock market 
participation costs simultaneously, allows the model to qualitatively match the pattern of 
changes in inequality. The study concluded that the changes in the pattern of stock returns 
were a major contributor to the increase in wealth inequality between 1983 and 2007. 
Recently, particularly after the great recession of 2007-2008 a new theory is starting 
to emerge the so called “asset bubble theory of income inequality”. The theory suggests that 
the rise in income inequality over the past 4 decades could be the product of a series of asset 
price bubbles within the financial and real estate markets Fox (2009). According to this 
theory, the share of income accruing to households at the top end of the income distribution 
                                                          
77
 In the model, the realization by risk averse households that their uninsurable labour income has become 
more risky will cause poorer households to respond by saving a higher fraction of their income. This is 
particularly true for low income households who are usually more afraid of large negative labour income 
shocks because they have no buffer stock of wealth to use as insurance.  
78
 According to him, allowing households to invest in equity and charging a participation cost is a direct 
departure from standard incomplete markets models. However, this departure is very important for 
considering inequality and heterogeneity. 
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increases whenever there is a boom in the financial markets and decreases when the boom 
gets bust. However, the increase even becomes much stronger with the next bubble. Piketty 
(2010) reported that some of the transitory changes in the income shares going to the top 1 
percent reflect the volatile nature of income from capital gains.  Capital gains ranged from 
about 3 percent to 5 percent of market income between 1979 and 1984; however, there was a 
spike in 1986 of over 10%. This spike could be attributed to investor’s rush to realize profits 
from asset price increases in anticipation of the capital gains tax increase scheduled to come 
into force in 1987  Congressional Budget Office (2011). The run-up in stock market prices 
from 1995 through 2000 further helped to fuel the increase in the share of income going to 
those households within the top echelon of the income distribution. 
 
            Figure 3.1 S&P 500 and Top 1 Percent Income Share 1970 to 2010 
 
Data sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (2009) and Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and 
Saez (2010) updated 
 
Figure 3.1 above shows that the S&P 500 and the income share of the top 1 percent 
income earners have followed similar trend since the 1980s, although the top 1 percent 
income share series reveals an upward spike in the mid 80s which was followed almost 
immediately by a downward trend. Apart from these periods, the two series have moved in 
tandem with each other since the late 1990s. Removing capital gains from the income of the 
top 1 percent smoothes out some of the jumps in their income but does not change the trend.  
How does income inequality fuel asset price bubbles? One can argue that the role 
that income inequality played during the pre-crisis period was the channelling of funds to 
the financial and real estate market. Given that more wealth yields to a diminishing marginal 
propensity to consume and a correspondingly higher propensity to either invest, save or 
speculate Dynan et al (2004); the speculative activities could lead to a vicious cycle of price 
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increases that may not be supported by changes in economic fundamentals while the 
diminishing propensity to consume is likely to result in a lower consumer demand at least 
within the upper class. 
This view is supported by Kumhof and Ranciere, (2010) who argued that the 
income/wealth inequality provided large and expanding funds to the wealthy that looked for 
the most profitable investment opportunities. According to Kumhof and Ranciere, (2010) 
capital was channelled to high-return, high risk investments within the financial sector 
because the profit in the real economy was low. The high demands for risky high interest 
paying financial instruments saw lots of funds been channelled into different forms of 
complex securitized instruments and real estate which created the conditions for asset 
bubbles to develop. A similar pattern was witnessed before the Great Depression, Reich 
(2010) showed that wealthy Americans in the 1920s created equity and real estate bubbles 
which saw the Dow Jones Stock index rose from 63.9% in the mid-1921 to a peak of 
381.2% eight years later before it collapsed. 
Furthermore, stagnating middle class income meant increased demand for credit, 
most of which were used to buy financial and real assets thus fuelling the bubble. Easy 
access to credit allowed first time home buyers to gain entry into the mortgage market thus 
generating high demands for private real estates, as demands kept increasing, prices kept 
skyrocketing. To summarize, the income inequality/asset price bubbles hypothesis suggests 
that the increase in wealth of the richest households and the cheap cost of consumable funds 
for the middle to low income households played a role in increasing the demand for 
investment assets. On the part of the top income households, their increasing income 
prompted the need to invest in high-risky, high-reward investments while the increase in 
debt-to-income ratios for the low income households in the period preceding the crisis was 
associated with mortgage debt. 
While these studies provided both empirical and theoretical evidence on the relation 
between stock returns and income inequality, the issue of causality between the two 
variables remains unexplored. The regression models used in previous empirical studies 
have been based on implicit assumptions that some unspecified causal relations exist 
between stock returns and changes in income inequality, particularly inequality measured 
using the income of the top income deciles. However, the existence of such relations 
between the two variables and the directions of causality has not been thoroughly 
established.  
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 Changes in the stock market and the income of the top 1 percent may be related 
because of some underlying economic variables that systematically affect the two variables 
leading to convergence of some sort of expectations among participants within the stock 
market which are usually the top income earners. For instance, it could be that innovations 
in the stock market affect income of the top 1 percent via capital gains income and dividends 
or it could be that changes in income of the top 1 percent affect stock prices. This logic is in 
line with the “stock” oriented and “flow” oriented models of exchange rates79, see- 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and Branson (1983). One of the central objectives of this 
chapter is to investigate causal relations between stock returns and income of the top 1 
percent income earners. The findings from this study will help in bridging the gap in income 
inequality and asset prices literature. 
 
3.3 Data description, and summary statistics  
 This section describes the variables that we used in our empirical analysis as 
well as the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. We start by providing the description 
and sources of each of the variables that we used. All the variables were measured on a 
quarterly basis from 1967 to 2011 and were all transformed to growth rates. 
Measures of income 
Top 1 percent income: This variable is defined as a measure of the share of total 
income (excluding capital gains) accruing to the top 1 percent of tax units80. The top 1 
percent is defined relative to all families in the US population. Top income shares are 
estimated as income accruing to a given top group such as top 1 percent divided by total 
personal income in the US economy. This variable is one of the most widely used in recent 
income inequality literatures, Sherman and Stone (2010), Dunn (2012) and Saez (2013) 
amongst others.  
The real disparity between the top 1 percent and the rest could be seen in their net 
worth. According to Dunn (2012), the top 1 percent81 income earners are worth about $8.4 
million, or 70 times the worth of the lower classes. The top 1 percent control 43 percent of 
the wealth in America while the next 4 percent control an additional 29 percent, Sherman 
                                                          
79
  The “flow” oriented models of exchange rates posit that changes in exchange rates affect income/output 
and therefore stock prices, e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) while “stock” oriented models e.g. Branson 
(1983), argues that innovations in the stock market affect exchange rates via the capital account. 
80
 Tax units refer to either a married couple living together with dependent or a single adult with dependents, 
Alvaredo, Atkinson Piketty and Saez (2003).  
81
 Within this group of individuals is a smaller and wealthier subset of people, 1 percent of the top 1%, or .01 
percent of the entire nation. These groups have incomes of over $27 million or approximately 540 times the 
national average income. 
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and Stone (2010). This variable was sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 
(2009, updated to 2013). 
Bottom 90 percent income: This variable is defined as a measure of the share of total 
income (excluding capital gains) accruing to the bottom 90 percent of tax units. Tax units 
estimated as sum of married men, divorced and widowed men and women, and single men 
and women aged 20 and over. Population and tax units’ estimates are based on census and 
current population surveys. This variable was sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson Piketty and 
Saez (2009, updated to 2013). 
Figure 3.2 presents the pre-tax income share of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 
percent income earners in the U.S from 1970 to 2010. The overall pattern of the top 1 
percent income share over the 1970s is a downward trend while the bottom 90 percent 
witnessed some level of volatility in their income during the same period. After decades of 
stability, the top 1 percent income share has increased substantially since the early 1980 
while the earnings of the bottom 90 percent income earners have failed to keep pace during 
the same time period. Although, the income of the bottom 90 percent saw large income 
gains between 1995 to early 2000s, the top 1 percent income earners have done even better. 
The plot showed a disproportionate surge in top incomes in the mid 1980s which continued 
till the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis.  
 
Figure 3.2 Top 1 and bottom 90 percent income earners1970 to 2010                         
 
Data sourced from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2009, updated to 2013). 
 
 
Income received by lowest fifth percent of households: this variable is defined as the 
share of aggregate income received by the lowest fifth percent of household. The data are 
based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic Supplements 
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(ASEC) sample of 68,000 addresses. The survey reports the share of aggregate income 
received by each fifth and top 5 percent of households all race. We used the lowest fifth 
percent as our third measure of income. 
Standard & Poor’s 500 composite market index: This variable is used as one of the 
explanatory variables. This is used as a proxy for financial assets and was sourced from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis database. The S&P 500 has been used by other studies as 
a measure of the U.S financial market, Volscho and Kelly (2012), Hockett and Dillon 
(2013). We transformed it to the growth rate. As was noted before, one of the major 
arguments for the concentration of income in the top of the income distribution has been 
linked to the stock market boom of the late 1980s. Wolf (2012) reported a substantial 
increase in S&P 500 of about 171 percent between 1989 and 2001. According to him, from 
2004 to 2007 the stock market rebounded after a brief recession and the S&P 500 rose by 19 
percent in real terms while real wages stagnated. Bond yield: This is proxied using Moody’s 
Aaa corporate bond yield sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. This variable 
is used to proxy financial income.   
House prices: We used the median sales price for new homes sold in the United 
States as our proxy for non-financial asset. This variable was sourced from U.S Census 
bureau. Recent studies on the relationship between house prices and income inequality have 
identified several channels through which inequality can affect house prices. For instance 
Dewilde and Lancee (2012) noted that higher investment in property by wealthy households 
could lead to changes in housing market dynamics and property prices. In addition, such 
households can derive additional income from their investments in properties in the form of 
rents and capital gains that comes from the sale of the properties. Smith et al (2008) opined 
that homeownership that was prevalent in the U.S during the period leading to the great 
recession was used by low income households as a form of investment that allows for capital 
gains, which can finance other consumption. This variable was sourced from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis 
Unemployment rate: Persistent high levels of unemployment and income inequality 
have continued to threaten the U.S economy four years after the Great Recession was 
officially declared to have ended. While unemployment literatures have focused more on its 
relationship with inflation and monetary policy82, the income inequality literatures are 
concerned on its relationship with economic growth and efficiency83. The 1990s however 
saw the emergence of large literatures on income inequality and unemployment with 
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See the classic work of Phillips (1958), Samuelson and Solow (1960), and Lucas (1976). 
83
 See the pioneering work of Kuznets (1955), Okun (1975) and others. 
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conflicting results. Unemployment rate is used in this study to capture the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on income across the nine equally spaced quantiles. This 
variable was sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis  
Inflation: The relationship between inflation and income inequality remains 
inconclusive in the literature, though many studies find that inflation on the average worsens 
inequality, Romer and Romer (1999), Easterly and Fischer (2000), and Huangfu and Zhang 
(2012) who found that changes in inflation negatively affects low wage earners more than 
high wage earners. To analyze the impact of inflation on income we included this variable in 
the model. Inflation is measured as the growth rate of consumer price index. 
Education/college premium: Education plays a critical role in labour markets and 
income inequality. Plethora of empirical studies from different countries supports the notion 
that well-educated individuals earn higher incomes, witness less unemployment and are 
employed in professional and prestigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts, 
Psacharopoluos (1985, 1994). Recent studies have argued that the widening income 
differential between the top income earners and low income earners is as a result of skill 
bias or education premium. In line with Goldin and Katz (2009), we used the growth rate in 
the income of individuals with four years or more of college education to capture the 
economic return to a year of college education that is skilled workers.  
We used changes in the income of individuals with four years or more of college 
education to analyze the effect of highly educated84 workers (skilled workers) across the 
entire income distribution. Our motivation for using this variable is because the earnings of 
the more educated is higher than that of the less educated- consequently, it seems plausible 
to use this variable to capture changes in the income of skilled workers. Following Goldin 
and Katz (2009), we defined college premium as the income differential between individuals 
with 4 years or more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college 
education. 
Our data reveals that the college premium began to collapse in the mid 1990s. 
Earnings of the more educated (workers with 4 years or more of college education) reduced 
relative to that of the less educated (workers with only 1 to 3 years of college education). 
The education premium started to pick in early 2000s. The premium to a college education 
returned to an upward trajectory in the early 2000s and has sustained this upward trend till 
                                                          
84
 According to Goldin and Katz (2009), there seems to be a change in the concept of highly educated worker. 
The authors highlighted the differences in the definition of highly educated worker in 1915 and now. 
According to them a college graduate or someone with a post-graduate degree is considered highly educated 
in today’s world while in 1915 a high school graduate would have been deemed well educated. 
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now. Table 3.1 is the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The table shows 
the mean income of top 1 percent income earners at $591595, the bottom 90 percent at 
$33388 and that of the lowest fifth percent income earners at $3806.  The maximum income 
of the top 1 percent income earners during the period under review stood at $106, 3046.00 
this is $1026443 higher than that of their bottom 90 percent counterpart.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics income inequality and asset prices 1967Q1 to 2011Q4 
 E_90_RBN J XIRBN O CF ℎO \ EP Jè NHXOGF 
Mean 33388 535 3806 591595 6.16 116388 1.08 -0.01 35327 2540 
Median 33314 318 3800 583447 5.80 118334 0.91 -0.03 39809 2391 
Maximum 36603 1497 4316 1063046 10.70 255933 3.87 0.57 47383 8131 
Minimum 30961 69 3185 336113 3.40 22333 -2.32 -0.69 14027 -3724 
Std.Dev 1452 482 320 241383 1.66 70299 0.78 0.25 9727 2776 
Notes E_90_RBN is the income share of the bottom 90 percent income earners, J denotes S&P 500 price index, XIRBN denotes the share of aggregate income going to the lowest fifth 
percent households, O denotes top 1 percent income share, CF denotes the unemployment rate, ℎO denotes the median sales price for new houses sold in the United States, \ denotes 
the growth rate of consumer price index, EP is the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield, Jè denotes the income of skilled workers and NHXOGF denotes the college premium, defined as 
the income differential between individuals with 4 years or more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education. 
. 
 
Table 3.2 Correlation matrix for income inequality and asset prices 1967Q1 to 2011Q4 
 E_90_RBN J XIRBN O CF ℎO \ EP Jè NHXOGF E_90_RBN 1.00 0.37 -0.04 0.29 -0.69 0.12 0.09 0.17 -0.03 -0.14 J 0.37 1.00 -0.89 0.97 -0.19 0.92 -047 -0.13 0.75 0.23 XIRBN -0.04 -0.89 1.00 -0.93 0.02 -0.95 0.61 0.26 -0.87 -0.28 O 0.29 0.97 -0.93 1.00 -0.19 0.96 -0.50 -0.16 0.82 0.26 CF -0.69 -0.19 0.12 -0.19 1.00 0.003 -0.02 -0.24 0.17 0.38 ℎO 0.12 0.92 -0.95 0.96 0.003 1.00 -0.49 -0.19 0.89 0.38 \ 0.09 -0.47 0.61 -0.50 -0.02 -0.49 1.00 0.44 -0.48 -0.05 EP 0.17 -0.13 0.26 -0.16 -0.24 -0.19 0.44 1.00 -0.27 -0.12 Jè -0.03 0.75 -0.87 0.82 0.17 0.89 -0.48 -0.27 1.00 0.36 NHXOGF -0.14 0.23 -0.28 0.26 0.38 0.38 -0.05 -0.12 0.36 1.00 
Notes: 
 E_90_RBN is the income share of the bottom 90 percent income earners, J denotes S&P 500 price index, XIRBN denotes the share of aggregate income going to the lowest fifth 
percent households, O denotes top 1 percent income share, CF denotes the unemployment rate, ℎO denotes the median sales price for new houses sold in the United States, \ denotes 
the growth rate of consumer price index, EP is the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield,  Jè denotes the income of skilled workers and NHXOGF denotes the college premium, defined as 
the income differential between individuals with 4 years or more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education. 
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Table 3.2 above, is the correlation matrix; a closer analysis of the table reveals a 
high negative correlation (-0.69) between the income of the bottom 90 percent and 
unemployment. This finding indicates that increasing unemployment will lead to a 
reduction in the income of this group of population. Another interesting observation from 
the correlation matrix is the positive relationship between stock prices and the income of 
the top 1 percent at 0.97 and a negative relationship between stock prices and the income 
of the lowest fifth percent of income earner; indicating that stock price appreciation will 
result to increase in the income of the top 1 percent and a reduction in the income of the 
lowest fifth percent income earners..  
The correlation matrix reveals a negative relationship between inflation and the top 
1 percent income earners. This implies that increasing inflation will result to decreases in 
this variable. On the other hand, inflation was found to have a positive relationship with 
the incomes of the lowest fifth percent earning population, and the strength of this 
relationship is high at 0.61 percent. In addition, unemployment was found to have an 
inverse relationship with the income of the bottom 90 percent and top 1 percent of the 
population; indicating that increasing unemployment will lead to a decrease in the incomes 
of these two groups. However, the impact of unemployment is felt more for low income 
earners as shown by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient at 69 percent compared to 
19 percent for top income earners. 
 
3.3.1 Causal effect of stock price on top 1 percent income earners 
Like we alluded in chapter two of this thesis, the average annual income of the top 
1 percent of the population is $717,000, compared to the average income of the rest of the 
population, which is around $51,000. The real disparity between the classes is in net 
worth85 or value. In addition to accumulating wealth through saving of current income, 
those individuals who own assets (mainly workers at the top of the distribution) may 
witness an increase or decrease in their wealth or income due to rising or falling asset 
prices. Consequently, being able to assess the directionality of the income of the top 1 
percent of U.S earning population and asset prices particularly stock prices will be an 
important milestone in understanding the corporative nature of the two variables.  
Research shows that one of the major factors driving the widening income gap 
between the top income earners and the rest is the unequal growth in earnings accruing to 
those at the top. Based on data from Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2009 updated 
                                                          
85
Net worth is defined as the difference in value between total assets and total liabilities or debt. 
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2013), the average annual earnings of the top 1 percent rose from 11.3 to 23.9 percent 
between 1913 and 1928. The income share going to this group of income earners fell from 
24 percent in 1928 to about 8.9 percent in 1975 and 1976. This downward trend was 
however, reversed during the 1980s, with the concentration of income within the top 
increasing to about 135 percent between 1981 and 2007, Volscho and Kelly (2012). In this 
section, we are interested in determining whether the higher earnings observed for the top 
1 percent income earners are caused by their higher investments in stock markets or 
whether the recent increases in the stock market is as a result of their investment in the 
market. In other words, we want to examine if stock returns Granger causes changes in the 
income of the top 1 percent or vice versa. We also estimated the causal relationship 
between stock returns and bottom 90 percent. The knowledge of causal relations between 
the stock market and the income of both the top 1and bottom 90 percent will potentially 
increase the information set available to policy makers on the widening income disparity 
between these two groups. 
Runes (1962) defined causality as a relationship between events, processes or 
entities in a time series such that the occurrence of one event will invariably lead to the 
occurrence of the other. This definition seems to suggest that one of the processes has the 
efficacy to produce or alter the other. In time series analysis, inference about cause-effect 
relationships hinges on the concept of Granger causality, Granger (1969)86. This concept is 
defined in terms of ‘predictability’ and exploits the direction of the flow of time to achieve 
a causal ordering of dependent variables, Eichler (2007). According to Granger (2001), if a 
signal Ö Granger-causes a signal Ö`, then it implies that the past values of Ö contains 
information that helps predict Ö` beyond the information contained in past values of Ö` 
alone. 
 
3.3.2 Presentation and interpretation of results from the causality models 
The Granger causality test is used to measure the precedence and information 
content of variables. Following Lutkepohl (1993), Lee and Yang (2006) that introduced 
Granger causality in bivariate case; we estimated a bivariate Granger causality on our 
variables for income inequality and stock returns. The bivariate linear autoregressive 
model we estimated is of the following functional form: 
 
                                                          
86
 The mathematical formulation of Granger Causality is based on linear regression modelling of stochastic 
processes. 
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J = Å + ∑ ^@	 Jk	 + ∑ Í@	 Ok	 + ]     (3.1) O = Å` + ∑ ^`@	 Ok	 + ∑ Í`@	 Jk	 + ]`     (3.2) J = Å + ∑ ^¢	 Jk	 + ∑ Í@	 E_90_RBNk	]    (3.3) E_90_RBN = Å` + ∑ ^`@	 E_90_RBN + ∑ Í`@	 Jk	 + ]`   (3.4) 
Where J= is the continuously compounded annualized rate of change of S&P 500; O= is the continuously compounded annualized rate of change of the income share of the 
top 1 percent; E_90_RBN= is the continuously compounded annualized rate of change of the bottom 90 
percent; O= is the maximum number of lagged observations in the model (the model order); Å, ^, LBm Í= The alphas, betas and gammas are the parameters to be estimated i.e. the 
contributions of each lagged observation to the predicted values of J and O , E_90_RBN,  
and ] , LBm ]`, are residuals (prediction errors) for each time series. 
Equations 3.1 to 3.4 are the unrestricted or bivariate models. According to Ajayi et 
al (1998), if the gammas are equal to zero in equations 3.1 to 3.4 then a restricted or 
univariate version of the respective equation is obtained. Following the estimation of 
equations 3.1 to 3.4, if the estimated lagged coefficient vector Í in equation (3.1) is 
statistically significant while the estimated lagged coefficient vector Í` in equation (3.2) is 
not statistically significant then the results suggest unidirectional causality within the 
Granger framework, from the stock returns to changes in the income of the top 1 percent 
income earners.  
If, on the other hand, the estimated lagged coefficient Í` in equation (3.2) is 
statistically significant while the estimated coefficient vector Í in equation (3.1) is not 
statistically significant then unidirectional causality exists from changes in the income of 
the top 1 percent to stock returns. If both vectors of lagged coefficients are statistically 
significant in equations (3.1) and (3.2), then the data provides evidence of bidirectional 
causality. The absence of directional causality is indicated if the set of parameters Í- are 
statistically insignificant. The same explanation applies to equations (3.3) and (3.4) for the 
bottom 90 percent. Before we performed the Granger causality test we tested for the 
presence of unit-roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The table reveals that all 
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the variables used in this study were found to be stationary (see table A3.1 in the appendix 
of this chapter)87.  
Prior to the pair-wise Granger causality tests we performed a lag order selection to 
determine the best lag length for the analysis. The entire lag selection criteria88 were 
unanimous in selecting lag 2 as the optimal lag length (see table A3.2 in the appendix). We 
then tested co-integration between the variables using Johansen Co-integration Test89. Both 
Trace test and Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 co-integrating equations at the 0.05 levels. 
Based on the estimated equations, Granger causality tests are performed and the F-statistics 
and probabilities are reported in table 3.3 below.  
 
Table 3.3 Pair-wise Granger causality tests for top 1 percent, bottom 90 percent and 
stock prices 1967 Q1 to 2011Q4 SCXX [POHℎFJRJ  W − LRJRN  ,GHE.  O mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF J @ XLÎ 1  0.31 0.581 J mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF O @XLÎ 1  11.19 0.001 O mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF J @ XLÎ 2  1.89 0.154 J mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF O @ XLÎ 2  6.22 0.003 J mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF E÷­¾ø@ XLÎ 1  0.17 0.682 E÷­¾ømHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF J@XLÎ 1  0.64 0.423 J mHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF E_90_RBN@XLÎ 2  1.62 0.201 E÷­¾ømHFJ BH µGLBÎFG NLCJF J@XLÎ 2  0.65 0.522 
Notes: 
 O denotes the growth rate of the income share of the top 1 percent income earners and J denotes the 
growth rate of the S&P 500 and E_90_RBN is the growth rate of the income share of the bottom 90 percent 
income earners 
 
The empirical results reveal statistically significant (at one percent level) 
unidirectional causality from stock returns to changes in the income share of the top 1 
percent. On the other hand, unidirectional causality from growth rate of income share of 
the top 1 percent to stock returns is found to be statistically insignificant. We found no 
evidence of directional causality between stock returns and income of the bottom 90 
percent either way. The absence of a significant causal relation between the two variables 
seems to suggest that development within the stock market does not have any effect on the 
income of the bottom 90 percent workers. Therefore, government policies that are geared 
towards propping up financial markets particularly the stock market will have no 
associated effect on the bottom 90 percent income earners. 
                                                          
87
 In estimating the Granger causality models, the stationarity of the series involved must first be 
ascertained in other to avoid spurious regressions. 
88
 The lag order selection criteria used were LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level), 
FPE: Final Prediction Error, AIC: Akaike Information Criterion, SC: Schwarz Information Criterion and HQ: 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
89
 A major implication of Granger causality is that if two variables say X and Y are co-integrated, then either 
X must Granger cause Y or vice versa. 
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The general implication of these findings is that stock market developments and 
income of the top 1 percent wage earners are well integrated with the direction of causality 
running from stock returns to top 1 percent income share.  One of the practical policy 
implications of this finding is that monetary policy stance that is directed to asset prices 
will have a concomitant effect on the income of the top 1 percent income earners. This 
empirical evidence provides strong support for our speculation in the previous chapter 
which suggested that the monetary policy reaction to the top one percent income share 
could be an indirect reaction to the developments within the stock market given that 
changes in stock returns have causal influence on the income flowing to this cohort. 
Therefore, including asset prices in the monetary policy reaction function will not only rein 
in speculative increase in asset prices but will also narrow the earnings gap between the 
rich and the poor at least to some extent. 
 
3.4 Model description and justification for the use of GMM 
One of the important assumptions of regression analysis is that the independent 
variables are uncorrelated with the error or disturbance term. If this assumption is 
untenable for any reason, both the OLS and weighted Least Squares LS are biased and 
inconsistent. This assumption will be violated in situations where some of the independent 
variables are endogenously determined or where the regressors are measured with error. 
The conventional approach to use when the right hand variables are correlated with the 
residuals in the model is to estimate the equation using Instrumental Variables (IV) 
regression. The intuition behind this estimation method is to find a set of variables, known 
as instruments that are both correlated with the explanatory variables in the equation and 
are uncorrelated with the disturbances. There are different approaches to using instruments 
to eliminate the effect of variable and residual correlation. 
We used the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to study the role of asset 
prices particularly equity prices on the income of the top 1 percent income earners. The 
GMM is used to solve the problem of heteroskedasticity of unknown form by using 
orthogonality conditions which allow for efficient estimation in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) hereafter referred to as Baum et al. 
The generalized method of moment’s estimator was introduced by Hansen (1982) as a 
generalization of the method of moments first introduced by Pearson (1894).  
Given that the central concern of the present study is the role of asset prices on the 
top 1 percent income earners, households that fall within this income spectrum may get 
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more money by investing in the stock market and receive higher income through price 
appreciation/dividend payments. In addition, the  massive investments of this group of 
income earners in the stock markets could also lead to stock price appreciation; 
consequently, the effect of stock prices on top income earners may be biased upwards (i.e. 
positive effect of stock prices is overstated). Furthermore, since monetary policy affects the 
stock market, which in turn affects the income share of the top 1 percent, there could be a 
problem of endogeneity. We used the GMM estimator to address this potential 
endogeneity. The GMM estimator is used to correct for bias caused by endogenous 
explanatory variables. We start with a brief description of the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
regression which is a special case of GMM. 
Adopting the general notation of Baum et al (2003), the equation to be estimated is, 
 P = Ö^ + C,            CC′ = Ω                                                                                    (3.5) 
 
with typical row 
   P = Ö^ + C                                                                                                                (3.6)      
  
The matrix of regressors Ö is B × ,  where B is the number of observations. The error 
term C is distributed with mean zero and the covariance matrix Ω is B × B. Some of the 
regressors are assumed to be endogenous, so that ÖC ≠ 0. The set of regressors Ö is 
partitioned into [Ö  Ö`],  with the  regressors Ö  assumed under the null to be 
endogenous, and the  −  remaining regressors Ö` assumed exogenous.     
 The set of instrumental variables is » and is B × U;  The instrumental variables are 
assumed to be exogenous, i.e., »C = 0. Like the regressors, the instruments are 
partitioned into [» »`],  where the U instruments »  are excluded instruments, and the 
remaining U − U instruments »` ≡ Ö` are the included instruments/exogenous 
regressors: 
 FÎGFJJHGJ Ö =  [Ö   Ö`] = [Ö »`] = [BmHÎFBHCJ  ÉHÎFBHCJ]                       (3.7)          
 0BJGCDFBJ » =  [»  »`] = [ÉNXCmFm   0BNXCmFm]                                                 (3.8) 
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 The order condition for identification of the equation is U ≥ ;  there must be at 
least as many excluded instruments as there are endogenous regressors, Baum et al (2003). 
If U = , the equation is said to be “exactly identified”; if U > ,  the equation is 
“overidentified”. If the projection matrix »»′»k»Q  is denoted by ,à, the instrumental 
variable estimator of ^ is  
 Ä^ðú = Ö′»»Q»k»′ÖkÖQ»»Q»k»QP = Ö′,àÖkÖ′,àP                               (3.9) 
 
Under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity the asymptotic distribution 
of IV estimator can be written as follows; let ¦Öà = ÖQ»                                                                                                           (3.10) 
 ¦»» = »Q»                                                                                                           (3.11) 
  
and let C× ≡ P − Ö Ä^ðú                                                                                                   (3.12) 
                                                                                                       
 
According to Baum et al (2003), the IV estimator is asymptotically distributed as 
Ä^ðú~S ^, }  Ä^ðú
 where 
 
} Ä^ðú
 = = Æ`¦′ü¹¦¹¹k¦ü¹k                                                                                  (3.13) 
 
Replacing ¦ü¹, ¦¹¹ and Æ` with their sample estimates 
 
¦Àü¹ = = Ö′»                                                                                                                   (3.14) 
 
¦À¹¹ = = »′»                                                                                                                   (3.15) 
 
Æ×` = :ý Q:ý=                                                                                                                         (3.16) 
 
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the IV estimator is obtained: 
 
 
144 
 
} Ä^ðú
 = Æ×`Ö′»»Q»k»′Ök = Æ×`Ö′,¹Ök                                                      (3.17) 
 
The IV estimator is a special case of a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. Within the context of the GMM , we express the assumption that the instruments » are exogenous as »C = 0. The L instruments yields a set of L moments, 
 Î Ä^
 = »QC× = »QP − Ö Ä^
                                                                                       (3.18) 
 
Where Î is U × 1 the moment function. The exogeneity of the instruments means that 
there are L moment conditions, or orthogonality conditions, that the  − dimensional 
parameters of interest, will satisfy at the true value of ^: 
 Î^
 = 0                                                                                                                 (3.19) 
 
According to Baum et al (2003), each of the U moment equations corresponds to a sample 
moment and are written as; 
 
Î̅ Ä^
 = = ∑ Î=  Ä^
 = = ∑ »Q= P − Ö Ä^
 = = »′C×                                                  (3.20) 
 
The idea behind GMM is to choose an estimator for ^ that solves Î̅ Ä^
 = 0. In 
cases where the equation to be estimated is exactly identified, that is U = , we will have 
as many equations-the L moment conditions as we do unknowns- the  coefficients in Ä^ . 
In such a situation, it is possible to find a Ä^  that solves Î̅^ = 0, this GMM estimator is 
the IV estimator. 
In other situations where the equation to be estimated is over-identified, so that U > ,  in this case, we have more equations than we do unknowns and it will not be 
possible to find a Ä^  that will set all U sample moment conditions to exactly zero. Therefore, 
an U × U weighting matrix T is used to construct a quadratic form in the moment 
conditions. This gives the GMM objective function: 
 ï Ä^
 = BÎ̅ Ä^
′TÎ̅ Ä^
                                                                                                   (3.21) 
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The GMM estimator for ^ is the Ä^  that minimizes ï Ä^
.  Solving the  first order 
conditions; 
 
þ
þ = 0                                                                                                                        (3.22)  
  
Produces the GMM estimator: 
 Ä^Ã22 = Ö′»T»′ÖkÖQ»T»′P                                                                                (3.23) 
 
An important issue when specifying a GMM estimator is the choice of weighting 
matrix.  While any sequence of symmetric positive definite weighting matrices T   will 
yield a consistent estimate of ^, however, the choice of weighting matrix affects the 
asymptotic variance of the GMM estimator. What is the optimal choice of weighting 
matrix?  Following Baum et al (2003), denote by  the covariance matrix of the moment 
conditions Î:   
 
 = = »′CC′» = = »′Ω»                                                                                     (3.24)      
 
where  is an U × U  matrix. The general formula for the distribution of a GMM estimator 
is  
                                           
} Ä^Ã22
 = = ¦′ü¹T¦ü¹k¦′ü¹TT¦ü¹¦′ü¹T¦ü¹k                                  (3.25) 
 
Baum et al (2003) opines that efficient GMM estimator is the GMM estimator with 
an optimal weighting matrix T, one which minimizes the asymptotic variance of the 
estimator. According to them, asymptotically efficient, or optimal GMM estimator of ^ 
may be obtained by choosing the weighting matrix so that it converges to the inverse of the 
long-run covariance matrix  given as T = k. Substituting the weight into equations 
3.23 and 3.25 yields the efficient GMM estimator. 
 Ä^
Ã22 = Ö′»k»′ÖkÖ′»k»′P                                                                           (3.26) 
 
With asymptotic variance: 
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} Ä^Ã22
 = = ¦′ü¹k¦ü¹k                                                                                   (3.27) 
 
Implementation of efficient GMM estimation requires that we obtain estimates of k. The current study used the HAC estimation weighting matrix which is a 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the long-run covariance 
matrix of »C^ based on an initial estimate of ^. To obtain an initial consistent 
estimate of ^ we employed iterate to convergence weight updating method. This iteration 
weighting matrix and coefficient estimation is performed until the coefficients converge so 
that Ä^	 = Ä^	k to a sufficient degree of precision.  
To compute the coefficient covariance weighting matrix, we used the Windmeijer 
standard errors and covariance estimation method that employs a bias-corrected estimator 
which take into account the variations of the initial parameter estimates. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) in their Monte Carlo study provided evidence that seems to suggest that the 
conventional covariance weighting matrix estimators such as Two-stage least squares, 
HAC-Newey-West and White covariance estimators produce standard errors that are 
downward biased in small samples. According to Windmeijer (2000 2005), part of this 
downward bias is as a result of the extra variation caused by the initial weight matrix 
estimation which is based on consistent estimates of the equation parameters. Windmeijer 
(2000 2005) developed bias-corrected standard error estimates that take into account the 
variation of initial parameter estimates.  
 
3.4.1 Model specification and lag Selection for the autoregressive model  
 The reactions of households to changes in incomes are not instantaneous. The 
changes are for the most part distributed over time; and positions of equilibrium are 
approached gradually. The slowness to respond may be due to the time delays in the 
transmission and analysis of the information upon which agents base their decisions on. 
Secondly, there could be some costs that may be incurred in the process of reacting to the 
new circumstances. In the context of the present study, stock market participants will incur 
some costs (for example brokerage fees or commissions) in a bid to react to stock price 
appreciations and these costs are likely to be positively related to the speed and the extent 
of the adjustments. Consequently, it is appropriate to make some provision in the model for 
such dynamic responses that are distributed over time. 
 We introduced an element of feedback in the model by including two lagged values 
of the dependent variable (measure of income inequality) Pk and Pk` on the right-hand 
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of the equation as part of the explanatory variables. We did this to capture the persistency 
in the income of these groups of people, because we expect that the current level of the 
dependent variable could be heavily determined by its past levels. The inclusion of these 
lag values are necessary to ensure the stability of the model. The dynamic model we 
estimated is of this functional form: 
 P = Å + ^Pk + ^`Pk` + ^cJ + ì^ℎO + ^íCF + ^\/à + ]                      (3.28) l = ^PÀk +  ^`PÀk`  
 
Replacing ^Pk and ^`Pk` with l in equation (3.28) yields: 
 P = Å + 1 − lPk5 + ^J + ^`ℎO + ^cCF + ì^\/à + ]                             (3.29) 
 
Where x is lags 1 and 2 of the dependent variable, P is a measure of income 
inequality namely the growth rate of the share of aggregate income received by top 1 
percent, bottom 90 percent and lowest fifth percent of the earning population. In addition, 
the lagged dependent variables according to Nerlove (1958) can be seen as a “partial 
adjustment”90 for any mean reverting behaviour.  
To confirm the partial adjustment theory, we expect ^ in equation (3.28) to be 
positive and significant. This would indicate a drift and ^` to be negative and significant 
which indicates reversion towards an equilibrium value. That is to say, they are necessary 
conditions for the attainment of a long-run equilibrium in the dynamic response. The total 
effect of the lagged income is defined as l that is  ^ + ^`.  J denotes growth rate of 
stock prices, ℎO represents the growth rate of house prices, EP is the corporate bond 
yield, while CF and \ represents unemployment rate and inflation rate respectively.] is 
the error term of the model and à the instruments provide information about changes in 
the income inequality variables that is not provided by the endogenous regressors in the 
model.  
Identification in equation (3.28) requires us to have at least the same number of 
moments and parameters. In other words, for the GMM estimator to be identified, there 
must be at least as many instrumental variables as there are parameters to estimate. In this 
case, we have over-identified models. The instruments used are a constant, lagged income 
                                                          
90
 The idea behind the partial adjustment is that, while the dependent variable P may be related to the 
explanatory variables Ö′J there is inertia in the system and the actual value of P  is made up of its value in 
the previous time period Pk and the current values of the explanatory variables  
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inequality Pkc, lagged stock price Jk, lagged house prices ℎOk, lagged bond 
yield EPk, lagged unemployment rate CFk, lagged inflation \k, lagged index of 
globalization xHIk, lagged college premium NHXOGFk measured as the income 
differential between individuals with 4 years or more of college education and individuals 
with 1 to 3 years of college education and a time trend.  
We can express equation (3.29) as a partial adjustment model (PAM). To illustrate 
this model, adopting the notations of Gujarati and Sangeetha (2007), we assume that there 
is equilibrium or long-run income of households within the top 1 percent, lowest fifth and 
bottom 90 percent income earners under the given state of the stock, fixed income and 
housing markets e.t.c. Also assume that this desired level of household income at the 
selected percentiles P∗ is a linear function of stock returns É our main variable of interest 
as follows: 
  P∗ = ^ + ^É + C                                                                                                    (3.30) 
 
Since the desired level of income is not directly observable, following Nerlove (1958) 
partial adjustment hypothesis we postulate the income adjustment hypothesis: 
 P − Pk = lP∗ − Pk                                                                                             (3.31) 
 
Where  l is the coefficient of adjustment such that 0 < l ≤ 1, and P − Pk is 
actual change and P∗ − Pk is the desired change. Equation (3.31) stipulates that the 
actual change in the income of households at the selected percentiles in any given time 
period  is some fraction l of the desired change for that period. According to Gujarati and 
Sangeetha (2007), if l = 1, it means that the actual incomes of those households adjust to 
their desired incomes instantaneously in the same time period. However, if l = 0, it 
implies that nothing changes since actual income at time  is the same as that observed in 
the previous time period. Typically, l the coefficient of adjustment is expected to lie 
between these extremes (1 and 0) since adjustment to the desired income is likely to be 
incomplete because of technical or institutional inertia or rigidities. The adjustment 
mechanism equation (3.31) can also be written as: 
   P = lP∗ + 1 − lPk                                                                                     (3.32)    
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Equation (3.32) implies that the observed income of households at the selected 
percentiles at time  is a weighted average of the desired income at that time and the 
income existing in the previous time period, l and 1 − l is the weights. Substituting 
equation (3.30) into equation (3.32) gives: 
 
 P = l^ + ^É + C + 1 − lPk       = l^ + l ^É + 1 − lPk + lC                                                                      (3.33) 
 
Equation (3.33) is known as the partial adjustment model. Given that equation 
(3.30) represents the long-run or equilibrium income of households at the selected 
percentiles, equation (3.33) can be regarded as the short-run income of these households 
since in the short-run their existing income may not be necessarily equal to its long-run 
level. Once we estimate the short-run function equation (3.33) and obtain the estimate of 
the adjustment coefficient l (in this case the the sum of  Pk  and Pk` ) we can derive the 
long-run function by dividing l^ and l ^ by l and omitting the lagged P term, which will 
then yield equation (3.30). The partial adjustment model is an autoregressive model. 
Following Koyck (1954), we can derive the speed of adjustment z as 1 − l i.e. 1 minus 
the coefficient of adjustment l. 
To select the lag length for the dynamic model equation (3.28) we specified an 
Autoregressive model of order Yß DLÉ; where ß DLÉ is the maximum lag length 
considered, given that the time series used in the present study is quarterly time series, our ß DLÉ = 4 periods. We estimated using OLS an Y 1, Y2, Y3LBm Y4 with 
deterministic time trends included in each of the models and then selected lags with 
statistically significant coefficients, in this case the coefficients on Pk and Pk` were 
found to be statistically significant.  
The econometrics specification equation (3.28) examines the response of income to 
changes in the covariates- financial and non financial assets as well as unemployment and 
inflation. There are limited works modelling household income dynamics in economics. 
Indeed, Sawhill (1988) and Masumura (1996) opined that economists have no model of 
household income dynamics or poverty. This is because of the limited knowledge of the 
processes generating families and family income, Gottschalk (1997). Having a standard 
model for household income dynamics is difficult because of the human capital issues and 
individual attributes that arise in personal earnings. These difficulties are further 
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compounded by the continuous evolution of households; therefore, having a model of 
household income dynamics might have a lot of econometric problems. 
Having said that, the empirical approach we used in this study is based on income 
distribution in macroeconomic models used by, Bertola et al (2005) and, Heathcote et al 
(2008) that used log of hourly wages for men and women in studying the macroeconomic 
implications of rising wage inequality and Sarel and Robinson (1997) that examined in a 
cross-section empirical framework, the relationship between macroeconomic environment 
and trends in income distribution using the logarithmic average of income per person as the 
main variable of interest. Given that we are interested in studying the effect of asset prices 
on the income of households at selected percentiles as well as testing to determine whether 
asset prices or the so called college premium provide better explanatory powers to changes 
in the top 1 percent income, we included variables to capture both the asset price and 
education premium channels of income inequality91.  
The macroeconomic variables considered in the present study are policy variables 
namely, inflation and unemployment rate as well as financial and non-financial variables 
namely stock prices, bond yield and house prices and a measure of skill/education 
premium. All the variables used in this study are stationary variables given that we 
transformed them to growth rates. We conducted a formal test of stationarity of the 
variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with intercept included in the test 
equation. The result of the ADF test is reported in Table 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91
 Equation 3.28 is a relatively simple model used to study the distributional consequences of asset prices 
and education premium on household income. Obviously, we do not in this chapter attempt to deal with all 
the documented causes of income inequality such as globalization, technological advancement amongst 
others. What we have done is to include variables that we feel captures the main factors involved. 
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. Table 3.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test }LGRLEXF   − LRJRN  ,GHE∗  O  -5.130842 0.0000 XIRBN  -4.656162 0.0002 E_90_RBN  -4.523297 0.0003 J  -9.314975 0.0000 CF  -3.268955 0.0178 ℎO   -14.79487 0.0000 EP   -5.905545 0.0000 \  -3.679163 0.0263 NHXOGF  -3.974325 0.0182 
Notes: O denotes growth rate of top 1 percent income share, XIRBN denotes the growth rate of the share of 
aggregate income going to the lowest fifth percent households, E_90_RBN is the growth rate of income share 
of the bottom 90 percent income earners, J denotes growth rate of S&P 500 price index, CF denotes the  
unemployment rate, ℎO denotes the growth rate of median sales price for new houses sold in the United 
States, EP is the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield, \ denotes the growth rate of consumer price index, NHXOGF denotes the growth rate of college premium, defined as the income differential between individuals 
with 4 years or more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education.  
 
 
3.4. 2 Presentation and interpretation of results 
 
We analyzed the effects of asset prices particularly stock prices on the income of 
the top 1 percent, lowest fifth percent and bottom 90 percent income earners in the U.S 
from 1970 to 2011.  Our aim is to examine whether changes in both financial and non-
financial assets particularly stock returns affect top and bottom earning households the 
same way, or if there are remarkable differences on how these variables affect individuals 
within these selected percentiles. The results from these analyses will be an important 
contribution in understanding what is driving the changes in the income share of the rich in 
the United States. The results are presented in turn below on tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. 
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Table 3.5 GMM regression estimates for top 1 percent income earners 1970Q1 to 
2011Q4 
 ^Å  ^Ok `^Ok` c^J ì^ℎO  í^EP  ^CF ^\  
   VHFIIRNRFBJ  0.64 
[1.06] 
1.01*** 
[3.31] 
-0.54*** 
[-2.77] 
0.13*** 
[1.89] 
-0.07 
[-0.54] 
-1.56 
[0.76] 
-0.14 
[-1.37] 
0.31 
[0.75] Ok + Ok` = l  0.47        Ymî `  0.60        
  ,GHE ï − JLRJRN  0.50        
Notes: 
Å, ^Ok, `^Ok`, c^J, ì^ℎO í^EP ^CF ^\ ¡  represents the parameters in the model, where Å is 
the constant, ^Ok, is the lag 1 of the growth rate of the income of the top 1 percent, `^Ok`  is the lag 2 
of the growth rate of the income of the top 1 percent, c^J denotes growth rate of S&P 500 price index, ì^ℎO 
denotes the growth rate of median sales price for new houses sold in the United States  í^EP is the Moody’s 
Aaa corporate bond yield, ^CF denotes the unemployment rate, ^\ denotes the growth rate of the consumer 
price index and l is the total effect of lagged income measured as Ok + Ok`). The parameter estimates 
are obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the 
estimation weighting matrix. The instruments à used in the model are, a constant, lagged income of the top 1 
percent Okc, lagged stock price Jk, lagged house prices ℎOk, lagged bond yield EPk, lagged 
unemployment rate CFk, lagged inflation \k, lagged index of globalization xHIk, lagged college 
premium NHXOGFk measured as the income differential between individuals with 4 years or more of 
college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education and a time trend. OGH. î − JL 
denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of observing the 
value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R . O = Å + ^Ok +  `^Ok` + c^J + ì^ℎO + í^EP + ^CF + ^\/à + ]                    (a) 
 
The results presented in table 3.5 below suggest several conclusions: first the 
portion of the income of the top 1 percent that is explained by last period’s income of this 
group of earners is significant. Secondly, the estimated coefficient on lagged income Ok 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent levels indicating a drift, which 
implies that the movement in the income of the top 1 percent this quarter continues the 
next quarter. The estimated coefficient on lagged income Ok` is negative and significant 
at I percent level of significance indicating a reversion towards an equilibrium value. 
Thirdly and perhaps the most important for the present study is that the estimated 
coefficient for the stock returns is positive and significant while house returns, and bond 
yields were found to be insignificant. Specifically, our result reveals that the effect of a one 
percent increase in stock returns tends to increase the income of the top 1 percent in the 
current period by 0.13 percent. 
The impact of stocks on the income of the top 1 percent in table 3.5 suggests that 
the effect of changes in stock returns is distributed over a number of quarters. The total 
effect of the lagged income, i.e. the partial adjustment parameter l from table 3.5 is 0.47 
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percent. The adjustment rate implicit in the partial adjustment coefficient  is 0.5392, 
meaning that 0.53 of the difference between desired and actual income of households 
within the top income spectrum is eliminated in one year i.e. 4 quarters. Given that we 
have estimated the short-run function equation (3.33) and have equally obtained the 
estimates of the adjustment coefficient, we can derive the long-run effect of changes in 
stock returns by dividing the short-run effect of changes in stock returns (contemporaneous 
effect J ) on the top 1 percent by l. We find that the long-run effect of stock returns on 
households within the top 1 percent income spectrum is 0.24.  
Notice that there is not a huge difference between the short-run 0.13 and the long-
run 0.24 effects of stock returns on top 1 percent income earners because the speed of 
adjustment is rapid. Our result suggests that holding all the other variables constant, that 
changes in stock returns can explain approximately 0.13% variations in the income of the 
top 1 percent. This is not surprising given that stock market participants are on average 
richer households and therefore, benefit disproportionately from a stock market boom. This 
finding provides substantial empirical evidence in support of the notion that the 
concentration of income at the top of the distribution could be driven at least in the short-
run by developments within the stock market.  
Table 3.8 below shows the percentage of total assets held by wealth class. The table 
reveals that about 64.4% of financial securities are owned by the top 1 percent population 
while 6.1% of the same asset class is owned by the bottom 90 percent in 2010. In addition, 
the top 1 percent income households owned about 48.8% of stocks and mutual funds and 
this same group of income earners owned 35% of all the listed stocks directly or indirectly 
during the period under review. While the bottom 90 percent owned only 8.6% and 19.2% 
of stocks and mutual funds and listed equities respectively.  
Furthermore, this finding offers support to our suspicion that the reaction of 
monetary policy to the top 1 percent income inequality measure, as opposed to the lack of 
reaction to all the other measures of inequality we used in chapter 2 of this thesis could be 
an indirect reaction to the stock market. This is because the income of the top 1 percent 
earning population exhibits high levels of correlation with the S&P500 stock index. In 
addition, figure 3.1 above reveals that the incomes of the top 1 percent are closely tied to 
the peaks and valleys of the stock market. We will now turn our attention to the response 
of households at the lower end of the income distribution to changes in asset prices. The 
                                                          
92
 That is 1-l and l in the current case is 0.47. Therefore  the speed of adjustment z is 1-0.47= 0.53 
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result for the GMM estimates of the reaction of the lowest fifth percent income earners is 
presented in table 3.6 below. 
 
Table 3.6 GMM regression estimates for lowest fifth percent income earners 1970Q1 
to 2011Q4 
 ^Å  ^XIRBNk `^XIRBNk` c^J  ì^ℎO í^EP  ^CF ^\  
   VHFIIRNRFBJ  0.04 
[0.44] 
1.53*** 
[5.76] 
-0.83*** 
[-5.31] 
-0.01** 
[1.83] 
0.05*** 
[2.40] 
-0.01 
[-0.04] 
-0.02 
[-1.06] 
-0.01 
[0.75] XIÇBNÀÀÀÀÀÀÀk +XIÇBNÀÀÀÀÀÀÀk` = l  0.70        Ymî `  0.77        
  ,GHE ï − JLRJRN  0.85        
Notes: 
Å, ^XIRBNk, `^XIRBNk`, c^J, ì^ℎO í^EP ^CF ^\ ¡  represents the parameters in the model, 
where Å is the constant, ^XIRBNk, is the lag 1 of the growth rate of the income of the lowest fifth percent 
income earning households, `^XIRBNk`  is the lag 2 of the growth rate of the income of the lowest fifth 
percent income earning households, c^J denotes growth rate of S&P 500 price index, ì^ℎO denotes the 
growth rate of median sales price for new houses sold in the United States  í^EP is the Moody’s Aaa 
corporate bond yield, ^CF denotes the unemployment rate, ^\ denotes the growth rate of the consumer 
price index and l is the total effect of lagged income measured as XIRBNk + XIRBNk`). The parameter 
estimates are obtained by GMM estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth=50000] as the estimation weighting matrix. The instruments à used in the model are, a constant, 
lagged income of the lowest fifth percent earning households XIRBNkc, lagged stock price Jk, lagged 
house prices ℎOk, lagged bond yield EPk, lagged unemployment rate CFk, lagged inflation \k, lagged index of globalization xHIk, lagged college premium NHXOGFk measured as the income 
differential between individuals with 4 years or more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years 
of college education and a time trend. OGH. î − JL denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-
identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of observing the value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is 
true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the 
regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in 
the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the adjusted 2R . XIRBN = Å + ^XIRBNk +  `^XIRBNk` + c^J + ì^ℎO + í^EP + ^CF + ^\/à + ]            (b) 
 
Table 3.6 above is the result of the regression for the lowest fifth percent earning 
households. The result from this model presents several interesting findings, first just as in 
the top 1 percent model; the past values of income of the lowest fifth earning population 
can explain variations in their current income. Secondly, the estimated coefficient on 
lagged income XIRBNk is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent levels 
indicating a drift, which implies that changes in the income of the lowest fifth percent this 
quarter continues the next quarter. The estimated coefficient on lagged income XIRBNk` is 
negative and significant at I percent level of significance indicating a reversion towards an 
equilibrium value. Thirdly, the contemporaneous effect of changes in stock returns is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent levels. Specifically, the result suggests that 
holding all the other variables constant, an increase in stock returns will result to a 0.01 
percent reduction in the income of households at the lowest fifth percent income spectrum.  
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The inverse relationship between our measure of inequality and stock returns in this 
model suggests some sort of redistribution. The total effect of lagged income of the lowest 
fifth percent income earning households, i.e. the partial adjustment parameter l from table 
3.6 is approximately 0.70 percent. The adjustment rate implicit in the partial adjustment 
coefficient is 0.30 percent  indicating that only about 30 percent of the difference between 
desired and actual income of households within the lowest fifth percent income spectrum is 
eliminated in one year i.e. 4 quarters. The long-run effect of stock returns on households 
within the lowest fifth income percentile is -0.05. Although the short run and long run 
distributive effects of changes in stock returns is minimal, this finding however provides 
support for the notion that monetary policy induced stock price inflation can exacerbate 
inequality.  
Allowing return in house prices to enter the model suggests a positive and 
significant relationship between the incomes of individuals at the lowest fifth percent 
income spectrum and house returns. This finding seems to suggest that a percentage 
increase in house prices, holding other variables constant favours those households at the 
low end of the income distribution. Quantitatively, one percent increase in house prices 
will increase the income of households at the lowest fifth percent by 0.05 percent and is 
significant while the same increase for the top 1 percent model will result to an increase of 
0.07; however, this is not statistically significant.  
This finding can be understood within the context of home ownership wealth effect. 
According to Belsky and Prakken (2004), housing wealth is far more broadly distributed 
across income levels than stock wealth. According to them, the top 1 percent of stock 
holders in 2001 held one out of every three dollars of stock wealth, while the top one 
percent of homeowners held a lesser one out of every eight dollars of home equity. This 
implies that home equity is particularly important to lower income households. Table 3.8 
reveals that the ownership of principal residence was more within the bottom income 
earners.  
Specifically, 59.8% of bottom 90 percent income earners own their residence as 
compared to only 9.2% of top 1 percent that owned their residence in 2010 meaning that 
residential assets are more widely distributed than stock. Levine (2012) reported that in 
2007, the wealthiest 10% of households held 38.5% of the gross equity in principal 
residences compared with 90% of the value of stock. In addition, households in the next 
40% of the distribution i.e. 50th to 90th percentile held 48.9% of gross equity in principal 
residence compared to 9.0% of the value of stock. Thus appreciation in house price appears 
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to have the potential of reducing the income gap between the top and low income earners 
via housing wealth and home equity borrowing. Inflation, unemployment rate and bond 
yield were all insignificant in both models suggesting that these variables do not explain 
changes in the incomes of both the top and lowest fifth percent income earners. 
Table 3.7 below presents the GMM model for the bottom 90 percent income 
earning households. The result from this table shows that both the first and second lags of 
bottom 90 percent income explains variations in the current income of this group of wage 
earners. In this model just like in the other two models above the estimated coefficient on 
lagged bottom 90 percent income E_90_RBNk is positive and statistically significant at the 
1 percent levels indicating a drift, which implies that movements in the income of 
households within the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution in this quarter 
continues in the same direction the next quarter. The estimated coefficient on lagged 
bottom 90 percent income E_90_RBNk` is negative and significant at I percent level of 
significance indicating a reversion towards an equilibrium value. 
 
Table 3.7 GMM regression estimates for bottom 90 percent income earners 1970Q1 
to 2011Q4 
 ^Å  ^E_90_RBNk `^E_90_RBNk` c^J  ì^ℎO í^EP  ^CF  ^\  
   VHFIIRNRFBJ  0.05 
[0.62] 
1.90*** 
[8.15] 
-1.01*** 
[-5.35] 
0.01 
[1.29] 
0.01 
[0.30] 
0.07 
[0.22] 
-0.01 
[-0.44] 
-0.01 
[0.18] E_90_ÇBNÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀÀk +E_90_k` = l  0.89        Ymî `  0.87        
  ,GHE ï − JLRJRN  0.91        
Notes: 
Å, ^E_90_RBNk, `^E_90_RBNk`, c^J, ì^ℎO í^EP ^CF ^\ ¡  represents the parameters in the 
model, where Å is the constant, ^E_90_RBNk, is the lag 1 of the growth rate of the income of the bottom 90 
percent earning households, `^E_90_RBNk`  is the lag 2 of the growth rate of bottom 90 percent earning 
households, c^J denotes growth rate of S&P 500 price index, ì^ℎO denotes the growth rate of median sales 
price for new houses sold in the United States  í^EP is the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield, ^CF denotes 
the unemployment rate, ^\ denotes the growth rate of the consumer price index and l is the total effect of 
lagged income measured as E_90_RBNk + E_90_RBNk`). The parameter estimates are obtained by GMM 
estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the estimation weighting 
matrix. The instruments à used in the model are, a constant, lagged income of the bottom 90 percent earning 
households E_90_RBNkc, lagged stock price Jk, lagged house prices ℎOk, lagged bond yield EPk, lagged unemployment rate CFk, lagged inflation \k, lagged index of globalization xHIk, 
lagged college premium NHXOGFk measured as the income differential between individuals with 4 years or 
more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education and a time trend. OGH. î −JL denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of 
observing the value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the 
adjusted 
2R . E_90_RBN = Å + ^E_90_RBNk + `^E_90_RBNk` + c^J + ì^ℎO + í^EP + ^CF + ^\/à + ]  (c)      
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The total effect of lagged bottom 90 percent incomes, i.e. the partial adjustment 
parameter l from table 3.7 is approximately 0.89 percent. The adjustment rate implicit in 
the partial adjustment coefficient is 0.11 percent  suggesting that only 11 percent of the 
difference between desired and actual income of households within the lowest 90 percent 
income spectrum is eliminated in one year i.e. 4 quarters in this case. The adjustment 
parameters in the low income models are very low suggesting that it takes a long while 
before a shock in the income of households within the low income spectrum returns to 
equilibrium. In this model, changes in stock returns, house price returns, bond yield do not 
explain variations in the income of the bottom 90 percent.  
This finding supports the notion that low income households have almost zero 
investment in financial markets, therefore, developments within the financial asset markets 
does not affect their income. In summary, the analysis thus far reveals that changes in 
stock returns can provide some explanation to variations in the income of the top 1 percent 
while stock returns do not provide any explanations to changes in the income of both 
lowest fifth and bottom 90 percent income earners. The results from this study provides 
empirical evidence to Favilukis (2011) overlapping generations model that showed that 
stock prices played a major role in increasing wealth inequality. 
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Table 3.8 Percentage of total assets held by wealth class 2010 
Investment assets Top 1 percent Bottom 90  percent 
Stocks and mutual funds 48.8 8.6 
Financial securities 64.4 6.1 
Trusts 38.0 19.0 
Business equity 61.4 8.1 
Non-home real estate 35.5 20.9 
Stocks directly or indirectly owned 35.0 19.2 
                                                                                                                 Housing, liquid and pension assets and debt 
Principal residence 9.2 59.8 
Deposits 28.1 29.5 
Life insurance 20.6 45.3 
Pension accounts 15.4 34.5 
Total debt 5.9 72.5 
Source Wolf (2012): “The asset price meltdown and the wealth of the middle class” 
Notes:  
Stocks directly or indirectly owned include direct ownership of stocks and indirect ownership through mutual funds. Top 1 percent according to Wolf (2012) has a net worth of 
$6,616,000 or more, while the bottom 90 percent has a net worth of less than $890,000. Net worth is defined as the difference in value between total assets and total liabilities or debt. 
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3.5 Skill/college wage premium and income inequality 
The contribution of education or skill gap to widening income inequality has given 
rise to numerous studies in recent years. This has been especially true since the notion 
became widespread that the increasing income inequality could be attributed to differences 
in educational attainment and skill levels, Goldin and Katz (2008), Mankiw (2013), 
amongst others. Our data supports this notion as can be observed from the plot of income 
of individuals with 4 years or more of college education and that of individuals with only 1 
to 3 years of college education- figure 3.3 (income differentials).  
 
Figure 3.3 Income differentials 1970 to 2010  
 
Data sourced from Bureau of Economic Data Analysis 
 
 
Figure 3.3 reveals that the income of individuals with only 1 to 3 years of college 
education has trailed behind that of individuals with four years or more of college 
education since 1967 to 2012.  A closer look at the chart reveals a slight increase in the 
earnings of less skilled workers during the mid 1990s specifically in 1995, before a decline 
in early 2000s.  
In addition, Goldin and Katz (2007) using two components of wage/income 
inequality measured as the college graduate wage premium relative to those who stopped 
at high school and the high school graduate wage premium relative to those who left 
school at eight grade showed that bulk of the widening wage/income inequality of the 
1980s could be traced to an increase in educational income differentials.  Specifically, the 
authors found that about 65% of the growth of overall wage inequality from 1980 to 2005 
for men and women can be accounted for by the expansion of educational wage 
differentials. Furthermore, Lemieux (2006) in his own contributions provided documented 
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evidence which seems to suggest that the increased returns to post-secondary education can 
explain in part the rise in male hourly wage inequality from 1973 to 2005.  
To test the stability of our findings we included a measure of education premium 
namely skill premium,93 as part of the endogenous regressors and the growth rate of the 
income of individuals with four years or more of college education (skilled worker) as one 
of the instruments to capture the contributions of education and college income premium to 
income inequality. The basic idea of this section is to test if the financial and non-financial 
variables we used in the baseline model will still be significant if we control for the effect 
of skill premium on the top 1 percent income variable. 
 
Figure 3.4 College graduate income premium 
 
Data sourced from Bureau of Economic Data Analysis: author’s calculation 
 
Figure 3.4 is a plot of the college graduate premium which is measured as the 
difference between individuals with four years or more of college education and those with 
no college education. The growth in college premium has been somewhat zigzag since the 
1970s although the general trend seems to be upward which is in line with previous 
studies. The plot of the college premium (figure 3.4) showed a steep decline in the mid 
90s, which can be attributed to an attempt from the U.S government to narrow the 
widening income differentials via the increase in Federal minimum wage94, targeted tax 
                                                          
93
 We define the skill premium as college wage premium measured as the wage differential between 
individuals over 25 years with 4 years or more of college education and those individuals with only 1 to 3 
years of college education. 
94
 A 2013 New York Times report suggests that increasing the Federal minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to 
$9 would directly address the United States yawning levels of income inequality, Lowrey (2013). According 
to this report, tying the minimum wage to inflation would allow it to increase in tandem with the cost of 
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
College Premium
 
161 
 
credits and transfers, United States Department of Labour, Wage and Hour Division 
(2012). However, the premium returned to its upward trajectories during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s and has continued with this trend; thus exacerbating income inequality. 
Over the past decades, the United States underwent significant structural changes, 
driven in part by the integration of the local economy into the global economy and rapid 
technological advancement. These changes tilted the income distribution in favour of 
highly skilled workers than low-skilled ones and thus affected the way earnings from work 
were distributed. However, changes in the earnings distribution alone cannot account for 
much of the overall trends in household income inequality in the U.S. Income from asset 
prices particularly equities can also have an impact on overall earnings inequality because 
the income it generates is much more unevenly distributed than wages and salaries.  
Our point is that incomes from stock price explains changes in the income of the 
top 1 percent income earners given that the ownership of large amount of corporate stocks 
is  concentrated within the upper and middle income households in the U.S. as can be seen 
from the results of our empirical analysis. Therefore, it is necessary that we test the 
robustness of our findings by allowing college premium to enter the model.  This allows us 
to see if the stock market channel will still be significant if we account for the college 
premium or which of the two provides better explanatory power for the concentration of 
income at the top end of the income distribution.  
         The result from this model table 3.9 below corroborates the finding of a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between stock returns and the income of households at 
the top 1 percent Specifically, a one percent increase in stock prices will result to a 0.11 
percent rise in the income of households at the top 1 percent. This finding provides strong 
support for the financial asset price channel of income inequality. The college premium 
variable in this model is not significant. This finding seems to suggest that stock price 
changes have played a more significant role in the concentration of income within the top 
echelon of the income distribution than the college premium in this model. The total effect 
of the lagged income l in this model is approximately 0.51 percent. The adjustment rate 
implicit in the partial adjustment coefficient is 0.49 percent  suggesting that about 0.49 
percent of the difference between desired and actual income of households within the top 1  
percent income spectrum is eliminated in one year i.e. 4 quarters in this case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
living and has the potential of boosting the wages of about 15 million low-income workers; hence, 
narrowing the income gaps between the low and high income earners. 
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           Table 3.9 GMM regression estimates for top 1 percent income earners 1970Q1 
to 2011Q4 robustness check 
 ^Å  ^Ok `^Ok`  c^J  ì^ℎO  í^EP ^CF  ^\ ^NHXOGFÎG 
   VHFIIRNRFBJ  0.65 [1.45] 1.13*** [3.33] -0.62*** [-2.95] 0.11* [1.76] -0.05 [0.32] -1.04 [-0.43] -0.12 [-1.09] -0.11 [0.17] 0.11 [0.42] OÀÀÀk +OÀÀÀk` = l  0.51         Ymî `  0.69         
  ,GHE ï − JLRJRN  0.25         
Notes: 
Å, ^Ok, `^Ok`, c^J, ì^ℎO í^EP ^CF ^\ ^NHXOGFÎG l  represents the parameters in the 
model, where Å is the constant, ^E_90_RBNk, is the lag 1 of the growth rate of the income of the bottom 90 
percent earning households, `^E_90_RBNk`  is the lag 2 of the growth rate of bottom 90 percent earning 
households, c^J denotes growth rate of S&P 500 price index, ì^ℎO denotes the growth rate of median sales 
price for new houses sold in the United States  í^EP is the Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield, ^CF denotes 
the unemployment rate, ^\ denotes the growth rate of the consumer price index, and l is the total effect of 
lagged income measured as E_90_RBNk + E_90_RBNk`). The parameter estimates are obtained by GMM 
estimation using HAC [Bartlett Kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth=50000] as the estimation weighting 
matrix. The instruments à used in the model are, a constant, lagged income of the bottom 90 percent earning 
households E_90_RBNkc, lagged stock price Jk, lagged house prices ℎOk, lagged bond yield EPk, lagged unemployment rate CFk, lagged inflation \k, lagged index of globalization xHIk, 
lagged college premium NHXOGFk measured as the income differential between individuals with 4 years or 
more of college education and individuals with 1 to 3 years of college education and a time trend. OGH. î −JL denotes the probability of the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions i.e. the probability of 
observing the value of the J-statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. The J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the regression. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  Ymî ` is the 
adjusted 
2R . O = Å + ^Ok +  `^Ok` + c^J + ì^ℎO + í^EP + ^CF + ^\ + ^NHXOGFÎG/à + ]        (d)                            
 
 3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the role of asset prices on the income of households within 
the top 1 percent, lowest fifth percent and bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. 
We used household incomes at these selected percentiles to understand the reaction of 
income to both financial and non-financial assets while controlling for the effects of 
inflation and unemployment. One of the novelties that the present study has brought to the 
income inequality literature is the use of GMM to examine the effects of stock returns on 
the selected percentiles. An important finding from this analysis, which is one of the key 
results of this chapter, is the substantial heterogeneity in the degree of sensitivity of income 
across different percentiles of household income to changes in stock returns and returns 
from home ownership. Application of this estimation approach enabled us to identify 
winners and losers among segments of the workforce to changes in stock prices and also 
evaluate how financial markets and economic policy initiatives affect the top and low 
income earners during the period under review. 
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Specifically, we found strong reaction to stock prices by households at the top 1 
percent of the income spectrum while no statistical significant reaction was found at the 
lower income percentiles. This pattern of stronger reaction makes it clear that households 
at the top of the income distribution made much greater gains over time than those at the 
bottom of the distribution to stock price changes. This finding has some intuitive appeal 
given that higher income households are generally better positioned to invest/trade in 
stocks than those at the lower end of the income distribution. On the other hand, increases 
in the returns from homeownership favours households within the low income brackets 
more than those at the top income brackets. Hence if appreciation in house prices favour 
more low income earners, it implies an increase in household wealth and a reduction in 
wealth/income inequality given that housing wealth is far more broadly distributed across 
income levels than stock wealth.  
According to Belsky and Prakken (2004), among homeowners with under $20,000 
in income in 2001, three quarters have more home equity than stock equity and the median 
wealth of these low income owners is 81 times greater than the median wealth of renters 
with comparable incomes. The decreases in the incomes of the top 1 and bottom 90 percent 
income earners during 2007-2009 can be attributed to the decreases in the value of home 
and stock equity during the global recession. However, the recovery periods witnessed a 
strong rebound in the income of households within the top income distribution at the 
expense of those in the low income percentile. This rebound was orchestrated in part with 
the recovery of stock prices from their 2007 lows but the continuing problems in the 
residential real estate market have continued to widen the income gap, hence exacerbating 
income inequality. 
In addition we found through the causality analysis that changes in stock returns 
has the efficacy of producing changes in the income of the top 1 percent wage earners. In 
other words, the causal relation between these two variables is such that when one changes, 
the other follows invariably. Given that an evidence of unidirectional causality from stock 
returns to top 1 percent income was established, it implies that the top 1 percent income 
earners benefits more disproportionately from stock price appreciations, at the same time 
they are also supposed to be penalized by stock price depreciation. However, this group of 
workers appears not to have been penalized as much as they gained during the boom years. 
For instance, the median value of stocks and equity in non-residential property fell by 23% 
during the global recession while the primary residence absolute value dropped by $18,700 
(measured in 2009 dollars), more than that of any other financial or non-financial asset.  
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In other words, owners of stocks and non-residential properties lost only 23% of the 
value of their investments while owners of primary residential homes (mostly low income 
earners) lost more value than the equity owners. A possible explanation of this is the 
finding of monetary policy asymmetric reaction to stock prices which favours high income 
earners more. A major policy implication of this study is that government policies that are 
targeted at stimulating economic activities through the stock market will worsen the rising 
income disparities between high and low income earners. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Financial development and income inequality 
 
(A dynamic panel GMM approach) 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The findings from the previous empirical chapter (chapter three) that asset prices 
particularly stock prices can explain in part the super concentration of income at the top 
end of the income distribution seems to suggest that economic policies that prop-up the 
stock market will result to an increase inequality. Some of such policies were witnessed 
during the financial crisis and the recovery period. National governments particularly in 
America and Europe used some unconventional policies to prevent their financial systems 
from total collapse at the peak of the global recession. The rationale behind their actions 
would be implicitly or explicitly attributed to the economic importance of the financial 
sector over the real sector.  The socialization of financial institution’s losses and the 
asymmetric reaction of monetary policy to asset prices particularly at the peak of the  
economic crises have given rise to the re-emergence of the question regarding  the 
contribution of financial system to the economy particularly to the widening income 
inequality in the United States and elsewhere.  
For instance, the Fed in a bid to prevent the collapse of the U.S financial system 
embarked on aggressive purchase of large quantities of long-term securities from 
predefined financial institutions, the so called quantitative easing, Dudley (2010). 
Monetary authorities in the U.S and elsewhere embarked on massive balance sheet 
expansions in a bid to save their financial systems. Bernanke the ex-Federal Reserve 
chairman opined that the quantitative easing had contributed to the rebound in stock prices 
over the past few years and suggested this as a positive outcome. In his words “This effect 
is potentially important, because stock values affect both consumption and investment 
decisions95”, Bernanke (2010).  
                                                          
95
 Bernanke’s assertion seems to suggest that the economic benefits from the rebound in stock prices 
orchestrated in part by the monetary policy stance of the Federal Reserve will benefit low income 
households by improving the economy as a whole, the so called “trickle down” economic policy.  
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If the finding of a unidirectional causality from stock prices to the income of top 1 
percent of the U.S population from the previous chapter is anything to go by, it implies that 
the rebound in stock prices as a result of the Fed’s quantitative easing will exacerbate 
inequality given that ownership of stocks is concentrated within the top income 
households. Empirical evidence suggests that the effect of some of these policies was a 
widening of income gap between the rich and the poor. For instance, Wolf (2012) reported 
that quantitative easing helped in boosting wealth for those already engaged in the 
financial sector while passing little along to the rest of the economy. This line of argument 
suggests that the trickle down policy has benefited the wealthy more than the rest of the 
population; hence, resulting in the widening of the income gap between the rich and the 
poor. 
The benefits of financial system that should warrant such type of special attention 
from the government fall short in being acknowledged by the public as the main operators 
(bankers and brokers) are seen as highly paid ‘selfish’ individuals who use the system to 
satisfy their high financial ambitions. Despite the widespread criticisms of the 
developments within the financial markets, particularly during the periods leading up to the 
global financial crisis, from an economic perspective, financial markets boost economic 
growth and provide the platform for wealthy as well as poor people to borrow and finance 
investments thus, ensuring that capital is distributed most efficiently irrespective of one’s 
financial background. The success of microfinance for the poor in most developing 
economies is a typical example of the effect of financial systems in reducing income 
inequality. A well developed financial system is expected to reduce the income gap 
between the rich and the poor via the granting of loans to finance human capital 
development and business investment, with the resultant effect of increased income and 
upward social mobility96.  
Beck Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) argued that financial sector development 
disproportionately raises the income of the poorest quintile and reduces income inequality. 
Also; Li, Squire and Zou (1998) found that financial sector development reduces inequality 
by increasing the income of the bottom income earners. On the other hand, other studies 
suggested that the benefits of financial sector development accrues mostly to the rich 
during the early stages of development thus exacerbating income inequality; however, this 
would tend to reduce as the economy develops and more agents gain access to the financial 
                                                          
96
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2010) provided an overview of the relation between microfinance and income 
inequality and cited studies in favour of inequality-reducing effect of financial development. 
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market, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Conversely, some authors have emphasized the 
negative distributional consequences of financial sector development. Tomaskovic-Devey 
and Ken-Hou (2011) suggests that income rents associated with financial sector 
development were realized primarily by capital in the banking, insurance and real estate 
industries and by employees in the securities industry. Their study found that the 
substantial increase in income rents to finance sector employees were not equally shared to 
all employees.   
Given the not so clear effect of financial development on income inequality, this 
chapter investigates the link between financial sector development and income inequality 
for a large unbalanced dataset of 91 countries classified according to the income categories 
defined by the World Bank (high-income, middle-income, and the low income countries). 
The World Bank’s criterion for classifying countries into different income groups is the 
gross national product (GNI) per capita97. Based on its GNI per capita every economy is 
classified as low income, middle income made up of lower and upper middle income and 
high income countries, World Bank (2013). Countries are classified according to 2012 GNI 
per capita98, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Low income countries are 
countries with a GNI per capita of $1,035 or less, lower middle income countries are 
economies with $1,036-$4,085, upper middle income countries have a GNI per capita of 
$4,086-$12,615 and high incomes countries have a minimum per capita GNI of $12,616, 
World Bank (2013). 
We tried to provide answers to the following questions; does financial sector 
development reduce income inequality? Is there any evidence that financial sector 
development favours high income earners? Can we spot major differences within countries 
based on their stage/level of economic development? Or is the effect the same around the 
world, irrespective of country peculiarities? Specifically, the null hypothesis tested in this 
study is that well developed financial markets reduce income inequality since efficient 
credit allocation will allow household choices and decisions to be made based on economic 
optimality rather than inherited wealth i.e. the linear negative influence hypotheses of 
                                                          
97
 There are some changes that were made in the World Bank’s 2014 financial year (FY 14) classification. 
First the Russian Federation was moved to high income countries. Chile, Lithuania and Uruguay also became 
high income countries moving from upper middle income countries for the first time. Hungary slipped back 
to upper middle income country after being high income since financial year 2009 (FY09). The new income 
classification was released after our analysis which explains why Russian Federation, Chile, Lithuania and 
Uruguay were shown as upper middle income countries. 
98
 It is important to mention that income classifications are set each year on July 1 and they remain fixed 
during the World Bank’s fiscal year. Therefore, countries remain in the categories in which they are 
classified irrespective of any revisions to their per capita income data. 
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Galor and Zeira (1993). Against the alternative hypothesis that better developed financial 
markets favour the rich more than the poor given that they can afford the collateral 
requirements needed to obtain credit. We also tested the inverted U-shaped hypothesis of 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) as well as the Kuznet (1955) inverted U-shaped path of 
income inequality along economic development. 
A major preoccupation of the present study is the provision of empirical 
explanation of the influence of financial sector development on income inequality within 
countries included in the datasets. To model this influence, we employed the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) dynamic panel GMM estimators which have 
the advantage of controlling for country characteristics via differencing and the orthogonal 
deviations respectively. To analyze the link between financial sector development and 
income inequality we used standard proxies in the financial development literature, namely 
the ratio of private credit to GDP, bank deposit to GDP and stock market capitalization to 
GDP as measures of financial development and the GINI coefficient of income distribution 
within countries as well as income share of the top 1 percent as measures of income 
inequality. 
Our contributions to existing literature on financial system development and 
income inequality is the analysis of the distributional consequences of different dimensions 
of financial sector development (stock market, deposit and non-deposit financial 
institutions) on GINI index of gross and net income inequality as well as the income of the 
top 1 percent of the population in the target countries. Finally, to test the stability of our 
benchmark specification, we divided our dataset in subsamples, according to income 
levels. The idea is to provide additional insight on how financial sector development 
affects income inequality in countries at various stages of economic development and we 
also used bank deposit to GDP as a measure of financial sector development. The rest of 
the chapter is structured as follows:  
Section 4.1 presents an overview of related literature; section 4.2 analyzes trends in 
income inequality around the countries covered in our datasets, and describes the data used 
in this chapter. In section 4.3 we conducted the econometrics analysis, in section 4.4 we 
tested the stability of our findings and evaluated the impact of financial development on 
the income of the top 1 percent while section 4.5 is the discussion of results and 
conclusion. 
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4.1 Literature review on financial development and income inequality 
In this section, we provide both theoretical and empirical literatures on the impact 
of financial sector development on income inequality. Several studies have highlighted the 
important role that finance99 play in theories of persistent inequality, Mckinnon (1973), 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993),  Shahbaz et al (2010) 
amongst others. The level of financial sector development of a country will determine the 
extent of the gap between the rich and the poor since financial system influence who 
becomes an entrepreneur and who cannot, who can afford quality education and who 
cannot, and who can take advantage of economic opportunities and who cannot. Thus, 
finance can shape the gap between rich and the poor as well as the degree to which that gap 
persists across generations, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009).  
 Early empirical investigation into the relationship between the distribution of 
income and economic development was by Kuznet (1955). He established the inverted U-
shaped path of income inequality along economic development-the so called Kuznets 
curve. Kuznet argument was premised on the notion that rural areas are more equal with 
somewhat lower average income than the urban areas at the onset of industrialization; 
therefore, a society becomes more unequal through urbanization. According to him, as 
families move from rural to urban areas, new generations of former poor rural families are 
able to profit from industrialization. Consequently, wages of former low income families 
who are beneficiaries of industrialization rises and overall income inequality narrows. A 
major underpinning of Kuznets’ argument of industrialization is financial development, 
which helps children of formerly poor migrants to choose the education they desire and to 
start their own businesses irrespective of their inherited wealth.  
Economic theory predicts conflicting relationship between finance and inequality. 
On the one hand financial sector development can reduce the intergenerational persistence 
of relative incomes because it can expand the economic opportunities of disadvantaged 
groups, thus, reducing the intergenerational persistence of relative incomes. On the other 
hand, financial sector development can equally enhance the financial services of those 
already accessing the financial system, which are generally high-income earners and well 
established firms. Therefore, the direct effect of improving the quality of financial services 
                                                          
99
  Finance consists of the ability of financial contracts, markets and financial intermediaries to facilitate the 
selection/screening of investment opportunities, the monitoring of investments after providing investment 
capital and the sourcing, trading and management of risk, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) 
 
170 
 
could have disproportionate impact on the rich, thus widening inequality and exacerbating 
inequality of economic opportunities between individuals from low and high income 
households, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).  
Townsend and Ueda (2006) in their study provided an indirect mechanism in which 
changes within the financial sector can affect inequality. According to them, changes in the 
financial system can influence both aggregate production as well as the allocation of credit, 
each of which may change the demand for low-and high-skilled workers with implications 
on the distribution of income. The finance-inequality relationship has resulted in different 
schools of thoughts; the inverted U-shape hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), 
the linear hypothesis of Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993), the 
human capital investment of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), and finally discrimination 
theory of Becker (1957). 
All these theoretical models sought to provide an insight into the role of finance in 
explaining persistent inequality. Some of the models cited above motivate the use of the 
ratio of private credit over GDP as a proxy for financial development. A pronounced theme 
in most of these models is the notion that financial sector development has the potential of 
improving an individual’s future income possibilities through easy access to credit. For 
example, Banerjee and Newman (1993), modelled households’ occupational choice, which 
depends on credit availability. Galor and Zeira (1993), in their contribution modelled 
human capital investment which again depends on credit availability.  
Finally, Greenwod and Jovanovic (1990) modelled household portfolio selection 
where the use of financial institution enhances household capital income; however, it 
comes at a small fixed cost. This cost element implies that at the initial stages of 
development poor households cannot afford using banks for their savings, resulting in 
increased inequality with financial development, as only those born in wealthy households 
are able to use bank finance. However, as the economy grows and matures overtime, a 
poorer household becomes richer and can also access bank finance. Consequently, 
inequality after some time decreases with financial development. (In what follows is an in-
depth analysis of the theoretical models tested in this chapter) 
 
Theoretical studies 
Greenwood and Jovanovic inverted U-shaped hypothesis  
This theory suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship (i.e., financial sector 
development might increase income inequality at the early stages of development, but then 
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tend to lower it when the average income increases and more household gain access to 
financial market) between financial sector development and income distribution. In their 
pioneering work Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) explored the finance-inequality nexus 
within the context of an endogenous growth model. Their theoretical model analyzed 
growth and inequality dynamics in a situation where finance plays an important role in 
households’ access to higher expected-return projects. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
model, it is difficult to assess the quality of projects by individuals.  
The development of financial intermediations can overcome the information 
friction on risky investment through collecting and analyzing information of a large 
number of potentially viable projects so as to discover their true quality and risk. In 
addition, the development of financial intermediary will also contribute in smoothing away 
the idiosyncratic risks associated with these projects through risk diversification, trading 
and pooling. To pay for these functions, agents pay a fixed cost to join financial 
intermediaries. Growth in this model implies that more agents can afford to join financial 
intermediaries thus, giving more individuals access to higher rates of return.  
Given this entry cost, not every agent will join the financial market immediately 
because of wealth constraints. Therefore, the participation in the financial market may be 
restricted only to agents with the amount of wealth higher than a certain threshold level. 
Thus, for a given period, all the agents can be divided into two groups- the agents who are 
already in the financial market (participants) and agents who are not in the financial market 
(non-participants). The financial intermediaries make decisions on projects and allocation 
of funds based on the information in their possession.  
The theoretical model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) produces a dynamic 
solution to the relationship between finance and inequality. According to the model, at low 
levels of developments few agents join the financial system as a result of the high fixed 
entry cost relative to income. Consequently, growth is slow and the distribution of income 
is equal. Over time, i.e. in the intermediate stage of development some agents join the 
financial intermediary and enjoy greater returns; inequality widens coinciding with the 
rapid growth. At maturity, when a sophisticated and extensive financial structure has been 
fully developed the degree of inequality will reduce because more agents will have access 
to the financial system which maximizes growth and reduces inequality. 
The linear hypothesis on finance-inequality relationship 
The theoretical models of Galor and Zeira (1993), and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) suggest a negative and linear relationship between financial development and 
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income inequality. Galor and Zeira (1993) model the dynamic pattern of income 
distribution in an economy with investment indivisibility, where economic agents live for 
two periods and there are inter-generational linkages through bequests (a gift of personal 
property by will). In their model, agents can either work as unskilled labours for both 
periods, or make an indivisible investment in human capital in the first period and then 
work as skilled labours in the second period. However, because of financial imperfections, 
opportunity for investment in human capital may be restricted to agents with sufficiently 
large inheritance or those that have access to external credits to cover the cost of human 
capital investment. 
Assume an economy with single consumption good that can be produced with 
either the skilled-intensive technology or the unskilled-intensive one. The wage of skilled 
and unskilled workers are given as è-  and è: respectively, with è- ≫ è:. i.e., the wage 
of skilled labour is much greater than that of an unskilled labour. An agent with a certain 
level of wealth that lives for two-periods will consume some amount in the first period, and 
will bequeath the capital amount to his children. Given that the cost of human capital 
development is very expensive, it means that only agents with substantial large inheritance 
will invest in human capital and then become the skilled labours, while the other agents 
will remain unskilled 
Galor and Zeira (1993), and Banerjee and Newman (1993) models implies that the 
initial wealth distribution matters for the long run level of income. This implies that 
income inequality will be perpetuated through bequests between generations. There will be 
a polarization of wealth between high-income skilled labours and low-income unskilled 
labours: the wealthy and high educated households will converge to the high-income 
steady state, while the poor and less-educated households will converge to the low-income 
steady state.  These theoretical models predict a linear relationship between finance and 
inequality. In the sense that the development of financial market and financial 
intermediation, through the elimination of capital market imperfections and  provision of 
easy access to credit for poor households enables them to borrow and invest in human 
capital. This contributes to improvement in income distribution thus, reducing income 
inequality.  
As can be seen from the theoretical models100 examined finance plays an important 
role in theories of inequality. Becker and Tomes (1979) and Galor and Zeira (1993) 
                                                          
100
  For an extensive review of the role of finance in explaining the persistence of intergenerational 
inequality see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009). 
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highlights information and transaction costs associated with borrowing to finance 
education as a major factor that hinders the ability of poor households to borrow, thus 
strengthening the connection between family wealth and human capital accumulation.  
Inequality reduces in these models when poor households borrow to pay for more 
education. Therefore, it is the use of finance by households that did not have access to 
those financial services that affects economic opportunities.   
Other models emphasize the relationship between education and the ability of 
households to smooth adverse income shocks. In a less developed financial markets, 
shocks to family income might force parent to remove their children from school and 
engage them in income earning activities. Therefore, financial system underdevelopment 
disproportionately hinders human capital accumulation in poor households.  In these 
models, inequality will reduce when the economic disadvantaged families have easy access 
to financial markets to smooth income shocks. 
Financial sector development can also disproportionately favour those that are 
already using financial services. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), improvements in the 
financial systems that do not lower the fixed costs of accessing financial services will 
improve the quality of financial services enjoyed by those already in the financial system. 
In other words, the direct benefits of financial system development will accrue primarily to 
the rich, widening both the distribution of income and disparities in economic 
opportunities. This however, does not prevent the potential indirect general equilibrium 
effects from financial development. As was noted by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) 
financial development may have dynamic general equilibrium effects if it improves the 
efficiency in the allocation of resources and boost wage rates.  
The authors argue that under these conditions, the fixed cost of accessing financial 
services falls relative to wage rates, potentially allowing a greater proportion of the 
population to access financial services. Thus while the initial effects of financial 
development favours those individuals that are already within the financial market more 
than non-participants intensifying inequality, the broader effects of financial development 
may work to expand economic opportunities and reduce inequality. In conclusion, theory 
provides both direct and indirect mechanisms through which changes in the operation of 
the financial systems can intensify or reduce the inequality of economic opportunity with 
concomitant implications for income inequality. 
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Empirical evidence 
Plethora of empirical evidence supports the notion that in the long run a well 
developed financial system will reduce income inequality. Li et al (1998) employing data 
for 40 developed and developing countries from 1947 to 1994 found that well functioning 
financial markets are strongly associated with lower income inequality. Clark et al 
(2003)101 tested these different theories using a dataset of 91 countries from both 
developed and developing countries between 1960 and 1995 found that inequality is lower 
in countries with better-developed financial sector and that income inequality decreases 
with the development of financial markets and financial intermediaries. Their study 
provides support to the linear hypothesis suggested by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Galor and Zeira (1993) but rejected Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) model. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) also tested the three theories using private credit over 
GDP as a proxy for financial development for a panel of 52 countries from 1960 to 1999. 
They confirm the linear negative influence of financial development on income inequality. 
According to them financial development disproportionately raises the income of the 
poorest quintile and reduces income inequality.  
In a similar study, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) explains variations in income 
inequality across counties and found that financial development lowered inequality and 
increased the average income of the bottom 80th percentile of the population. They 
measured financial development as M2 over GDP, which has a significantly negative 
effect on inequality in their sample of 49 countries. Further empirical studies that provided 
support for Galor and Zeira and Banerjee and Newman models is Kappel (2010) that 
reported a linear negative relationship between financial development and income 
inequality.  
The following studies also provided documented evidence that financial sector 
development leads to a reduction in income inequality; Liang (2006) using a dynamic 
panel estimation GMM approach in studying the impact of financial development on 
income inequality in rural and urban China found a negative and linear relationship 
between financial development and inequality in both rural and urban China. But their 
                                                          
101
 Clarke et al (2003) used both private credits over GDP and Bank deposits over GDP as measures of 
financial development. The control variables are GDP per capital and its squared term to follow the Kuznets 
curve. Other variables are government consumption, inflation and the share of the modern sector amongst 
others. 
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study offered a weak support for the inverted U-Shaped relationship. Specifically, they 
found that easy access to credit improved income inequality.  
Ang (2008, 2010) found that financial development and higher banking density 
improved income share of the poor in India. Bittencourt (2006) examined the impact of 
financial development on earning inequality in Brazil in 1980s and 1990s and found that 
financial development improved access to credit for poor households, alleviated extreme 
inequality and consequently improved welfare without distorting economic efficiency. 
Other studies, however, challenged the finding that financial sector development 
can lead to a reduction in income inequality. For instance Canavire-Bacarreza et al (2010) 
in their study of the impact of financial development on the distribution of income in Latin 
America and the Caribbean found that the income of the poorest quintile has not been 
affected by expansion in the financial system. Their study also found that financial 
development has had a disproportionate positive effect on the incomes of the second, third 
and fourth quintiles. The study found some evidence for the Greenwood-Jovanovic 
hypothesis that this positive effect started after a country crosses a certain economic 
development threshold.  
Similarly, Law and Tan (2009) examined the role of financial development on 
income inequality in Malaysia for the period 1980 to 2000 using the ARDL bound test. 
Their result suggests that financial market development has not been successful in reducing 
income inequality in Malaysia. Specifically, their research found the proxy for financial 
development to be statistically insignificant in reducing income inequality in Malaysia. 
Their result is robust for three different measures of financial indicators, including the 
banking sector, and financial aggregate variables. Jaumotte et al (2008) analyzed income 
inequality with a particular focus on trade and financial globalization in a sample of 51 
countries from 1981 to 2003. They used private credit over GDP as a control variable and 
found a positive and significant coefficient for financial development in all the different 
models, thus rejecting the financial development-inequality reducing hypotheses. Jauch 
and Watzka (2012) using an unbalanced dataset of up to 138 developed and developing 
countries over the years 1960 to 2008 also found that financial development has a positive 
effect on income inequality thus rejecting the negative linear relationship. 
Paulson and Townsend (2004) in their own contribution showed that financial 
constraints played an important role in shaping the patterns of entrepreneurship in 
Thailand. They showed that Wealthier households are more likely to start businesses than 
poor families. Theses constraints are more binding on entrepreneurship in the poor 
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Northeast compared to the richer Central region. They concluded that increased access to 
financial services via financial development is likely to accelerate economic growth and 
increase the demand for labour; however, the initial gains are likely to concentrate 
disproportionately on a small group of talented individuals. But at the long run, a much 
wider class of workers will benefit from increases in employment and wages, as new 
entrepreneurs are able to build and expand their businesses with greater access to credit. 
Their study supported the inverted U-shaped hypothesis of financial sector development 
and income inequality. 
The general equilibrium model has also been used to analyze the effect of financial 
sector development on income inequality. Gine and Townsend (2004) developed a model 
using information about wealth, wage rate, financial transactions and occupational choices 
to evaluate the evolution of Thai growth and savings rates. The authors used their model to 
study how increases in the share of households with access to credit affects 
entrepreneurship, employment, wages, economic growth and income distribution. They 
provided evidence which seems to suggest that financial liberalization and increased access 
to credit can explain the GDP per capita growth in Thailand over the sample period 
spanning from 1976 to 1996. This development was accompanied with occupational shifts 
from subsistence sector to the intermediate sector which increased employment and wages. 
The general equilibrium model of Gine and Townsend (2004) suggests that the 
greatest quantitative impact of improved access to finance on income inequality comes 
through indirect labour market effects of higher employment and wages. In other words 
they showed that the reduction in inequality is not primarily as a result of households at the 
lower end of the income distribution increasing their use of financial services or from poor 
households accessing the financial markets for the first time. Rather, finance reduces 
inequality by increasing the demand for labour in the long term, which off-sets the short 
term increases in inequality due to the gains that accrue to new entrepreneurs. Townsend 
and Ueda (2006) extended the model and endogenized the size of the intermediated sector 
by introducing fixed transaction costs into the model and found similar results. These 
authors concluded that some of the restrictive financial sector policies in Thailand might 
have slowed the growth of financial intermediation below the endogenous growth rate that 
would have resulted from increasing per capita income, as predicted by Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990).  
Natural policy experiment is another method of assessing the impact of financial 
development on economic opportunity. In contrast to the general equilibrium models that 
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examine the impact of parameter changes within the model, natural policy experiments 
evaluate the impact of an actual policy change on different outcomes, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2009). An important element in using policy experiments is with the identification 
of an exogenous change in policy. Burgess and Pande (2005) used this type of experiment 
to evaluate the impact of Indian government’s policy on banking branching102 on access to 
credit and poverty.   
Their study found that the bank branching policy led to a decline in poverty in 
states that started the period with a lower level of financial development during the 
program period. In addition, they found that there were increases in the wages of 
agricultural workers over the period while the wages of urban factory workers did not 
record such increase. The study seems to suggest that the increase in the number of 
branches in the rural area facilitated easy access to credit which led to the reductions in 
poverty and increase in the wages of farmers. Using the same policy experiment 
methodology, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) found that the removal of geographic 
restrictions on banks in the United State improved banking efficiency by lowering interest 
rates on loans, interest margins, overhead costs and loan losses.  
The authors also found evidence of a significant rate of economic growth across 
states after removing intrastate branching restrictions103. According to them, branching 
deregulation improved the ability of banks to direct savings to the most profitable projects 
and to also oversee the successful execution of these projects. They noted that banks 
function better after branching deregulation as is evidenced by the sharp reduction in loan 
losses, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998). These improvements were as a result of banks ability 
to screen and monitor loans with positive implications to economic growth because savings 
flow more consistently into profitable investment opportunities.  
In a recent study by Beck, Levine and Levkov (2008) using a semi-natural 
experiment associated with bank deregulation to examine the impact of finance on 
inequality and the mechanisms that drive the finance-inequality relationship. They found 
that the GINI coefficient of income inequality decreases in states that have removed 
geographical restrictions relative to other states and relative to the state’s own level of 
inequality before deregulation. According to them, deregulation exerts a disproportionately 
                                                          
102
 In 1977 the Reserve Bank of India mandated that a commercial bank could open a new branch in a 
location that already had bank branches only if it opened four in locations with no branches. This policy led 
to the opening of 30,000 new rural branches as well as increase in deposit and credit volume in states with 
initially low levels of financial development. 
103
 The United States witnessed an imposition of restrictions on the ability of banks to branch within state 
borders (intrastate regulations) and ability of banks from one state to operate in other states (interstate 
regulation) for  the most part of the 20
th
 century, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). 
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positive increase in the demand for lower-skilled workers, which increases the annual 
earnings of lower-income workers relative to higher-income individuals.  
Levine and Rubinstein (2008) in their study used bank deregulation across the 
states of the United States to evaluate the impact of bank deregulation and reduction in 
lending rates on the high school dropout rates. Their study showed that reduction in the 
lending rate eased credit market constraints and lowered high school dropout rates. 
According to the authors, this effect only holds among poor households and they 
concluded that financial sector reforms that reduced the cost of borrowing increased the 
rate of human capital accumulation among lower-income families. Levine and Rubinstein 
(2008) study provided support to Lazear (1980) and Lang and Ruud (1986) who also 
showed that finance affects the persistence of income inequality by hindering the poor 
from accumulating human capital.  
Most of these studies found evidence that support the notion that financial sector 
reforms that boost availability of credit for poor and low income families will reduce 
income inequality. The present study departs from most of the studies described above in 
that we distinguished the effect of financial development on the rich (measured using the 
income share of the top 1 percent in some selected high income countries)104. In addition, 
we used dynamic panel GMM estimation method while majority of the previous studies 
have used pooled OLS with the exception of Liang (2006) who studied the impact of 
financial development on income inequality in rural and urban China and Jauch and 
Watzka (2011) that analyzed the link between financial development and income 
inequality for up to 138 developed and developing countries using both OLS and 
instrumental variable estimation method.  
The present study is different from these two in terms of the additional proxy that 
we used to capture the direct effect of stock market development on within country 
inequality and the panel corrected robust standard error we used in our estimation, as well 
as the analysis of financial sector development on the income of the top 1 percent wage 
earners in some developed economies. 
 
4.2 Trends in income inequality around the world 
Over the past five decades the world has observed increasing levels of income 
inequality in many countries, especially, in the developed world. The current chapter 
employed the recently compiled cross-country dataset that distinguishes market or gross 
                                                          
104
 The selection is based on countries that have complete information on the top 1 percent income 
earners. 
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inequality defined as GINI index of inequality before taxes and transfers and net inequality 
defined as GINI index of inequality after taxes and transfers to analyze the trends in 
income inequality around the world, Solt (2009)105.  We divided our sample into three 
income groups namely, high income countries, middle income countries and low income 
countries. Our analysis reported in table 4.1b reveals that inequality is highest in middle 
income countries and the lower income countries.  
 
Table 4.1a Distribution of gross and net inequality according to income groups, 
1960q1 to 2007q4 
 High income middle income Lower middle income 
 Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net 
Mean 42.83 29.65 48.42 43.03 47.07 42.09 
Maximum 67.19 59.34 80.52 71.89 66.64 58.23 
Minimum 26.04 17.56 19.67 16.94 21.36 21.72 
Std.dev 6.83 6.02 10.34 9.36 8.11 7.46 
Data source: Solt (2013) Standardizing the world income inequality database 
 
Very high and increasing levels of income inequality can also be observed within 
the high income groups. Specifically, we observed massive difference in the levels of 
inequality measured either as gross or net GINI coefficient. For instance, in table 4.1a we 
found that the level of net income inequality (29.65), i.e., after redistribution is much lower 
than gross income inequality at (42.83) in developed countries. Country specific 
comparison of net and gross inequality for some selected high income countries can be 
seen in figures A4.1 to A4.4, for middle income countries figures A4.5 to A4.8 and for 
lower income countries in figures A4.9 to A4.12 in the appendix. An analysis of these 
graphs reveals that countries that might be considered as being relatively equal, such as 
Sweden have high levels of gross income inequality. In Sweden figure A4.3 we observed 
higher volatility in gross inequality over time compared to relatively stable movement in 
the graph of net inequality.  
This might be an indication that redistribution in Sweden changes whenever there is 
an increase in gross inequality. The same volatility in gross GINI can be seen in Germany 
figure A4.4. The country witnessed a sharp drop in gross inequality during the early 1980s 
indicating how the governments of these countries react to gross inequality using 
redistributive policies. In the case of United States and United Kingdom, we observed that 
                                                          
105
Solt (2009) combined information from available surveys to infer comparable series of the GINI 
coefficients for net and gross inequality for many countries. He divided the surveys into 21 types and used 
the entire dataset to decide how to map each of these 21 survey types into standard measures of net and 
market inequality. According to Slot (2009) net inequality is associated with income after direct taxes and 
subsidies, and market or gross inequality as pre-tax and pre-subsidy income. 
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gross and net inequality have moved in tandem during the periods under review (1960 to 
2007). This could mean that redistribution in these countries does not change when gross 
inequality increases or decreases. Table A4.2b below presents inequality within the 
countries included in our dataset. 
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Table 4.2b Income inequalities around the world 1960q1 to 2007q4 
High income 
 countries 
Maximum 
Gini_gross 
Column 1 
Maximum 
Gini_net 
Column 2 
Upper middle 
 income 
 countries 
Column 3 
Maximum 
GINI_gross 
Column 4 
Maximum 
GINI_net 
Column 5 
Low income  
Countries 
Column 6 
Maximum 
GINI_gross 
Column 7 
Maximum 
GINI_net 
Column 8 
Australia 44.01 31.70 Argentina 53.03 46.24 Armenia 49.34 41.85 
Austria 44.54 28.01 Brazil 69.70 55.95 Bolivia 60.69 55.18 
Bahamas 61.40 54.01 Chile 55.58 50.60 Cameroon 58.85 53.31 
Barbados 61.54 57.63 Colombia 63.32 59.37 Cape Verde 57.56 52.54 
Belgium 51.28 30.87 Cost Rica 60.04 49.04 Ecuador 61.04 55.65 
Canada 43.36 31.83 Dominican Republic 52.25 47.31 Egypt 48.43 43.12 
Croatia 34.98 33.14 Iran 56.60 44.63 El Salvador 58.69 51.89 
Cyprus 50.21 29.25 Jamaica 69.52 60.96 Georgia 48.04 42.72 
Czech Republic 36.76 26.23 Kazakhstan 39.31 37.91 Ghana 59.49 44.20 
Denmark 56.29 27.38 Lithuania 57.41 35.47 Honduras 66.64 57.65 
Estonia 51.57 36.86 Macedonia 37.95 34.97 India 55.39 48.80 
Finland 53.65 35.07 Malaysia 67.06 50.49 Indonesia 47.56 41.28 
France 55.79 38.31 Mauritius 49.57 45.17 Guatemala 59.64 54.72 
Germany 51.07 30.50 Mexico 62.94 53.91 Jordan 48.39 43.24 
Greece 50.83 34.89 Panama 56.66 52.49 Moldova 41.94 39.67 
Hong Kong 59.89 42.20 Peru 63.24 60.04 Morocco 62.11 55.01 
Hungary 43.09 32.28 Romania 60.50 53.77 Nigeria 56.83 58.28 
Ireland 46.78 33.64 Russian Federation 51.27 44.96 Pakistan 46.71 37.19 
Israel 48.61 37.00 South Africa 80.52 71.89 Paraguay 59.80 57.35 
Italy 52.32 37.21 Turkey 64.90 52.34 Philippines 56.05 47.17 
Japan 54.31 32.54 Uruguay 51.91 50.05 Sri Lanka 52.06 40.48 
Korea Republic 46.99 30.96 Venezuela 50.40 44.95 Thailand 53.59 46.32 
Latvia 52.52 37.63  
 
Tunisia 56.16 48.62 
Luxembourg 45.52 27.75 Yemen 44.27 39.69 
Malta 67.19 59.35  
Netherlands 48.82 30.34 
New Zealand 60.60 53.51 
Norway 50.34 36.10 
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Poland 47.97 32.01 
Portugal 64.82 37.78 
Singapore 51.49 38.08 
Slovak Republic 35.94 26.38 
Slovenia 34.79                  26.56 
Spain 46.62 35.19 
Sweden 51.31 31.58 
Switzerland 42.66 30.90  
United Kingdom 53.04 36.06 
United States 49.21 37.93 
Data source: Solt (2013) Standardizing the world income inequality database 
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Table 4.2a columns 1, 2, and 3 reveal that countries such as Belgium has very high 
levels of gross inequality at 51.28, Cyprus at 50.21, Denmark 56.29, Estonia 51.57, 
Finland 53.65, France 55.79 and Germany 51.07. These countries are more unequal in 
terms of gross income relative to the U.S that has a gross GINI of 49.21. A major 
difference between these countries and the U.S is with the way that they have used 
redistributive policies to manage their distribution of income. Table 4.2b column 1 shows a 
significant drop in gross GINI from 51.28 percent to 30.87 percent in Belgium and similar 
level of drop was witnessed in Denmark from 56.29 to 27.38 representing drops of 66 
percent and 105 percent in both countries respectively. Germany is another interesting case 
within the high income group. Germany witnessed a massive drop in gross inequality; from 
51.07 percent to 30.50 percent about 67 percent drop in gross income inequality. This 
expands our knowledge of how different high income governments address the issues of 
unequal income distribution; this can be considered as a major finding.  
Shifting our focus to middle income countries, we observed high levels of gross 
inequality in countries like South Africa (80.52), Brazil (69.70), Jamaica (69.52) and 
Turkey (64.90) amongst many others-refer to table 4.2b. Comparing the gross income 
inequality with the net income inequality in these countries reveal lower levels of 
redistribution. For instance, South African which has perhaps the highest level of gross 
income inequality amongst all the countries in our datasets has a net income inequality of 
71.89 percent. This suggests that the direct effect of redistribution is only 12 percent For 
Brazil it is 25 percent and for Jamaica and Turkey it is 14 and 24 percent respectively.  
These effects are somewhat minimal if we compare them to countries like 
Denmark, Belgium and Germany that used redistribution transfers to tackle the problem of 
unequal distribution of income. For the lower income group, the difference between gross 
inequality and net inequality in most of the countries is equally low. For instance in 
Morocco gross inequality is 62.11 percent while net inequality is 55.01 percent 
representing a drop of approximately 13 percent. In general we found that in all the 
countries included in this analysis, redistribution transfers have played an important role in 
reducing income inequality albeit at varying degrees. The only exception is the interesting 
case of Nigeria where gross income inequality at 56.83 percent seems to be slightly lower 
than net income inequality at 58.28 percent.  
The main findings from the analysis of income inequality around the world are that 
the level of income inequality tends to decrease if one accounts for the role of 
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redistribution. In addition, we observed within the high income countries that unequal 
societies tend to redistribute more while the reverse seems to be the case for both upper 
middle income and lower income countries.  
 
4.3 Data description and summary statistics  
Table 4.3a Descriptive statistics 1960q1 to 2007q4 
 ÎRBR_BF ÎRBR_ÎGHJJ ONÎmO EmÎmO OGDJF ÎmOOFGNLO RBmÎXHE 
Mean 36.88 46.08 0.54 0.48 100.92 9696.02 59.48 
Median 35.20 46.07 0.41 0.39 101.62 4438.90 57.61 
Maximum 71.89 80.52 2.02 3.90 147.51 106919.5 92.70 
Minimum 19.68 27.23 0.03 0.02 40.84 146.44 26.97 
Std.Dev 9.54 7.50 0.40 0.38 11.36 11911.12 16.23 
Notes: ÎRBR_BF denotes the GINI coefficient of net income, ÎRBR_ÎGHJJ is the GINI coefficient of gross income,  ONÎmO private credit divided by GDP; claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions.EmÎmO denotes bank deposits divided by GDP; demand, time and savings deposits in 
deposit money banks.OGDJF denotes primary school enrolment; gross enrolment ratio.ÎmOOFGNLO denotes 
the GDP per capita, RBmÎXHE denotes the index of globalization. 
 
Table 4.3a (descriptive statistics for all the countries) shows that average gross 
income inequality for all the countries is 46.08% while the average for the net income 
inequality is 36.88%. The sample maximum for the gross GINI is 80.52% while the sample 
minimum is 27.23%. South Africa has a gross GINI that is exactly the same with the 
sample maximum-see (table 4.2b column 4) indicating that South Africa has the largest 
level of gross income inequality amongst all the countries. For net GINI the sample 
maximum is 71.89% while the sample minimum is 19.68%. Slovenia has the lowest 
income inequality in our dataset. The country’s gross inequality 34.76% is lower than the 
sample average of 46.08%, indicating that gross inequality in Slovenia is about 33% lower 
than the sample average.  
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Table 4.3b Correlation Matrix 
 ÎRBR_BF ÎRBR_ÎGHJJ ONÎmO EmÎmO OGDJF ÎmOOFGNLO RBmÎXHE ÎRBR_BF 1.00 0.78 -0.37 -0.33 0.05 -0.52 -0.58 ÎRBR_ÎGHJJ 0.78 1.00 -0.06 -0.12 0.10 -0.19 -0.28 ONÎmO -0.37 -0.06 1.00 0.72 0.07 0.69 0.53 EmÎmO -0.33 -0.12 0.73 1.00 0.02 0.62 0.40 OGDJF 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.02 1.00 0.04 0.18 ÎmOOFGNLO -0.52 -019 0.69 0.62 0.04 1.00 0.72 RBmÎXHEX -0.58 -0.28 0.53 0.40 0.18 0.72 1.00 
Notes: 
 ÎRBR_BF denotes the GINI coefficient of net income,ÎRBR_ÎGHJJ is the GINI coefficient of gross income,  ONÎmO private credit divided by GDP; claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions.EmÎmO denotes bank deposits divided by GDP; demand, time and savings deposits in 
deposit money banks.OGDJF denotes primary school enrolment; gross enrolment ratio.ÎmOOFGNLO denotes 
the GDP per capita, RBmÎXHE denotes the index of globalization. 
 
The correlation matrix in table 4.3b shows a strong positive correlation between the 
net and gross GINI at 78%. Both measures of income inequality has negative relationships 
between our measures of financial development namely credit to private sector as a ratio of 
GDP and bank deposit as a ratio of GDP. In addition, GDP per capita and index of 
globalisation has negative relationship with both net and gross GINIs. The strength of this 
relationship is stronger with net GINI at (-52%) for GDP per capita and  
(-58%) for globalization index, compared to (-19%) and (-28%) respectively for gross 
GINI.  
 
Measures of income inequality (Dependent variable) 
Gross and Net GINI coefficient: Jauch and Watzka (2011) noted that redistributive 
policies may blur the theoretical relationship between financial development and income 
inequality, when it is modelled without an explicit role for redistribution. To account for 
the effect of redistribution on financial development-income inequality nexus we used both 
Gross and Net GINI coefficient in our empirical analysis. The two variables were sourced 
from Solt’s Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)106 (2009). Income 
inequality may be measured on a gross and a net basis. Gross income removes all income 
from non-private sources.  
In other words, pensions provided by the state to pensioners, all types of social 
transfers to poor people are subtracted while taxes and social contributions are included in 
                                                          
106
 The (SWIID) according to Ortiz and Cummins (2011) is a cross-nationally comparable database of GINI 
indices across time. It uses the World Income Inequality Database by the United Nations University, which 
replaces Deininger and Squires (1996) database, data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), Brank 
Milanovic’s World Income Distribution data, The Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the ILO’s 
Household Income and Expenditure Statistics. The SWID has a total coverage of 171 countries with 4285 
country-year observations and 802 observations for five-year averages. 
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its calculation. Net income on the other hand includes all types of public transfers and 
deducts taxes and other deductions. The net GINI coefficient captures inequality after 
redistribution. It considers an individual’s earning entitlements on pensions and other 
social benefits. Net income measures the disposable income of an individual which can be 
used for saving and consumption. 
Income share of the Top 1 percent population
107: This is a second measure of 
income inequality. It captures the aggregate income of the top 1 percent income earners for 
8 high income countries. We used this proxy to test the direct effect of financial sector 
development on the income of top 1 percent populations of some of the countries included 
in our datasets. Only country year observation with information on top 1 percent income 
earners are used to explore this link. 
Measures of financial sector development (Main variables of interest) 
The three variables used to measure financial sector development include Private 
credit as a ratio of GDP, Bank deposits as a ratio of GDP and Stock market capitalization 
as a ratio of GDP.  These variables were sourced from the updated 2010 version of the 
Financial Structure Database by Beck, Demirguc-Kent and Levine (2009).  
Private credit as a ratio of GDP: Private credit is calculated based on the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and consists of credit provided by deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions to the private sector, (private firms and households). This 
proxy is used to capture the extent to which private agents have access to financial 
intermediation-as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) or access to loans  as in Banerjee 
and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993). It is plausible to argue that the magnitude 
of credit extended to private agents is a good indicator of financial development. This is 
because financial intermediaries are expected to limit the amount of credit given to 
households and private enterprise if they are unable to assess credit risk, overcome 
maturity mismatch and to mobilize savings. 
Bank deposit to GDP: Bank deposits are also sourced from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and consists of demand, time and savings deposits in deposit money 
banks to economic activity. Bank deposit to GDP ratio measures the amount of resources 
available to the financial sector for its lending activities. This indicator captures the 
effectiveness of monetary institutions in mobilizing savings. This indicator measures the 
liability side of the financial intermediaries’ balance sheets.  
                                                          
107
 Refer to chapter three for a definition of this proxy 
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Stock market capitalization to GDP: stock market capitalization as a ratio of GDP 
is used to gauge the size of equity markets and equals the value of listed shares divided by 
GDP. The stock market capitalization to GDP indicates the size of the stock market 
relative to the size of the economy. Some financial commentators and investors have 
argued that this variable can be used to judge whether the stock market is cheap 
(undervalued) or expansive (over-valued) since the ratio compares the valuation that 
investors are putting on companies with the output of the economy, Buffett and Loomis 
(2001)108. 
We control for other variables that have been used to explain inequality. GDP per 
capita is used in constant dollar terms sourced from the World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank. GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for the stage of development of a 
given economy. KOF index of globalisation is used to capture globalization effects. The 
KOF index of globalization measures the three dimensions of globalization namely, 
economic, political and social globalization109. Finally, the primary school enrolment rate 
is used as a proxy for human capital development. Increase in human capital development 
as a result of increase in education implies an increase in the supply of skilled labour and a 
decrease in the relative skilled/unskilled wage, thus a reduction in overall income 
inequality.  
On the other, a sustained increase in the supply of skilled labour may keep the 
relative skilled/unskilled wages constant in the presence of the so called “skill biased 
technological change”. All the control variables were sourced from the World 
Development Indicators World Bank.  
 
 
 
                                                          
108
 The price to earnings ratio (P/E) or its smoothed version; cyclical price to earnings ratio (cyclical P/E) has 
been used to spot equity price bubble. The use of this valuation metric in spotting market over-valuation 
was popularized by Shiller (2000). However, individual; company earnings or the earnings of entire sectors 
can be very volatile and this put limits on value of using price earnings ratios to identify bubbles. Buffet and 
Loomis (2001) argues that despite the limitations of this stock market capitalization to GDP in telling you 
what you need to know; it is probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given 
moment. Buffet used this measure to explain how he saw the dotcom bubble developing in the late 1990s. 
It is important to note that different countries have very different markets therefore, it could be misleading 
to use this ratio to spot bubbles in other countries, given that there are several factors that determine the 
size of a country’s stock market capitalization including, stock-buying culture of the local population, 
company use of debt versus equity financing, and how easy or difficult it is to list on the local exchange.  
109
 Economic globalisation characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as 
information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; political globalization characterized by a 
diffusion of government policies; and social globalization expressed as the spread of ideas, information, 
images and people, Axel et al (2008). 
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4.4 Econometric Specification and panel unit root test 
Previous empirical literatures on financial development, economic growth and 
income inequality use the instrumental variable techniques as the preferred estimation 
method. This is largely because of the possibilities of reverse causality110 in the 
relationship between financial development, economic growth and income inequality 
variables -see, King and Levine (1993b), and Jauch and Watzka (2012) amongst others.  
To control for unobserved time invariant unique characteristics across cross-sections most 
of the above mentioned studies apply the within estimator or the fixed effects estimator 
that allows for unobserved country specific heterogeneity that may be correlated with the 
regressors, Baltagi and Chang (1994). According to Baltagi and Chang (1994), such 
unobserved heterogeneity may lead to omitted variables bias.  
The Fixed effect estimator has the advantage of controlling for country 
characteristics while using all observations of the dataset and developments over time. This 
estimator method removes period specific means from the dependent variable and 
exogenous regressors, and then performing the specified regression using the demeaned 
data, Baltagi (2005). However, some researchers have argued that the within group fixed 
effect estimator does not eliminate dynamic panel bias where the dynamic relationships of 
the variables are characterized by the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors, Nickell (1981) and Bond (2002). The general model of the data-generating 
process for a dynamic panel can be written as: 
 P = ÅP,k + ÖQ ^ + ]                                                                                                (4.1) ], = n + w  n = w = nw = 0  
 
Where P is the dependent variable. The disturbance term in equation (4.1) has two 
orthogonal components: the fixed effects, n’ and the idiosyncratic shocks, w.  The model 
in equation (4.1) above can also be written as: 
 ΔP = Å − 1P,k + ÖQ ^ + ]                                                                                  (4.2) 
 
                                                          
110
 Levine (1997) provided a good account of this controversy over the direction of causality between 
financial development and growth in the introductory section of his study; while Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996) conduct a formal causality test between financial development and growth and found evidence of a 
bi-directional causation. 
 
189 
 
The model can also be thought of as being for the level or increase of P. In other to 
remove dynamic panel bias what is needed is a transformation of the data that is different 
from that of the within-groups estimator111. The Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference 
transformation can be employed to expunge the cross-section fixed effects. Applying this 
transformation to equation (4.1) yields: 
 ΔP = ÅΔP,k + ΔÖQ ^ + Δw                                                                                    (4.3) 
 
 According to Roodman (2009) first-difference transformation although has the 
ability of removing fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable is still potentially 
endogenous, since the P,k term in ΔP,k = P,k − P,k` is correlated with the w,k.  
A major weakness of the first-difference transformation is that it magnifies gaps in 
unbalanced panels. For instance, if some of the dependent variable P is missing then both ΔP and ΔP, will also be missing in the transformed data. In addition, the first-
difference method makes successive errors correlated even if they are uncorrelated before 
the transformation: Δw = w − wk is related to Δw,k = w,k` mathematically 
through the common w,k term that they share. 
Given that the assumption of Homoscedasticity is not a necessary condition when applying 
the difference GMM or system GMM this property does not matter much. 
This forms a major motivation for the second common transformation the Arellano 
and Bover (1995) forward or orthogonal deviations or simply orthogonal deviations. This 
transformation method subtracts the average of all future available observations of a 
variable unlike the first-difference approach that subtracts the previous observation from 
the contemporaneous one. According to Roodman (2009) no matter the gap in the panel, 
the orthogonal deviations approach subtracts the average of all future available 
observations except the last for each cross-section; therefore, it minimizes data loss. The 
resilience of this estimation method to gaps is one of the main reasons we have used it in 
addition to the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Given that lagged observations do not 
enter the formula, they are valid as instruments, Roodman (2009). According to Arellano 
                                                          
111
 Under the within-groups transformation, the lagged dependent variable changes to P,k∗ = P,k −1/ª − 1P` + ⋯+ Pª, while the error becomes w∗ = w − 1/ª − 1  w` + ⋯+ wª. Observe 
that the introduction of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor restricts the sample to  = 2, … , ª. . 
The problem with this method in the presence of such dynamic is that the P,k term in P,k∗  correlates 
negatively with the −1/ª − 1w,k in w,∗  while symmetrically, the −1/ª − 1P and w terms also 
move together. Consequently, the regressor and the disturbance/error are still correlated after 
transformation, Roodman (2009). 
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and Bover (1995) in balanced panels, any of the two transformations of full row rank will 
give numerically identical estimators, holding the instrument set fixed. 
Given that the current study has lag 1 of the dependent variable as part of the 
regressors, we employed a dynamic panel GMM estimation method. This method is used 
to examine the effect of financial sector development on income inequality within 
countries. We estimated a first-order reduced model of this form; 
 1 = ∑ Å	1k	@	 + ÖQ ^ + l + z + ]                                                                    (4.4) 
 
Where R LBm   denote country and time period respectively. 1, is the 
contemporaneous measures of income inequality which could be gross GINI, net GINI or 
income of the top 1 percent of the population. 1k is lag 1 of the dependent variable,  Ö 
is a vector of the explanatory variables namely the log of private credit divided by GDP ONÎmO,, and the quadratic term of private credit to GDP ONÎmO,` , log of GDP per capita ÎmOOFGNLO, and it’s quadratic term ÎmOOFGNLO,` , the log of KOF index of globalization  RBÎXHE,, log of primary school enrolment level OGDJFX,, and ] is the error term with ] = 0, for all R and  while l Picks up the fixed effects that differ among countries 
but are constant over time. That is the time invariant country-specific factors that might 
influence GINI coefficient, such as geographic and demographic dynamics and z denotes 
a year-specific effect.  
The time period effects z are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as 
coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the sample. Controlling for 
period effects is important in this study because countries included in the dataset employs 
different redistributive policy interventions to tackle the problem of income inequality and 
ameliorate the sufferings of low income households. First-differencing equation (4.4) as in 
Arellano and Bond (1991) or applying forward orthogonal deviations an alternative to 
differencing proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) eliminates the individual 
heterogeneous effects l and produces an equation of the form: 
 
 
 1 = ∑ Å	@	 1k	 + ÖQ ^ + z + ]                                                                  (4.5) 
 
The current study employed the GMM dynamic panel method that allows dynamic 
effects to be introduced into the model and also has the advantage of controlling 
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endogeneity of the independent variables in lagged-dependent-variable models such as the 
one used in this study. To account for individual fixed effects in dynamic models, a 
transformation is applied to the specification to expunge cross-section fixed effects. The 
transformation method we used in this study are both the Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
the orthogonal deviations as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). While the Arellano 
and Bond employs first differencing the Arellano and Bover transforms each observation 
as the deviation from the average of future observations in the sample for the same cross 
section, and weights each deviation to standardize the variance112. The Arellano and Bover 
(1995) approach has better small sample properties and the estimator allows to consistently 
estimate non-stationary data in levels as opposed to first difference using variables in first 
differences as instruments.  
This transformation method has three major advantages: first, it does not magnify 
gaps in unbalanced panels. It does not matter how many gaps, it is computable for all 
observations except the last for each of the countries, and therefore, it minimizes data loss. 
Second, because the orthogonal deviations method supports the use of lagged values of the 
variables as valid instruments since lagged observations do not enter the formula, it is well 
suited for this study; since we used lagged values of all variables in the model as 
instruments. Third, the orthogonal deviations allows the estimation of the equation in 
levels, using variables in first differences as instruments as opposed to estimation in first 
difference using level instruments, Roodman (2009).  
Specifically, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that in employing the Arellano and 
Bover (1995) orthogonal deviations to dealing with dynamic panel bias, it is possible to 
transform/difference the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effects instead 
of transforming the regressors to expunge the fixed effects. According to Roodman (2009), 
this is valid assuming that changes in any of the variables, è, used as instruments are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects: Δèn = 0 for all R and .  If this holds, then Δè,k is a valid instrument for the variables in levels: 
 Δè,k]
 = Δè,kn
 + è,kw
 − è,k`w
 = 0 + 0 − 0                (4.6) 
 
                                                          
112
 In the Arellano and Bover (1995) orthogonal deviations, data is transformed using the following formula: ]∗ =  	k	k/` ] − 	k ] + ⋯+ ]	
!, i.e. the transformation subtracts the mean of the remaining 
future observations available in the sample. The first term weights the transformed errors to equalize their 
variance, Greene (2003). 
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 To put it succinctly, where Arellano and Bond (1991) instruments differences with 
levels, Blundell and Bond (1998) employing orthogonal deviations instruments levels with 
differences. According to Roodman (2009), for variables that behave like random walk, 
past changes may in fact be more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current 
changes so that the new instruments are more relevant. It is important to mention again that 
the validity depends on the assumption that the w are not serially correlated, if they are, 
then è,k and è,k`, which are correlated with past and contemporaneous errors may 
also correlate with future ones. Blundell and Bond noted that if è is endogenous, Δè,k 
is available as an instrument because Δè,k = è,k − è,k` should not correlate with w; earlier realizations of Δè can serve as instruments as well. On the other hand, if è is 
predetermined, the contemporaneous Δè = è − è,k is also valid, since èw=0. 
The Blundell and Bond (1998) approach that instruments P,k with ΔP,k, brings 
up issues of stationarity. According to Blundell and Bond (1998) the assumption can hold, 
if the data-generating process is such that the fixed effect and the autoregressive process 
governed by Å, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in equation (4.2) offset 
each other in expectation across the whole panel. Consequently, they posit that Å must 
have absolute value less than unity so that the process converges. For the reasons discussed 
above, we specified both the Arellano and Bover (1995) dynamic panel estimator that uses 
orthogonal deviations and the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic estimator that uses 
differences. In the model we specified, we included the squared terms of financial 
development and GDP per capita respectively ONÎmOX,`  and ÎmOOFGNLOX,`  in other to test 
both the linear and inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development and 
inequality and Kuznets curve. Specifically the model we estimated is; 
 Δ1, =ÅΔ1,k + ^ΔONÎmOX, + ^`ΔONÎmOX,` + ^cΔÎmOOFGNLOX, + ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX,` +^íΔRBÎXHEX, + ^ΔOGDJFX, + z + ],                                                                 (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) allows a comparison of the effect of financial sector on income 
inequality within the countries included in our datasets. The estimation also allows for 
nonlinearities due to the Kuznets curve as well as the initial increasing and then decreasing 
influence of financial development on inequality. Equation (4.7) is estimated using GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM method 
requires that the theoretical relation between the parameters satisfies the so called 
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orthogonality conditions implying that the sample correlations between the explanatory 
variables and instruments are as close to zero as possible. To ensure the validity of the 
statistical results from the GMM dynamic panel data analysis, we adjusted the standard 
errors of the coefficient estimates for possible dependence in the residuals using panel 
corrected standard error (PCSE) that is robust to non-spherical errors113, Bailey and Katz 
(2011). Specifically, we used the period weights (PCSE) that is robust to heteroskedasticity 
across periods. 
This is one of the main differences separating our econometric approach from 
previous studies such as Jauch and Watzka (2012) that used (HAC) robust standard error. 
Others such as Clarke et al (2003), and Kappel (2010) did not report what type of standard 
errors they used. MacKinnon and White (1985) noted that the PSCE bears some 
resemblance to heteroskedasticity consistent (HC) estimators; however, the (HC) 
estimators do not explicitly incorporate the known time-series-cross-section structure of 
the data. While acknowledging the fact that most empirical studies now provide standard 
error estimates that are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent, cross-sectional or 
spatial dependence is still largely ignored114. For the GMM weights we applied the period 
weights that allows for period heteroskedasticity. 
This chapter investigates how gross and net income inequalities as well as income 
of the top 1 percent of the population are affected by financial and stock market 
development and other explanatory variables. Our specification also allows us to test the 
hypotheses of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) namely that 
financial development has a negative impact on income inequality against the hypothesis 
of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) that the influence of financial development on income 
inequality follows an inverted U-shape. Table 4.4a below is a summary of the hypotheses 
tested and the expected signs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113
 Non-spherical errors are common to Time-Series-Cross-Section (TSCS) data which are characterized by 
having repeated observations over time on some set of units such as countries. Such data according to 
Bailey and Katz (2011) show non-spherical errors because of contemporaneous correlation across the units 
and unit level heteroskedastic. 
114
 According to Petersen (2009), large fraction of published papers in leading financial journals still fails to 
adjust the standard errors appropriately. 
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Table 4.4a Summary of the hypotheses tested and expected signs  
Linear Negative Influence: Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
                                                                      Expected Signs 
^Im, Negative and Significant 
`^Im,`  Insignificant 
Inverted U-shape hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic  (1990) 
^Im, Significant and positive 
`^Im,`  Significant and Negative 
Kuznets Curve (1955) Inverted U-shaped path of income inequality along economic development 
c^ÎmOOFGNLOX, Positive and significant 
ì^ÎmOOFGNLOX,`  Negative and significant 
Note: 
 Im, denotes financial development. We used two measures of financial development in this study namely, 
log of private credit to GDP, ONÎmOX,  and log of bank deposit to GDP EmÎmOX, and  ÎmOOFGNLOX, 
denotes log of GDP per capita. 
 
 Table 4.4a provides a summary of the hypotheses tested. Following the hypothesis 
of a linear negative influence, we expect ^ to be negative and significant and we expect ^` to be insignificant. For the inverted U-shape hypothesis, we expect ^ to be positive and 
significant and ^` to be negative and significant. For the Kuznet curve, we expect ^c to be 
positive and significant and ì^ to be negative and significant. We further investigated 
whether financial development has different effects on income inequality for different 
country groups. This is achieved by splitting the sample into three groups according to 
income categories defined by the World Bank. This allows us to test the hypothesis of 
differential effect of financial and economic development on countries depending on the 
stages of their development. Countries are classified into; high income countries, middle 
income countries and lower income countries. 
We performed unit root test to the test for the presence of unit or otherwise in the 
variables used for this estimation. Panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit 
root test based on individual time series since they make use of the larger cross-section 
sample. A summary of three tests namely the Levine, Lin & Chu (2002) test, the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) W-stat test and ADF-Fisher Chi-square tests fail to reject the null 
of a unit root on the series log of GDP per capita, log of index of industrial globalization, 
and log of bank deposit to GDP. These series however, became stationary after first 
differencing. Levin, Lin & Chu tests as well as Im Pesaran and Shin-W-stat rejects the null 
hypothesis of unit root on the series Logs of Gini index of gross and net income inequality, 
while ADF-Fisher Chi-square fail to reject the null hypothesis. Given the fair amount of 
disagreement in these results as to whether the logs of gross and net Gini index of 
inequality have a unit root or not we decided to first difference the two series. Table 4.4 
below presents the panel unit root tests. 
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Table 4.4b Panel unit root test 
 0D, ,FJLGLB LBm ℎRB T− JL YW − WRJℎFG VℎR− .CLGF UFwRB, XRB & VℎC  ΔÎRBR_BFX  -3.45838*** 487.699*** -5.56095*** ΔÎRBR_ÎGHJJX  -3.62090*** 279.760*** -8.19106*** 
ΔONÎmOX  -23.6630*** 918.458*** -24.8463*** 
ΔÎmOOFGNLOX  -32.1310*** 1313.09*** -35.6177*** 
ΔEmÎmOXm  -28.3307*** 1147.96*** -26.1995*** 
ΔRBÎXHE  -36.9564*** 1503.54*** -39.1548*** OGDJFX  -4.34604*** 284.684*** -5.04347*** 
Note: ÎRBR_BFX, denotes the log of GINI coefficient of net income, ÎRBR_ÎGHJJX, denotes the log of GINI 
coefficient of gross income, ONÎmOX,denotes the log of private credit divided by GDP.  ÎmOOFGNLOX, 
denotes log of GDP per capita, EmÎmOX denotes the log of bank deposit to GDP, RBÎXHEX, denotes the log 
of KOF index of globalization, OGDJFX, denotes the log of primary school enrolment and Δ is the first 
difference operator.  
 
  
4.4.1 Empirical results 
In line with Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003) and Jauch and Watzka (2012) and Arcand 
et al (2011), we estimated a model regressing the natural log of GINI coefficient of net 
income, ÎRB_BFX on the common regressors the log of private credit to GDP ONÎmOX, and 
its quadratic term ONÎmO`, the log of  GDP per capita ÎmOOFGNLOX and its quadratic term ÎmOOFGNLO`.  Following Romer and Romer (1999) and Jaumotte, et al (2008), we used 
yearly data as opposed to the five-year averages used by Clarke et al (2003) and Jauch and 
Watzka (2012) which implies a loss in the number of observations. The current study 
departs from the aforementioned studies by including in the model a lagged dependent 
variable which is used to capture potential temporal or cross-sectional dynamics. 
To test the linear hypothesis suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and 
Newman (1993), and the inverted U-shaped hypothesis of financial development and 
income inequality, as well as the Kuznet curve we regress the natural log of GINI index of 
net income inequality on both linear and quadratic terms of private credit to GDP and both 
linear and squared term of GDP per capita while controlling for globalization and human 
capital development effects on income inequality. To deal with dynamic panel bias, we use 
the two commonly used transformation methods Arellano and Bond (1991) “first-
difference transform” and Arellano and Bover (1995) “orthogonal deviations transform”. 
The results or Arellano and Bond (1991) model are reported in table 4.5a below. 
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Table 4.5a Arellano and Bond difference Dynamic panel GMM (gini_net models) 
1960 to 2007 
Parameters Column 1 All 
countries 
Column 2 high 
 income countries 
Column 3  
 middle income  
countries 
Column 4 low 
  income  
countries ÅΔÎRBR_BFXk -0.281*** 
(-9.34) 
-0.432*** 
(-16.44) 
-0.46*** 
(-27.88) 
0.30** 
(2.37) 
^ΔONÎmOX, -0.002 
(0.87) 
-0.018 
(-1.38) 
-0.013** 
(-2.08) 
-0.014 
(-0.89) 
`^ΔONÎmO,`  0.084*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.07 
(-0.79) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.087 
(0.49) 
c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, 0.005 
(0.45) 
-0.006 
(-0.99) 
0.003 
(0.811) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  0.01 
(1.28) 
0.35*** 
(4.35) 
-0.006 
(0.311) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
í^ΔRBÎXHEX, -0.005 
(0.59) 
-0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
0.064* 
(1.80) 
^ΔOGDJFX, -0.02*** 
(3.87) 
0.02 
(0.97) 
0.022 
(0.86) 
-0.067*** 
(-1.88) 
Notes: ÅΔÎRBR_BFXk denotes lag 1 of the log of GINI coefficient of net income, ΔONÎmOX,denotes the log of 
private credit divided by GDP. ΔONÎmOX,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit divided by GDP, ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, denotes log of GDP per capita, ΔÎmOOFGNLOX,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per 
capita, ΔRBÎXHEX, denotes the log of KOF index of globalization, ΔOGDJFX, denotes the log of primary 
school enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The time period effects z 
are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the 
sample. ], is the error term and Δ is the first difference operator. The standard errors for the GMM 
regression coefficient estimates were computed using the White diagonal standard errors, for the GMM 
weight the White diagonal instruments weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ΔÎRBR_BFX, =ÅΔÎRBR_BFX,k + ^ΔONÎmOX, + `^ΔONÎmOX,` + c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, + ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX,` +í^ΔRBÎXHEX, + ^ΔOGDJFX, + z + ],                                                                                               (a) 
             
 
First to analyse whether financial development always reduce income inequality in 
the countries included in our dataset we used data on all the countries, the result is reported 
in table 4.5a column 1. The coefficient on lagged gini index of inequality in net income ÅΔÎRBR_BFX,k is negative and significant at the 1 percent levels indicating that countries 
starting the estimation period with more skewed distribution of income (high initial gini) 
tend to witness faster reductions in income inequality than countries with lower levels of 
initial income inequality. The linear term of private credit to GDP enters negatively but 
insignificant while the quadratic term of private credit is positive and significant in this 
model, suggesting that financial development tends to increase income inequality.  
A plausible explanation of increasing income inequality effect of financial sector 
development could be the so called financial markets imperfections.  Explaining this 
finding within the context of Galor and Zeira (1993) theoretical model, an economy with 
financial market imperfections (i.e. more difficulties in borrowing funds to finance 
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profitable business investments and human capital development) and an initial unequal 
distribution of wealth will maintain this inequality even in the presence of financial sector 
development. As a result of these financial market imperfections, only rich agents with the 
necessary collateral requirements can borrow enough money to finance profitable 
investments thus resulting in higher inequality. Controlling for GDP per capita growth 
given that financial development may influence income inequality by affecting economic 
growth, both the linear and quadratic terms of this variable were insignificant. Next 
controlling for the level of globalization our result shows a negative but insignificant 
relationship between income inequality and globalization in this model. Finally, we control 
for human capital development in this model using the level of primary school enrolment 
as our measure of human capital development. The estimated coefficient on this variable is 
negative and statistically significant suggesting a negative relationship between human 
capital development and inequality in net income. This result is in line with theory that 
predicts that increase in human capital should result in a reduction in income inequality. 
The questions are is the positive quadratic relationship between financial 
development and income inequality the same irrespective of country characteristics and 
stages of development? Secondly, is the impact of globalization on income distribution the 
same or different between developed and developing nations? Thirdly, does the negative 
relationship between human capital development and income inequality the same in all 
society or are there important differences across and within countries based on their levels 
of economic development? To answer these questions we split the sample into three groups 
according to the income categories defined by the World Bank, namely the high income 
group, the middle income group and the low income group. The results of equation 4.6 for 
high income countries is reported in table 4.5a column 2, for middle income countries 
column 3 and for low income countries in column 4.  
 For the high and middle income countries, the lagged coefficients of gini net 
income inequality is negative and significant like that of the all countries model in column 
1 of table 4.5a suggesting a faster reduction in net income inequality for countries included 
in these data sets while the same coefficient of gini net income inequality is positive and 
significant for low income countries-see table 4.5a column 4. The positive coefficient of 
past realizations of gini net income inequality suggests that increasing inequality in net 
income will lead to an increase in contemporaneous inequality in net income. This could 
mean that countries starting the estimation period with somewhat low initial gini tend to 
witness slower reductions in income inequality than countries with higher levels of initial 
 
198 
 
net income inequality. For the financial development variables our main variable of 
interest, we observe that increasing private credit to GDP in middle income countries 
results to a reduction in gini inequality of net income. Indeed, the result for the low income 
countries reveals that the coefficients on both the linear and quadratic terms of private 
credit to GDP are negative and statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Based on the estimated coefficient in column 3 of table 4.5a a 
one percent increase in private credit to GDP reduces net income inequality by 0.013 
percent, controlling for all time invariant heterogeneity in the countries. The same level of 
increase in the non-linear term will result in a higher decrease 0.17 percent in net income 
inequality in the middle income countries. 
 The coefficients of the GDP per capita in both linear and quadratic terms in 
all the models except for the high income model enters statistically insignificant while the 
coefficient of the quadratic term of GDP per capita in the high income model is positive 
and significant. Quantitatively, the result suggests a 0.35 percent increase in income gap 
for a one percent increase in economic development. This result indicates that after a 
certain stage of economic development is reached, more economic development begins to 
increase the income gap between the rich and the poor. This result seems to suggest that 
low income differentials cannot be maintained at fast growth. A plausible explanation of 
this finding could be linked to the ‘incentive driven inequality’ hypothesis, which suggests 
that higher levels of inequality may have boosting effects on an economy from an incentive 
point of view given that the economy channels more reward to agents who incur extra 
efforts for the production of goods and services. Therefore, as agents are incentivised to get 
ahead of others in business, technological and social innovations the economy tends to 
grow at a faster rate, offering more income to talented individuals resulting in more 
inequality.  
Controlling for the level of globalization, we found that increased globalization 
worsens income distribution in low income countries indicating that increased 
globalization affects the poor and favours the rich. The result suggests that the 
globalization indices explain approximately 0.064 percent of the variation in within 
country income inequality. We control for human capital development using the level of 
primary school enrolment as our measure of human capital development. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant for the low income 
group suggesting a positive relationship between human capital development and 
inequality in net income. This is in line with theoretical expectations. In summary, we 
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found significant differences in the manner in which income inequality measured using 
gini index of net income reacts to financial sector development using the Arellano and 
Bond difference GMM estimator. Using instead the Arellano and Bover estimator which 
transforms data by employing orthogonal deviations yields more consistent results with 
respect to the response of gini inequality of net income. The estimator allows for 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and is robust to gaps in panel data analysis. The 
results from Arellano and Bover estimator are reported in table 4.5b below. 
 
Table 4.5b Arellano and Bover orthogonal deviations Dynamic panel GMM (gini_net 
models) 1960 to 2007 
Parameters Column 1 All 
 countries 
Column 2 high 
 income countries 
Column 3  
 middle income  
countries 
Column 4 low 
 income  
countries ÅÎRBR_BFXk 0.87*** 
(38.53) 
0.85*** 
(25.58) 
-0.80*** 
(35.79) 
0.58*** 
(4.55) 
^ONÎmOX, -0.007* 
(-1.63) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.013** 
(-2.08) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.27) 
`^ONÎmO,`  -0.003*** 
(-1.20) 
-0.029* 
(-1.78) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.153*** 
(-3.16) 
c^ÎmOOFGNLOX, -0.025 
(-0.84) 
-0.14 
(-1.23) 
-0.006 
(-0.61) 
-0.142 
(-0.429) 
ì^ÎmOOFGNLO,`  0.004 
(1.06) 
0.019 
(1.40) 
-0.008 
(0.12) 
0.029 
(0.53) 
í^RBÎXHEX, -0.004 
(0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.14) 
0.19** 
(1.80) 
^OGDJFX, 0.025** 
(2.08) 
-0.017 
(-0.85) 
0.023 
(0.75) 
0.021 
(0.37) 
Notes: ÅÎRBR_BFXk denotes lag 1 of the log of GINI coefficient of net income, ONÎmOX,denotes the log of private 
credit divided by GDP. ONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit divided by GDP, ÎmOOFGNLOX, 
denotes log of GDP per capita, ÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per capita, RBÎXHEX, 
denotes the log of KOF index of globalization, OGDJFX, denotes the log of primary school enrolment, z  
represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The time period effects z are assumed fixed 
parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the sample. ], is the 
error term. The standard errors for the GMM regression coefficient estimates in this model were computed 
using the period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance, for the GMM weight the period weights 
instrument weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels 
respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,                                                                                                                               ÎRBR_BFX, = ÅÎRBR_BFX,k + ^ONÎmOX, + `^ONÎmOX,` + c^ÎmOOFGNLOX, + ì^ÎmOOFGNLOX,` +í^RBÎXHEX, + ^OGDJFX, + z + ],                                                                                                 (b) 
             
 
The estimated coefficients for all the countries model is reported in column 1, for 
high income countries column 2, for middle and low income countries columns 3 and 4 
respectively. The coefficients on lagged gini inequality of net income of 0.87 percent for 
all the countries, 0.85 percent for high income countries, 0.80 percent for middle income 
countries and 0.58 percent for low income countries suggests high level of persistence in 
the gini inequality of net income. Comparing these values with that of the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator of 0.28 percent for all countries, 0.43 percent for high income, 0.46 
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percent for middle income countries and 0.30 percent for low income countries confirms 
the finding of Blundell and Bond (1998) that for high values of Å,, the first difference 
GMM estimator suffers “both a huge downward bias” and yields “very imprecise estimates 
for Å,”. 
Focusing now on the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, we found that 
the past values of gini net income inequality is positive and statistically significant across 
all countries, high income countries and low income countries. This indicates that high 
values of past inequality in net income is followed by high contemporaneous values and 
vice versa, while for middle income countries, high values is followed by low values, 
which may indicate faster reductions of income inequality in these countries. Turning our 
attention to the financial development variable measured using private sector credit to GDP 
suggests increasing reductions of income inequality with better financial sectors in all the 
models. These results are in line with economic theory that predicts a negative impact of 
financial development on income inequality.  
The result seems to suggest that more financial development will lead to further 
reduction in income inequality in almost all the countries. This can be observed from the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient between the two variables. While a one percent 
increase in linear financial development variable results in a 0.013 percent decrease in 
inequality for middle income countries, an increase of the same amount in the quadratic 
term will lead to a 0.17 percent reduction in income inequality. Since the coefficient on the 
squared term is statistically significant in the entire models, the results provide support for 
some aspects of the inverted u-shaped hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) that 
suggests that after a certain stage of financial development is reached, more financial 
development starts to reduce income inequality.  
These findings are consistent with the insight of Banerijee and Newman (1993) and 
Galor and Zeira (1993) that financial development has a significant effect in reducing 
income inequality in the target country. This is because better developed financial system 
and markets widen the availability of credit, thereby allowing both the rich and the poor 
access to credit for human capital development as well as starting their own businesses. 
Both the quadratic and linear terms of GDP per capita in all the models are insignificant 
while the worsening effect of increased globalization found in the difference GMM model 
for low income countries was confirmed with the Bond and Bover estimator. However, in 
this model, the contribution of globalization to gini net income inequality is stronger at 
0.19 percent. 
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This finding seems to provide empirical support to the view that globalization 
causes economic insecurity and contributes to the growing inequality in developing 
countries, Stiglitz (2004),  Borjas and Ramey (1994), and Bergh and Nilsson (2011).  The 
estimated coefficient on primary school enrolment variable for all countries model, column 
1 table 4.5b is positive and statistically significant suggesting a positive relationship 
between human capital development and inequality in net income. This result is rather 
puzzling given that theory predicts that increase in human capital should result in a 
reduction in income inequality. 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
To test the internal stability of our findings we used GINI index of gross income 
inequality as our dependent variable. There is a big difference between gross and net GINI 
coefficients as can be seen from section 4.2 (trends in income inequality around the 
countries included in our dataset). Gross GINI coefficient captures inequality in gross 
income before redistribution and taxes the so called “market inequality” while net GINI 
coefficient captures inequality in net income after redistribution and taxes also known as 
“net inequality”, Solt (2009). Consequently, it is possible for redistributive policies to 
distort the theoretical relationship between financial development and income inequality 
when it is modelled without accounting for redistribution. It is therefore important to 
distinguish the effect of financial system development on both market and net inequality in 
our effort to understand the financial development-inequality nexus. Gini coefficient based 
on pre-tax income (ÎRBR_BF) captures redistribution of wealth from rich to poor and this 
tend to lower the overall Gini coefficient.   
First we present the results from the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM in 
table 4.6a bellow.  
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Table 4.6a Arellano and Bond difference Dynamic panel GMM (gini_gross models) 
1960 to 2007 
Parameters Column 1 All 
countries 
Column 2 high 
 income countries 
Column 3  
 middle income  
countries 
Column 4 low 
  income  
countries ÅΔÎRBR_ÎGHJJXk -0.19*** 
(-7.43) 
-0.12** 
(-16.44) 
-0.53*** 
(-9.66) 
-0.25** 
(-5.92) 
^ΔONÎmOX, -0.002 
(-0.66) 
-0.008 
(-0.21) 
0.004 
(0.611) 
-0.019** 
(-2.44) 
`^ΔONÎmO,`  0.098*** 
(2.96) 
-0.073 
(-0.33) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.217** 
(2.14) 
c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, -0.006*** 
(-2.47) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
0.003 
(-0.67) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.19) 
ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  -0.049*** 
(1.28) 
0.63** 
(4.35) 
-0.019 
(-0.63) 
-0.083** 
(0.26) 
í^ΔRBÎXHEX, -0.054*** 
(0.59) 
-0.024 
(-0.79) 
-0.048** 
(-1.93) 
0.013 
(072) 
^ΔOGDJFX, -0.008*** 
(3.87) 
-0.095* 
(1.74) 
0.023 
(0.56) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.05) 
Notes: ÅΔÎRBR_ÎGHJJXk denotes lag 1 of the log of GINI coefficient of gross income, ΔONÎmOX,denotes the log of 
private credit divided by GDP. ΔONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit divided by GDP, ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, denotes log of GDP per capita, ΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per 
capita, ΔRBÎXHEX, denotes the log of KOF index of globalization, ΔOGDJFX, denotes the log of primary 
school enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The time period effects z 
are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the 
sample. ], is the error term and Δ is the first difference operator. The standard errors for the GMM 
regression coefficient estimates were computed using the White diagonal standard errors, for the GMM 
weight the White diagonal instruments weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,                                                                                                                               ΔÎRBR_ÎGHJJX, = ÅΔÎRBR_ÎGHJJX,k + ^ΔONÎmOX, + `^ΔONÎmOX,` + c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, +
ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX,` + í^ΔRBÎXHEX, + ^ΔOGDJFX, + z + ],                     (c)  
                                                                                                                                       
        
Looking at the result for Arellano and Bond difference GMM in table 4.6a column 
1 we found that the coefficients of the lagged gini inequality in gross income in all the 
models are negative and statistically significant. The effect of financial development on 
income inequality within the low income countries is negative and significant at the 5 
percent levels of significance in both the linear and quadratic terms. In the Arellano and 
Bond net GINI model, we observed no reaction to financial sector development while in 
this model an increase in private sector credit will result to a 0.22 reduction in gross 
income inequality. This result shows that the distribution of gross income reacts more 
strongly than the distribution of net income to financial development. For the middle 
income countries, we found that a 1 percent increase in the quadratic term of private credit 
will lead to a 0.12 percent reduction in gross GINI inequality in the non-linear term. This 
result seems to suggest that increasing access to credit for private agents results to the 
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narrowing of gross income gaps between the rich and the poor115. In addition, we observed 
that the influence of economic development on gross income inequality for the entire 
country group is negative and significant in both the linear and quadratic terms.  This result 
suggests that Income inequality first decreases with the process of economic development 
and continues to decrease as the economy develops more.  
The negative coefficient on both the linear and quadratic terms reject the Kuznet 
(1955) inverted U-shaped path of income inequality, with income inequality decreasing in 
countries at the earlier stages of development and increasing in countries with more 
economic development. However, the result in this model suggests a linear negative 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality. In other words, income 
inequality reduces at the initial stages of economic development and continues to narrow 
as economies continue on the path of accelerating development. Industrial globalization in 
this model is negative and significant suggesting that increasing globalization reduces 
inequality in gross income. The level of primary school enrolment is negative and 
significant in this model. This result seems to suggest that in countries included in our 
datasets increasing human capital development will reduce inequality in market income, 
i.e. income before redistribution and taxes. 
The results for high income, middle upper income and lower income countries 
shows that financial development, have a significant negative effect on gross income 
inequality. An important point to note here is with regards to high income countries where 
we found that credit to private sector although has a negative sign has no significant 
explanatory power for variations in gross income inequality. Allowing economic growth to 
enter the model, the result for high income countries in table 4.6a columns 2 reveals that 
economic growth starts to have a significant explanatory power to increase in gross income 
inequality once it passes a certain threshold; specifically, we found that at the initial stages 
of development GDP per capita does not explain changes in gross gini income however, 
once a critical level of GDP per capital income is surpassed, additional economic 
development will result to increase in inequality of gross income.  
For the middle and low income countries, we found no evidence of the Kuznets 
inverted U-shaped curve. GDP per capita does not explain changes in income inequality in 
                                                          
115
 Easy access to main stream financial services remains a challenge to low income families not only in 
developing but also in developed economies. A recently released book titled Savings, Assets, Credit and 
Banking among Low-Income Households edited by Blank and Barr (2011) suggests that one in four American 
adults doesn’t have a bank account. A similar finding for emerging economies was documented by 
Fernando (2007) who opined that the formal financial sectors in most developing countries serve only 
about 20-30% of the population. According to him, majority of the households that do not have access to 
basic financial services are concentrated in low-income categories. 
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middle income countries while for the low income countries the effect is negative and 
significant. Controlling for globalization, we observed significant negative relationship 
between this variable and income inequality in all the country groups and the middle 
income countries. The result seems to suggest that the influence of globalization on income 
inequality depends on first the type of inequality whether it is gross or net income 
inequality and secondly on the income category which the target country belongs to. 
Controlling for the effect of human capital development measured using the level of 
primary school enrolment this variable becomes negative and significant for all country, 
high income and low income categories. These results indicate that higher literacy level 
will reduce income inequality in gross income in these countries. 
 
Table 4.6b Arellano and Bover orthogonal deviations Dynamic panel GMM 
(gini_gross models) 1960 to 2007 
Parameters Column 1 All 
 countries 
Column 2 high 
 income countries 
Column 3  
 middle income  
countries 
Column 4 low 
 income  
countries ÅÎRBR_ÎGHJJXk 0.88*** 
(37.95) 
0.88*** 
(25.58) 
-0.73*** 
(19.46) 
-0.25*** 
(5.93) 
^ONÎmOX, 0.01 
(1.01) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.03*** 
(-1.41) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.44) 
`^ONÎmO,`  -0.04* 
(1.71) 
-0.04* 
(-1.71) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.22*** 
(2.14) 
c^ÎmOOFGNLOX, -0.24 
(0.86) 
-0.24 
(-1.37) 
-0.07 
(-1.41) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.19) 
ì^ÎmOOFGNLO,`  0.03 
 (1.31) 
0.03 
(1.31) 
-0.01 
(1.52) 
-0.08*** 
(-2.15) 
í^RBÎXHEX, 0.04*** 
(2.08) 
0.04** 
(2.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.46) 
0.013 
(0.72) 
^OGDJFX, -0.06*** 
(-2.54) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.54) 
0.09** 
(2.34) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.05) 
Notes: ÅÎRBR_ÎGHJJXk denotes lag 1 of the log of GINI coefficient of net income, ONÎmOX,denotes the 
log of private credit divided by GDP. ONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit divided by GDP, ÎmOOFGNLOX, denotes log of GDP per capita, ÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per capita, RBÎXHEX, denotes the log of KOF index of globalization, OGDJFX, denotes the log of primary school 
enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The time period effects z are 
assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the 
sample. ], is the error term. The standard errors for the GMM regression coefficient estimates in this model 
were computed using the period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance, for the GMM weight the 
period weights instrument weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,                                                                                                                               ÎRBR_ÎGHJJX, = ÅÎRBR_ÎGHJJX,k + ^ONÎmOX, + `^ONÎmOX,` + c^ÎmOOFGNLOX, + ì^ÎmOOFGNLOX,` +í^RBÎXHEX, + ^OGDJFX, + z + ],                                                                                                 (d) 
 
 
For the Arellano and Bover model, the negative effect of financial sector 
development within the middle and low income countries remains negative and significant. 
The impact of financial development on income inequality within these countries is such 
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that when the level of financial development is high, the level of inequality in both net and 
gross income tends to reduce, irrespective of the GMM estimator that is employed, thus 
confirming some aspects of the existence of negative and linear relationship of Galor and 
Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993).  Our results show that an increase in 
financial sector development within the low income economies is associated to a reduction 
of gross income inequality between the ranges of 0.02 to 0.22 in both the Arellano and 
Bond and Arellano and Bover models. 
Considering the inverted U-shaped hypotheses proposed by Greenwood-Jovanovic 
(1993), the result for the all countries model reported in table 4.6b column 1 reveals that 
the linear relationship coefficient is positive but insignificant while the non-linear 
relationship coefficient is significant and negative confirming some aspects of the 
hypothesis. Quantitatively, we found that a 1 percent increase in credit to private sector 
will reduce inequality by 0.04 percent. This effect is consistent for the high income, middle 
income and low income countries, indicating that at an early stage of financial 
development credit to private sector have little or no effect on market income inequality. 
However, income inequality tends to decrease with advanced financial sector. 
The impact of globalization on market income inequality in both the all countries 
model and high income model is positive and significant indicating that more globalization 
worsens income inequality in these countries. This increasing effect of globalization within 
the high income economies provides support for Miller (2001) that showed that 
globalization can explain the significant increase in earnings inequality in the U.S since the 
late 1970s. Miller (2001) opined that most of the increase in wage inequality since the late 
70s was as a result of changes in the structure of production which entails the outsourcing 
of less intensive production process to low income countries with low labour costs.  
The implication of production process outsourcing is a stiff competition between 
low-skilled workers in these countries and low-skilled workers from the rest of the world 
while the demand for high skilled workers in the outsourcing country is on the increase. 
These situations will depress the wages of low-skilled workers while increasing that of 
their highly skilled counterparts’ thus increasing inequality of market income. The proxy 
for human capital development measured using the level of primary school enrolment in 
this model is negative and significant for the all countries model column 1, high income 
model column 2. And low income model column 4.  Specifically, we found that one more 
year of schooling will reduce inequality of gross income by 0.06 percent in all the 
countries as well as the high income countries while the same increase is associated to a 
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0.04 decrease in market income inequality within the low income economies. The effect of 
human capital development within the middle income groups is positive and significant; 
specifically, we found that increase in primary school enrolment within these countries will 
increase inequality in gross income by approximately 0.09 percent. One possible 
explanation of this finding could be that primary education can only give the basic 
knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic it does not give skills that are relevant for 
employment that can ensure high wages. Consequently, people with primary education still 
end up with low wages. 
 
Table 4.7 Arellano and Bond difference dynamic panel GMM using bank deposit to 
gdp (gini_net models) 1960 to 2007 
Parameters Column 1 All 
countries 
Column 2 high 
 income countries 
Column 3  
 middle income  
countries 
Column 4 low 
  income  
countries ÅΔÎRBR_BFXk -0.192*** 
(-6.915) 
-0.44*** 
(-20.62) 
-0.68*** 
(-17.90) 
0.21 
(0.82) 
^ΔEmÎmOX, 0.004 
(0.81) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.31) 
0.003 
(0.40) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.57) 
`^ΔEmÎmO,`  0.19*** 
(7.77) 
0.27*** 
(5,53) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.62*** 
(2.13) 
c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, 0.016*** 
(4.47) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.81) 
0.004 
(-1.02) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  0.017 
(047) 
0.27*** 
(7.27) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
0.06 
(0.53) 
í^ΔRBÎXHEX, -0.013 
(-0.98) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.03** 
(-1.97) 
0.05* 
(1.64) 
^ΔOGDJFX, 0.006 
(0.718) 
-0.001 
(0.23) 
0.09*** 
(1.97) 
-0.07* 
(-1.71) 
Notes: ÅΔÎRBR_BFXk denotes lag 1 of the log of GINI coefficient of net income, ΔONÎmOX,denotes the log of 
private credit divided by GDP. ΔONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit divided by GDP, ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, denotes log of GDP per capita, ΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per 
capita, ΔRBÎXHEX, denotes the log of KOF index of globalization, ΔOGDJFX, denotes the log of primary 
school enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The time period effects z 
are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the 
sample. ], is the error term and Δ is the first difference operator. The standard errors for the GMM 
regression coefficient estimates were computed using the White diagonal standard errors, for the GMM 
weight the White diagonal instruments weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic,   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ΔÎRBR_BFX, =ÅΔÎRBR_BFX,k + ^ΔEmÎmOX, + `^ΔEmÎmOX,` + c^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX, + ì^ΔÎmOOFGNLOX,` +í^ΔRBÎXHEX, + ^ΔOGDJFX, + z + ],                                                                                                   (e)                                   
 
 
Using a different measure of financial sector development that has been used in the 
literature, bank deposit to GDP our results (table 4.7), confirmed the negative relationship 
between financial sector developments and inequality in net income in all the models 
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expect the all countries model in column 1 of table 4.7. For the high income category, we 
found a linear negative relationship between financial sector development and inequality. 
However, at a certain stage of financial development, wealthier household’s starts to 
benefit disproportionately from advanced financial sector. Within the high income 
countries, development of this sector results to a 0.01 percent decrease in net income. At a 
certain stage, more development in this sector will lead to approximately 0.27 percent 
increase in the income of richer households. For the middle income countries, the 
coefficient of financial development in the linear form is insignificant, however, that of the 
non-linear is negative and significant indicating that more financial development in these 
countries will narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. 
 The inverse relationship between financial development and inequality in the low 
income countries that was found in the previous models is confirmed. .  In general, the 
results seem to support inequality reducing effect of financial system development. 
Therefore, improvements in financial markets and intermediaries expand economic 
opportunities and reduce inequality. In addition, we found that the effect of economic 
development on income inequality measured using net GINI is insignificant within the 
middle and low income models. For the high income model, the linear term of GDP per 
capita is negative and significant while the quadratic term is positive and significant 
confirming the earlier findings. 
The results in table 4.7 columns 1, 2 and 3 for reveal that globalization has a 
reducing impact on income inequality in these countries. Specifically, we found that as 
countries that make up the income groups become more integrated with the world 
economy, inequality in net income is reduced by approximately 0.01 percent for all the 
countries model, 0.01 percent for high income countries and 0.03 for the middle income 
countries . This finding provides empirical evidence in support of the neoclassical growth 
theory that predicts that national economies will converge in their average productivity 
levels and average incomes because of increased mobility of capital, Wade (2001). For the 
low income countries, we found that globalization worsen income disparity between the 
rich and the poor.  
The result suggests that globalization explains 0.05 percent of the increases in net 
income inequality indicating that integration into the world economy leads to increasing 
gaps in the distribution of income in the target countries. This finding provides support for 
the endogenous growth theory that predicts that diminishing returns to capital as a result of 
more integration into the world economy is offset by increasing returns to technological 
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innovation in the target countries thus increasing inequality. Summarising the findings of 
sections 4.4.1 and 4.5, we obtained a consistent strong negative impact of financial sector 
development on income inequality in most of the models. Specifically, we found that 
financial sector development measured using credit to private sector and bank deposit to 
GDP reduces inequality in net and gross income within the low income countries and 
depending on the measure of financial sector development employed, the same reducing 
impact can be seen within the high and middle income countries. Indeed, access to 
financial services for all households particularly low-income households has been 
recognised as crucial for the reduction of not only inequality in income but also other 
dimensions of inequality including education, economic and health inequalities, Rojas-
Suarez (2010) and Fernando (2007).  
Access to finance broadly defined as the ability of agents and firms to use financial 
services if they chose to do so, allows households as well as firms to move away from 
short-term decision making toward an inter-temporal allocation of resources, Rojas-Suarez 
(2010). Low income families with less stable employment and earnings have more reasons 
to smooth their income over short-term fluctuations. Consequently, they have an ongoing 
need for financial services that can make it easier for them to save or access credit, thus 
improving their incentive for productive investments. 
 
4.6 Financial development and top 1 percent income group 
Bulk of the empirical studies that have analyzed financial development-income 
inequality nexus have frequently used a rather narrow definition of financial development 
such as total credit extended by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a 
measure of financial sector development or bank deposit to GDP. A major reason for the 
wide use of these proxies in cross country panel studies is their availability across countries 
and time, Demirguc-kent and Levine (2008). However, we know that the financial sector is 
more than just the banking sector; we also have the financial markets particularly the stock 
market. In other to capture the effect of stock market development on income inequality 
we used the stock market capitalization to GDP. We sort to circumvent the limitations of 
data availability for all countries by including in this analysis countries that have complete 
data for this variable. 
 In addition, most of the empirical studies on financial development and income 
inequality employ different variants of GINI coefficient as a measure of income inequality. 
As we alluded in chapter 2 of this thesis this measure of income inequality has some 
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limitations. For example, Gini statistic is sensitive to outliers-a few very wealthy or very 
poor individuals can change the statistic significantly, even in large samples. One of the 
gaps in literature that the current study intends to bridge is the use of the income of top 1 
percent of the population as a measure of inequality. Again because of lack of availability 
of information on this variable across countries and time we have included countries that 
have information on the income of the top 1 percent of the population in this analysis. The 
variables used for this analysis were all transformed to growth rates. 
Countries included in the analysis are Australia (AUS), France (FRA), Japan (JPN), 
Norway (NOR), Singapore (SPG), Sweden (SWE) and the United States (USA). The time 
period covered is 1988 to 2008. An important point to bear in mind with regards to the 
countries included in the analysis is that they all belong to the same income category (high 
income countries). The cross-sectional descriptive analysis in table 4.8a reveals the trend in 
the income share of top 1 percent, level of stock market capitalization, extent of credit to 
private sector as well as the GDP per capita income in the countries under review. A closer 
look at the table shows that the United States has the highest level of income share going to 
the top 1 percent of the population with an average of 14.42 percent followed by Singapore 
with an average of 12.39 percent. Countries such as Australia, France, Japan, and Norway 
have the income share accruing to the top 1 percent of population hovering between 8.05 
and 8.62 percent; while Sweden has the lowest share of income going to the top 1 percent 
at 5.60 percent in the group.  
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Table 4.8a Cross-section specific descriptive statistics financial development and top 1 
percent income earners 1988 to 2009 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Std.Dev 
                                   Income of top 1 percent  income earners in the target countries HO1_LCJ 8.05 10.06 6.34 1.22 HO1_IGL 8.24 8.94 7.65 0.45 HO1_îOB 8.25 9.62 7.06 0.91 HO1_BHG 8.62 16.49 4.28 3.20 HO1_JÎO 12.39 15.07 9.84 2.07 HO1_JèF 5.60 6.61 4.38 0.56 HO1_CJL 14.42 18.06 12.17 1.93 
                                 Stock market capitalization as a ratio of GDP in the target countries JDxNLO_LCJ 0.86 1.33 0.40 0.30 JDxNLO_IGL 0.60 1.11 0.27 0.30 JDxNLO_îOB 0.79 1.23 0.56 0.20 JDxNLO_BHG 0.36 0.71 0.19 0.15 JDxNLO_JÎO 1.71 2.50 0.95 0.48 JDxNLO_JèF 0.85 1.46 0.39 0.35 JDxNLO_CJL 1.08 1.64 0.58 0.36 
                                                     Private credit as a ratio of GDP in the target countries ONÎmO_LCJ 0.79 1.08 0.57 0.17 ONÎmO_IGL 0.88 0.94 0.81 0.04 ONÎmO_îOB 1.48 1.95 0.98 0.39 ONÎmO_BHG 0.93 1.04 0.81 0.08 ONÎmO_JÎO 1.10 1.36 0.93 0.16 ONÎmO_JèF 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.01 ONÎmO_CJL 1.53 1.95 1.17 0.30 
                                                      GDP per capita in the target countries ÎmOOFGNLO_LCJ 23109.95 36113.00 17658.08 6272.91 ÎmOOFGNLO_IGL 26017.98 35457.05 21268.25 5130.89 ÎmOOFGNLO_îOB 34548.76 42522.07 25123.63 4506.16 ÎmOOFGNLO_BHG 41914.90 72959.77 27404.59 15015.93 ÎmOOFGNLO_JÎO 22281.02 31585.60 11845.41 5522.33 ÎmOOFGNLO_JèF 31469.42 43948.62 23173.30 6620.12 ÎmOOFGNLO_CJL 34288.32 46443.81 23954.52 7750.21 
                                                                Primary school enrolment (gross ratio) OGDJF_LCJ 102.25 105.56 100.26 1.98 OGDJF_IGL 104.96 113.84 101.51 3.52 OGDJF_îOB 101.66 102.81 100.74 0.66 OGDJF_BHG 99.58 100.94 98.51 0.93 OGDJF_JèF 103.14 109.73 95.71 5.03 OGDJF_CJL 101.31 104.20 98.87 1.66 
                                              KOF Index of globalization in the target countries RBmÎXHE_LCJ 78.87 81.57 73.40 2.84 RBmÎXHE_IGL 80.18 83.74 73.24 3.45 RBmÎXHE_îOB 55.85 64.83 46.64 5.17 RBmÎXHE_BHG 80.82 83.24 76.46 1.89 RBmÎXHE_JÎO 84.47 87.57 80.85 2.46 RBmÎXHE_JèF 86.53 88.78 80.44 2.69 RBmÎXHE_CJL 74.64 77.02 70.21 2.02 
Notes:  
countries included in this analysis are Australia (AUS), France (FRA), Japan (JPN), Norway (NOR), Singapore (SGP), 
Sweden (SWE) and United States (USA). HO1 denotes the income share of the top 1 percent in the target countries, JDxNLOX denotes stock market capitalization in the target country, ONÎmO denotes private credit divided by GDP, ÎmOOFGNLO denotes GDP per capita in the country,OGDJF denotes primary school enrolment; gross enrolment ratio, RBmÎXHE is the KOF index of globalization in the countries involved. Singapore is not included in the primary school 
enrolment ratio because it does not have any information on it. 
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Although the total national income share of the top 1 percent is smaller in Norway 
(8.62) and Singapore (12.39) percent compared to the U.S (14.42) percent, Norway and 
Singapore have higher standard deviations of 3.20 and 2.07 percent compared to the U.S 
1.93 percent indicating that the income of the top 1 percent of the population in Norway 
and Singapore vary more than that of the United States. Effectively, the data suggests that 
the top 1 percent income earners in the United States are more similar in their incomes than 
the top 1 percent in Norway and Singapore. 
With regards to stock market capitalization as a ratio of GDP we observed high 
level of stock market capitalization to GDP in Singapore, at 171 percent followed by the 
United States at 108 percent and Australia at 86 percent, Sweden at 85%, Japan at 79% 
France at 60% with Norway having the lowest at 36%. In addition, looking at the extent of 
private credit relative to GDP we observed that the U.S has the largest lending to private 
sector at 153% followed by Japan at 148% with Sweden having the lowest at 65% during 
the period under review. The GDP per capita shows that Norway has the highest in the 
group, with an average GDP per capita of about $41,914.90, followed by the U.S at 
$34,288.32 with Singapore reporting the lowest GDP per capita of $22,281.76. 
 Average primary school enrolment (gross ratio) in the countries used for the 
analysis stood between 100 and 104% with Norway having a slightly lower ratio of 
99.58%. The KOF index of globalization reveals that all the countries in the datasets have 
almost the same level of economic, social and political globalization hovering between 74 
and 86%, with Japan having the least level of integration with the world economy at 
55.85%.  
 
Table 4.8b Correlation matrix financial development and top 1 percent income 
earners 1988 to 2009 
 ÎmOOFGNLO  RBmÎXHE ONÎmO OGDJF JDxNLO HO1 ÎmOOFGNLO 1.00 0.54 0.91 0.12 0.89 0.69 RBmÎXHE 0.54 1.00 0.80 -0.59 0.82 0.93 ONÎmO 0.91 0.80 1.00 -0.10 0.99 0.88 OGDJF 0.12 -0.59 -0.10 1.00 -0.15 -0.38 JDxNLO 0.89 0.82 0.99 -0.15 1.00 0.88 HO1 0.69 0.93 0.88 -0.38 0.88 1.00 
Notes: 
 ÎmOOFGNLO denotes GDP per capita,RBmÎXHE is the KOF index of globalization,  ONÎmO denotes private 
credit divided by GDP; claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions.OGDJF denotes primary school enrolment; gross enrolment ratio.JDxNLO denotes the stock 
market capitalization to GDP, HO1 denotes the income share of the top 1 percent. 
 
The correlation matrix on table 4.8b shows a positive correlation between the two 
measures of financial development. Specifically, the matrix reveals a 99% correlation 
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between stock market capitalization to GDP and private credit to GDP. Given this high 
level of correlation, it might be tempting to suggest that an analysis differentiating the 
effect of these two variables on the income share of the top 1 percent may not be important 
since one can substitute for the other. This argument may not be entirely correct since the 
two variables represent different dimensions of financial development; while credit to 
private sector as a ratio of GDP represents access to loan-advancing financial institutions, 
stock market capitalization represents financial markets. It is possible that the influence of 
stock market development and financial institutions’ on the income of the top 1 percent 
may differ in terms of direction and significance. In addition, we found that primary school 
enrolment has a negative relationship between stock market capitalization, globalization 
index and top 1 percent income share. 
We tested the stationarity or otherwise of all the variables used in this study. The 
three tests namely, Im, Pesaran and Shin, ADF-Fisher and Levin, Lin and Chu tests were 
unanimous in confirming the presence of unit root in the variables. The null hypothesis for 
Im Pesaran and Shin W-stat is that the variable assumes common unit root process, for the 
ADF-Fisher, and Levin, Lin & Chu the null hypothesis is that the variables assumes 
individual unit root process. Consequently, we differenced the variables, included in the 
test equations are the individual intercepts. Table 4.8c reports the panel unit root test of the 
variables used in this section of the analysis.  
 
Table 4.8c Panel unit root test for the top 1 percent income analysis 
 0D, ,FJLGLB LBm ℎRB T− JL YW − WRJℎFG VℎR− .CLGF UFwRB, XRB & VℎC  ΔHO1  -3.59558*** 37.9901*** -6.54331*** 
ΔONÎmO  -3.29344*** 45.9507*** -5.97536*** 
ΔΔÎmOOFGNLO  -3.23018*** 35.5856*** -2.57679** ΔJDxNLO  -5.54328*** 56.1698*** --5.93690*** 
ΔRBÎXHE  -4.01702*** 43.4413*** -2.99822*** ΔΔOGDJF  -2.26977*** 24.3805*** -1.93720** 
Note: HO1 denotes the growth rate in the income share of the top 1 percent earnings population, ONÎmOX, the 
growth rate of private sector credit to GDP.  ÎmOOFGNLO, denotes the growth rate of GDP per capita, JDxNLO denotes the growth rate of stock market capitalization to GDP, RBÎXHE, denotes the growth rate of 
KOF index of globalization, OGDJF, denotes the growth rate of primary school enrolment and Δ is the first 
difference operator and ΔΔ denotes the second difference operator. 
 
In this section we are particularly interested in testing how financial development 
affect the income share of the top 1 percent income earners in the target countries. To 
achieve this objective, we estimated two models using the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
Dynamic Panel GMM estimator. We employed the two measures of financial sector 
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development namely, growth rate of private credit to GDP ONÎmO and the growth rate of 
stock market capitalization to GDP JDxNLO. The equation we estimated is of this 
functional form: 
 ΔHO1, = ΔαHO1, + ΔΔ ^ÎmOOFGNLO, + ΔΔ^`ÎmOOFGNLO,` + Δ^cONÎmO, +Δ^4ONÎmOR,2+Δ^5RBmÎXHEÎR,+ΔΔ^6OGDJFR,+z+]R,                                     (4.8) 
 ΔHO1, = ΔÅHO1, + ΔΔ ^ÎmOOFGNLO, + ΔΔ `^ÎmOOFGNLO,` + Δ^cJDxNLO, +Δ ì^JDxNLO,` + Δ í^RBmÎXHEÎ, + ΔΔ ^OGDJF, + z + ],                                  (4.9) 
 
                    
Where HO1, denotes the growth rate of the income of the top 1 percent, Å denotes 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ÎmOOFGNLO, denotes the growth rate of 
GDP per capita, ÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per capita, RBÎXHE, 
denotes the growth rate of KOF index of globalization, OGDJF, denotes the growth rate of 
primary school enrolment, ONÎmO, denotes the growth rate of private credit divided by 
GDP.  ONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit,  JDxNLO denotes the growth 
rate of stock market capitalization to GDP. The time period effects z are assumed fixed 
parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each year that is used in the 
sample.  ], is the error term.   
The results from table 4.9a suggests that inequality tends to be on the increase as 
countries included in our dataset achieve a higher level of per capita income, since the 
GDP per capita in the model is positive and significant in both the linear term and the 
quadratic terms. Specifically, the result in table 4.9a suggests that controlling for the 
influence of globalization, level of primary school enrolment and financial development a 
1 percent increase in GDP per capita will result to a 0.05 and 0.001 percent increases in the 
income of the top 1 percent of the population. Globalization and primary school enrolment 
in this model does not have any significant explanatory power to changes in the income of 
the top 1 percent earning population. Focusing attention on our main variable of interest, 
credit to private sector one of the measures of financial sector development we observed a 
linear negative relationship between private sector credit and the income of the top 1 
percent. Specifically, we found that a one percent increase in credit to private sector will 
reduce the income of the top 1 percent of the population by 0.07 percent. Looking at the 
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quadratic term, we observed a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
income of the top 1 percent and this measure of financial sector development. This result 
seems to suggest that private sector development after a certain threshold starts to favour 
disproportionately households within the top income spectrum.  
 
Table 4.9a Arellano and Bond difference dynamic panel GMM for top 1 percent 
using credit to private sector to GDP 1994 to 2009 
Parameters private sector credit  ΔÅHO1X,k  -0.70*** 
[-16.08] ΔΔ ^ÎmOOFGNLO,  0.05** 
[2.23] Δ `^ÎmOOFGNLO,`   0.001** 
[2.11] Δ c^ONÎmO,  -0.07*** 
[-3.32] Δ ì^ONÎmO,`   0.01*** 
[3.74] Δ í^RBÎXHE,  0.07 
[0.62] ΔΔ ^OGDJF,  -0.02 
[-0.22] 
Note: 
. ÅΔHO1k denotes growth rate of the income share of the top 1 percent, ΔΔÎmOOFGNLO, denotes growth 
rate of GDP per capita, ΔΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per capita,  ΔONÎmOX,denotes 
the growth rate of private credit divided by GDP. ΔONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of private credit 
divided by GDP,   ΔRBÎXHE, denotes the growth rate of KOF index of globalization, ΔΔOGDJF, denotes the 
growth rate of primary school enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects from the countries. The 
time period effects z are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies for each 
year that is used in the sample. ], is the error term and Δ is the first difference operator and ΔΔ is the second 
difference. The standard errors for the GMM regression coefficient estimates were computed using the White 
diagonal standard errors, for the GMM weight the White diagonal instruments weighting matrix was used. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels respectively. The values in the brackets 
are t-statistic. ΔHO1, = ΔαHO1, + ^ÎmOOFGNLO, + `^ÎmOOFGNLO,` + c^ONÎmO, + ì^ONÎmO,` + í^RBmÎXHEÎ, +
^OGDJF, + z + ],                                                                                                                                     (f)                                                                                                                        
    
 
Focusing on a different dimension of financial development i.e. financial market 
expansion measured using stock market capitalization to GDP we found different reactions 
by the top 1 percent income earners. The result from this model is reported in table 4.9b 
below. First the positive relationship between GDP per capita and the top 1 percent income 
earners is confirmed in this model at least in the linear term. This finding provides support 
to the argument that increasing inequality is not only an inevitable effect of economic 
growth, but it is also a necessary condition for growth, Colman and Nixson (1988). 
According to the proponents of the pro-inequality argument, in order to ensure capital 
accumulation and growth, income has to be redistributed towards the groups that save and 
invest-the rich because savings are essential to increase productive capacity which leads to 
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higher rates of growth. Consequently, an economy with a high concentration of income 
within the top is more likely to grow faster than one with more equal distribution of 
income. 
 
Table 4.9b Arellano and Bond difference dynamic panel GMM for top 1 percent 
using stock market capitalization to GDP 1994 to 2009 
Parameters private sector credit  ΔÅHO1,k  -0.69*** 
[-23.04] ΔΔ ^ÎmOOFGNLO,  0.06** 
[3.03] Δ `^ÎmOOFGNLO,`   0.004 
[0.49] Δ c^JDxNLO,  0.03 
[0.80] Δ ì^JDxNLO,`   -0.004*** 
[-2.78] Δ í^RBÎXHE,  0.21*** 
[3.52] ΔΔ ^OGDJFX,  -0.06** 
[-2.10] 
Note:  
. ÅΔHO1k denotes lag 1 of the growth rate of income share of the top 1 percent, ΔΔÎmOOFGNLO, denotes 
the growth rate of GDP per capita, ΔΔÎmOOFGNLO,`  denotes the quadratic term of GDP per capita,  ΔONÎmO, denotes the growth rate of private credit divided by GDP. ΔONÎmO,`  denotes the quadratic term of 
private credit divided by GDP,   ΔRBÎXHE, denotes the growth rate of KOF index of globalization, ΔOGDJF, denotes the growth rate of primary school enrolment, z  represents the time period fixed effects 
from the countries. The time period effects z are assumed fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of 
time dummies for each year that is used in the sample. ], is the error term and Δ is the first difference 
operator and ΔΔ is the second difference. The standard errors for the GMM regression coefficient estimates 
were computed using the White diagonal standard errors, for the GMM weight the White diagonal 
instruments weighting matrix was used. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels 
respectively. The values in the brackets are t-statistic. ΔHO1, = ΔαHO1, + ^ÎmOOFGNLO, + `^ÎmOOFGNLO,` + c^JDxNLO, + ì^JDxNLO,` +^5RBmÎXHEÎR,+^6OGDJFR,+z+]R,                                                                                              (g)                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                       
 Allowing globalization to enter the model table 4.9b above, we observed a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between globalization and the income of 
households within the top 1 percent. The result suggests that increasing globalization 
increases the income of the top 1 percent thus exacerbating income inequality. This is in 
line with the hypothesis that suggests that globalization has increased the demand for 
talented workers around the world while demand for others is dwindling-creating a more 
polarized job market.  
A possible explanation of this finding could be that as countries achieve higher 
levels of economic development and become more integrated with the world economy, 
talented individuals extract more rent form the economy via their innovations and 
productivity thus the income gap between these group and the rest widens resulting in 
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inequality. In addition, as economies develop and become more sophisticated, the top 1 
percent will see growing demand for their specialized skills and knowledge thus receiving 
above average rewards than the rest. Quantitatively, 0.21 percent of changes in the income 
of the top 1 percent households can be explained by globalization. Controlling for the level 
of human capital development, we found that primary school enrolment in this model 
explains changes in the income of the top 1 percent. Specifically, we found that one more 
year of schooling is associated to a 0.06 percent reduction in the income inequality. 
Turning our attention to the second measure of financial sector development-stock 
market capitalization as a ratio of GDP, we found that in the linear level, financial sector 
development does not explain changes in the income of the top 1 percent. There is 
however, a significant inverse non-linear relationship between the top 1 percent income 
earners and changes in stock market capitalization. The result suggests that increasing the 
depth of the stock market; will reduce the income of the top 1 percent by 0.004 percent 
thus narrowing the income gap between the top 1 percent of the population and the rest 
within the countries included in this analysis. The result seems to suggest that more capital 
market expansion in the target countries will result in reduction in the income of the top 1 
percent although the magnitude of this reduction is somewhat minimal.. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed theoretical models which explain the link between financial 
development and income inequality. We employed different measures of income inequality 
namely; Gini index of net and gross income as well as the income share of the top 1 
percent of the population in a cross-country perspective. Some of the findings from our 
empirical estimations are worth discussing, especially those that fail to meet prior 
expectations. We start our discussions on financial sector development and income 
inequality. We found via the empirical estimations that the impact of financial sector 
development measured using bank deposit to GDP on inequality measured using the Gini 
index of net income inequality in the Arellano and Bover estimator table 4.7b does not 
explain changes in inequality within the all countries model, column 1, high income 
countries column 2 and middle income countries column 3. This finding is not surprising 
given that in most of these countries, majority of the population, low-income families in 
particular, do not have access to financial services. Some of the low-income households 
that have gained access to financial sector as a result of recent developments in financial 
services are often underserved both in terms of quantity and quality. Fernando (2007) in 
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his study of access to finance in middle income emerging  economies documented that 
formal financial system at best serves no more than 20-30 percent of the population, and 
excludes 70-80 percent of the population and majority are from low-income households. 
Another finding that seems contrary to prior expectation is the relationship between 
human capital development and income inequality. The results in almost all the models 
suggest that increasing human capital development increases income inequality, this 
implies that improvement in literacy level is not a sufficient condition to reduce income 
inequality, although it may help in improving the living standards of individuals at the 
bottom of the income distribution. One should expect that an increase in human capital 
development would translate to a reduction in income inequality. A plausible explanation 
of this finding could be that increase in the literate population acquiring primary education 
has reduced income inequality at least by improving the share of income going to the 
lowest income group, however, at the same time, external factors such as globalization and 
financial market expansion have concurrently increased the income share going to the top 
income group. 
In general, we found that within the high income countries economic development 
reduces inequality at the initial stages of development given that the linear term of GDP 
per capita in most of the models are negative and significant; however, it gets to a level 
where the positive effect of increasing economic development starts to vanish. Most 
researchers have argued that the negative distributional effect of economic development at 
least in the U.S can be attributed to the excessive increase in the income and wages of top 
income earners, Bivens, and Mishel (2013). Using Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 
(2013) data on top incomes, Bivens and Gould (2013) demonstrated that the decade 
following 1928, income inequality declined rapidly in the U.S (the only country with 
complete information on top 1 percent income earners before 1970s).  
The top 1 percent claimed less than 10 percent of total income on the average 
between 1948 and 1979. According to their analysis, income growth during these periods 
was essentially shared proportionately. For the purposes of this study, these periods could 
be regarded as the initial periods of economic growth; however, as the U.S continued to 
expand its national income, the top 1 percent’s take has soared. In fact Piketty and Saez 
(2013) in their study showed that 95% of income gains from 2009 to 2012 went to the top 
1 percent of the earning population. Although one cannot generalize the case of U.S, it 
provides a reasonable insight into why increasing economic growth leads to widening 
instead of narrowing income differentials between the rich and the poor.  
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For the upper middle income and lower income countries, we found that the effect 
of economic growth depends on whether you use the GINI index of net or gross income as 
a measure of income inequality. Accounting for the effect of redistribution in income 
inequality we found evidence of the Kuznet inverted U-shape hypothesis within the low 
income countries table 4.7b column 4 which suggests that inequality increases at the initial 
stages of development (low income periods) and starts reducing as a country gets to an 
advanced level of development. However, using gross GINI with no explicit role for 
redistribution, we found that our measure of economic growth becomes insignificant for 
the middle income group while we found an increasing return of economic development on 
income inequality for the low income countries. The current study supports the use of net 
GINI index of inequality given that the analytical basis for economic development’s effect 
on inequality concerns net (post-tax) inequality, which affects incentives and prospects for 
social stability. 
With regards to financial development and income inequality which is the main 
focus of this chapter, the impact of financial development on income inequality depends on 
the dimension of financial development one is considering. Looking at the effects of 
financial development measured using private sector credit to GDP on gini index of net 
income inequality; we found inequality reducing effect of financial development across all 
the three different income groups’ table 4.5b columns, 2, 3 and 4. Using credit to private 
sector as a measure of financial development and gross income inequality, we confirmed 
the inequality reducing effect of financial development within the middle and low income 
categories only while the effect for the high income economies is insignificant-see table 
4.6a. However, using a different measure of financial sector development namely bank 
deposits to GDP, we found that the previous finding of inequality reducing effect of 
financial sector development within the middle and the low income countries is upheld.  
For the high income countries, we observed a somewhat linear relationship between 
financial development and net inequality as indicated by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the linear bank deposit to GDP variable EmÎmOX while the 
quadratic term of bank deposit to GDP variable EmÎmOX`  is positive and significant. 
This finding suggests that for countries within the high income group after a certain 
income threshold is surpassed, the inequality-reducing effect of economic development 
disappears and more development will start to favour the households that can extract 
economic rent from the system. Furthermore, employing the top 1 percent as a measure of 
inequality (the results are reported in tables 4.9a and 4.9b), we gained some interesting 
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insights. First, our analysis revealed that the impact of financial sector development on 
income inequality depends on the dimension of the financial sector been analyzed. Using 
the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel GMM we found that the effect of financial 
development (measured using credit to private sector as a ratio of GDP) on income 
inequality is negative and significant in the linear term and positive and significant in the 
quadratic term. This finding indicates that the inequality reducing effect of financial sector 
development across the countries included in this analysis is mainly seen at the initial 
stages of financial sector development. However, after a certain stage, the impact of further 
development within the financial sector starts to favour the rich.  
Using a different measure of financial development namely, stock market 
capitalization as a ratio of GDP, we found some aspect of the inverted U-shaped 
hypothesis-table 4.9b. Although the coefficient of the linear stock market capitalization is 
insignificant in this model, the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative and highly 
significant; indicating that well developed capital market reduces inequality. In summary, 
the results in almost all the models suggest that increasing access to private credit for low 
income households will reduce income inequality. This topic is important in the light of the 
potential for using financial development as a policy tool to reduce the widening income 
inequality around the world. 
 In principle the result seems to suggest that policies that restricts access to 
financial services particularly the banking sector and other credit providing institutions will 
lead to deterioration in income distribution. In a more practical way; easy access to credit 
makes investment attractive, and small entrepreneurs are likely to benefit more. 
Furthermore, access to financial resources unleashes entrepreneurial talent which generates 
employment opportunities, increases output, and improves welfare of the poor. Rjan and 
Zingales (2004) pointed out that limited access to finance can significantly reduce the 
choices that agents have in deciding where to live and work. With easy access to finance 
all agents from low income households and connected individuals will be able to take 
advantage of economic opportunities. 
The emphasizes in most of the theoretical and empirical literatures in finance and 
income inequality is ‘access to financial services116’ which is mostly limited by financial 
                                                          
116
On the surface, access to financial services may seem to be a simple concept; however, measuring access 
to finance is usually very difficult largely because it is different from actual usage of financial services, 
Fernando (2007). According to Fernando (2007), an individual may be said to have access to financial 
services if he/she is able to use financial services in an “appropriate” form at reasonable prices when he/she 
requires such services. Consequently, some agents who do not use financial services at any given time may 
 
220 
 
market imperfections such as information asymmetries, contract enforcement costs and 
transaction costs. Poor entrepreneurs may be the most affected by these imperfections 
because of their lack of collateral and almost no credit history. Consequently, poor 
entrepreneurs with good business projects may not be able to access funding from financial 
markets and remain in poverty thus increasing income inequality.  
The challenge of improved access implies making financial services available to 
all, thereby expanding equality of opportunities and reducing persistent inequality. From 
this perspective, one can argue that the challenge is more than granting consumer loans to 
economic agents. It is just as much about developing financial policies that will reduce 
financial market frictions, which are particularly binding on the talented poor and small 
enterprises that lack collateral, credit histories and connections, thus, limiting their 
opportunities and exacerbating inequality.  
However, serious gaps in cross-country survey data about who has access to which 
financial services as well as about the barriers to broader access is a major impediment to 
our understanding of how reduced barriers and improved access affect household welfare. 
Continuing research in this area will expand our understanding of the relationship between 
improved access to finance and persistent inequality. This will in turn, inform the design of 
policy interventions to build more inclusive financial system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
actually have access, whereas some other nonusers do not. For a classification of dimensions of access to 
finance refer to chapter Fernando (2007). 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis examined the reaction of monetary policy to income inequality as well 
as the relationship between income inequality, asset prices and financial development. 
Previously, income distribution and monetary policy were considered as separate issues. 
However, this view has recently been challenged after the global recessions of 2007 to 
2009.  The last six years witnessed the use of expansionary monetary policy stance in most 
developed countries to navigate their various economies out of the global recessions into 
recovery. In the U.S. for instance, the Fed used a combination of low interest rates 
environment and the unconventional monetary policy of quantitative easing to help the 
economy recover from the recession and reduce the unemployment rate.  
Available evidence showed that such expansionary policy stance has contributed to 
the growth in income inequality. The low interest rates over the crises period have 
significantly benefited high income households because of the increase in the price of their 
large holdings of corporate stocks, due for the most part, to low interest rates. Low income 
households did not benefit. Indeed, low income earners may suffer to the extent that stock 
market boom results to a shift in the allocation of national income from labour to capital. 
Our literature search showed that the richest 1% of Americans have seen real 
income gains of 31% since after the global recessions, while the poorest bottom 99% have 
gained less than 1%. This is because the richest 1% of the population gets much of their 
income from the financial markets either in the form of wages or stock ownership. Low 
income households have no assets so they get no returns from financial assets price booms 
and are often the worst hit form asymmetric monetary policy reaction to asset prices. 
Consequently, previously independent factors- income distribution and monetary policy 
are now considered interrelated. The current thesis was motivated by these developments 
and attempted to investigate the response of monetary policy to income inequality and the 
relationship between income inequality, asset prices and financial sector development, 
using a range of econometric and theoretical frameworks. In what follows is a summary of 
our main findings and potential policy implications. 
Chapter 2 examined the response of monetary policy to income inequality within 
the context of a forward looking Taylor rule monetary policy reaction function. The rule 
takes the nominal short term interest rate G∗ as the monetary policy instrument and 
predicts that it should increase if inflation (πt) increases above its target range (π
*). In 
equilibrium, the deviation of inflation and output from their target values is zero and 
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therefore, the desired interest rate is the sum of equilibrium real rate plus the target value 
of inflation. 
 In that chapter, we focused on the response of the short term interest rate to 
changes in income inequality. Our principal innovation to the standard specification is the 
inclusion of three measures of income inequality namely, Gini index of income inequality, 
average income share going to the top 1 percent income earners and 90/10 wage 
differential ratio. A major motivation for the inclusion of these measures of income 
inequality in the Fed’s reaction function is to test the inequality transmission mechanism 
proposed by Areosa and Areosa (2006). This channel implies that the objective of a 
monetary policy that is consistent with welfare maximization should include inequality 
stabilization as well as inflation and output gap stabilization.  According to them, monetary 
policy influences both output gap and inequality which in turn affect inflation. We used 
quarterly data from the United States covering the period 1960-2009. The results suggested 
that monetary policy authorities in the U.S do take into account changes in income 
inequality when calibrating their policy stance, however, this reaction is dependent on the 
proxy used to measure income inequality.  
Specifically, we found no evidence of monetary policy reaction to income 
inequality measured using the GINI index of inequality and the 90/10 wage gap. 
Conversely, for the top 1 percent income model we found a positive and statistically 
significant reaction, similar to the reaction of monetary policy to asset prices particularly 
equities. This finding is invariant to the use of an alternative measure of monetary policy- 
the three month Treasury bill as well as the unemployment rate as a measure of economic 
activity as opposed to the frequently used output gap. The Federal Reserve’s reaction to 
income of the top 1 percent seems to be an indirect reaction to stock prices given that the 
income of this group of earning population correlates closely with the S&P 500 stock index 
as we have shown in this thesis. Available evidence suggests that increasing inequality 
combined with higher household debt, can trigger financial and real sector crises and both 
outcomes are a cause for concern for Federal Reserve with potential significant impacts on 
their transmission mechanisms as well as price and financial stability. To test the structural 
stability of our findings we reduced the sample size starting from 1984 to 2007 that marked 
the periods of the great moderation characterized by low inflation, strong economic 
growth, low macroeconomic risk and high income inequality.  
The sub-sample analysis considered the potential reaction of monetary policy to the 
income of the top 1 percent during the ‘great moderation’ era until the on-set of the global 
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financial crisis in the second quarter of 2007. The results from the sub-sample model 
suggests that the Fed during the great moderation periods and before the start of the 2007 
great recession observed changes in our measure of income inequality in setting the policy 
rate. In principle, a positive and significant reaction to the income of the top 1 percent 
indicates both interest rate cuts in times of sustained income decreases and rates hikes in 
times of sustained income increases. Using a state dependent dummy variable, we sought 
to find out whether the interest rate setting of Fed differs during periods of sustained 
increase and decrease in the income of top 1 percent income earners. The result revealed 
the presence of asymmetry in the response of monetary policy to the income of the top 1 
percent income earners. This is because although monetary policy tightens during periods 
of prolonged income increases, the Fed did not increase interest rates high enough to curb 
the increase in income as they would cut rates in the event of a decline in income. This 
finding is similar to the sort of monetary policy asymmetric reaction to stock prices. 
Consequently, we concluded that the financial asset price channel could be the link 
between monetary policy and income inequality measured using the top 1 percent income 
share. 
In chapter 3, we turned our attention to the relationship between income inequality 
and asset prices. First, we evaluated the causal relationship between the income share of 
the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent and the stock market. The Austrian economists 
identified the portfolio channel as one of the channels through which changes in monetary 
policy can affect income inequality. According to the Austrian perspective the portfolio 
channel implies that high income households, with large concentration of financial assets 
gain more from asset market booms orchestrated by expansionary monetary policy. 
Consequently, developments within the financial asset markets should have a significant 
impact on the income of households within the top spectrum of the income distribution. 
Using data from the United States spanning the periods 1967 to 2012, we wanted to find 
out empirically if there is some sort of endogeneity in financial market development and 
the income of the top 1 percent.  
The results from the causality tests revealed a unidirectional causality from stock 
returns to changes in the income share of the top 1 percent. We found no evidence of 
directional causality between stock returns and income of the bottom 90 percent either 
way. The absence of a significant causal relation between the two variables seems to 
suggest that development within the stock market does not have any effect on the income 
of the bottom 90 percent workers. Therefore, government policies that are targeted towards 
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stimulating the financial markets will have no associated effect on the bottom 90 percent 
income earners. In addition, we also analyzed the relationship between asset prices and 
income inequality. Using the Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) estimator we 
examined the reaction of inequality measured using the income share of the top 1 percent, 
the bottom 90 percent and the lowest fifth percent households to changes in asset prices. 
Our task here is to examine whether changes in both financial and non-financial assets 
affects everyone in the top and bottom of the income distribution the same way, or if there 
are remarkable differences on how these variables affect individuals within the top and 
bottom income percentiles. To achieve our objective, we specified a parsimonious model 
for household income at the selected percentiles as a function of six factors (6 covariates): 
financial assets (stock returns), non financial assets (returns on house prices), bond yields, 
macro-economic factors (unemployment rate and inflation), education premium and a time 
trend. 
The results from the GMM regressions showed that the effect of stock returns on 
the low income percentiles is statistically insignificant. However, we found that changes in 
stock returns have a significant impact on income of the top 1 percent households. This 
finding is not surprising given that the ownership of stocks is heavily concentrated at the 
top of the income distribution, thus providing support to the portfolio channel. The finding 
of unidirectional causality from stock market to the income of the top 1 percent, as well as 
a significant reaction of stock prices to the top 1 percent income spectrum, seems to 
suggest that monetary policy reaction to the income of the top 1 percent could be their 
reaction to stock prices.  A major policy implication of this finding is that the inherent 
asymmetry in “mopping up” after a burst in asset price bubble will worsen the rising 
income disparity between high and low income earners through steep increases in stock 
prices. This kind of policy action could be destabilizing. 
In chapter 4 we focused our attention on the relationship between financial sector 
development and income inequality. Our dataset comprised 91 countries classified 
according to the income categories defined by the World Bank (high-income, middle-
income, and the low income countries). To analyze the link between financial sector 
development and income inequality, we used standard proxies in the financial development 
literature, namely the ratio of private credit to GDP, bank deposit to GDP and stock market 
capitalization to GDP as measures of financial development and the GINI coefficient of net 
and gross income distribution within countries as well as income share of the top 1 percent 
as measures of income inequality.  
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Using a broader datasets and controlling for time-invariant country specifics using 
Arellano and Bond (1991) differencing and Arellano and Bover (1995) orthogonal 
deviations, the results suggest that in majority of the countries under investigation, 
financial development leads to a reduction in income inequality. With regards to financial 
development and income inequality which is the main focus of this chapter, the impact of 
financial development on income inequality depends on the dimension of financial 
development one is considering. Looking at the effects of financial development measured 
using private sector credit to GDP on gini index of net income inequality; we found 
inequality reducing effect of financial development across all the three different income 
groups’ table 4.5b columns, 2, 3 and 4. Using credit to private sector as a measure of 
financial development and gross income inequality, we confirmed the inequality reducing 
effect of financial development within the middle and low income categories only while 
the effect for the high income economies is insignificant-see table 4.6a. However, using a 
different measure of financial sector development namely bank deposits to GDP, we found 
that the previous finding of inequality reducing effect of financial sector development 
within the middle and the low income countries is upheld.  
In addition, we analyzed the impact of financial development on income inequality 
using the income of the top 1 percent income earners to proxy for inequality in seven of the 
countries included in our dataset. We used the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
GMM estimator and found that the effect of financial development (measured using credit 
to private sector as a ratio of GDP) on the top 1 percent is negative and significant in the 
linear term. Specifically, we observed that a one percent increase in credit to private sector 
will reduce the income of the top 1 percent of the population by 0.07 percent. Looking at 
the quadratic term, we observed a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
the income of the top 1 percent and this measure of financial sector development. This 
result seems to suggest that private sector development after a certain threshold starts to 
favour disproportionately households within the top income spectrum.  
Using a different dimension of financial development stock market capitalization to 
GDP we found that increasing the depth of the stock market; will reduce the income of the 
top 1 percent thus narrowing the income gap between the top 1 percent of the population 
and the rest within the countries included in this analysis. However, the problems in 
measuring financial development, particularly, the degree to which households-especially 
the low income ones-have access to the financial system is an area for future research. For 
instance, the extent to which low income earners have access to the banking system, can be 
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captured using key indicators like; the number of banks in rural areas, or the number of 
SME/micro loans from banks and microfinance institutions. However, these data are not 
easily available in developing countries.  
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Chapter 2 Appendix 
 
     Figure A2.1a  Histogram of the distribution of  inflation rate 
 
Data sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia    
 
 
Figure A2.1b Histogram of logarithmic transformed inflation rate  
 
Data sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
 
Table A3.1 Lag Length Selection Criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1511.70 NA  206448.8 17.95 17.95 17.93 
1 -1323.86 369.01 23440.04 15.74 15.85 15.78 
2 -1294.39 57.19* 17341.63* 15.44* 15.62* 15.51* 
3 -1290.98 6.53 17464.71 15.44 15.70 15.55 
Notes 
:* indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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Chapter 4 Appendix 
 
Table A4.1 Countries included in the analysis 
High Income Countries Number of Gross and Net GINI observation 
Australia 46 
Austria 25 
Bahamas 32 
Barbados 12 
Belgium 35 
Canada 37 
Croatia 19 
Cyprus 11 
Czech Republic 21 
Denmark 37 
Estonia 27 
Finland 35 
France 36 
Germany 41 
Greece 40 
Hong Kong 30 
Hungary 39 
Iceland 5 
Ireland 29 
Israel 31 
Italy 41 
Japan 41 
Korea Republic 37 
Latvia 27 
Luxembourg 23 
Malta 8 
Netherlands 34 
New Zealand 47 
Norway 35 
Poland 39 
Portugal 29 
Singapore 30 
Slovak Republic 21 
Slovenia 21 
Spain 30 
Sweden 48 
Switzerland 23 
Trinidad and Tobago 18 
United Kingdom 49 
United States 49 
Upper Middle Income  
Argentina 39 
Botswana 10 
Brazil 36 
Bulgaria 44 
Chile 29 
Colombia 35 
Cost Rica 35 
Dominican Republic 32 
Iran 13 
Jamaica 32 
Kazakhstan 26 
Lithuania 27 
Macedonia 18 
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Malaysia 32 
Mauritius 27 
Mexico 36 
Panama 32 
Peru 32 
Romania 18 
Russian Federation 26 
South Africa 34 
Turkey 30 
Uruguay 28 
Venezuela 32 
Lower Middle Income  
Armenia 21 
Bolivia 13 
Cameroon 19 
Cape Verde 14 
Cote d’Ivoire 26 
Ecuador 22 
Egypt 31 
El Salvador 33 
Georgia 25 
Guatemala 28 
Honduras 19 
India 38 
Indonesia 34 
Jordan 24 
Lesotho 14 
Moldova 26 
Morocco 29 
Nigeria 27 
Pakistan 37 
Paraguay 13 
Philippines 32 
Senegal 14 
Sri Lanka 27 
Thailand 31 
Tunisia 29 
Vietnam 12 
Yemen 14 
Source: World Bank database  
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Gross and net GINI income inequality for some selected high income countries 
Figure A4.1 GINI gross and net income inequality (USA)                           Figure A4.2 GINI gross and net income inequality (UK) 
                      
Figure A4.3 GINI gross and net income inequality (Sweden)                     Figure A4.4 gross and net income inequalities (Germany) 
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Gross and net GINI income inequality for some selected upper middle income countries 
Figure A4.5 gross and net income inequalities (Brazil)        Figure A4.6 gross and net income inequalities (Jamaica) 
                       
 
Figure A4.7 gross and net income inequalities (Malaysia)                                  Figure A4.8 gross and net income inequalities (South Africa) 
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Gross and net GINI income inequality for some selected lower middle income countries 
Figure A4.9 gross and net income inequalities (Bolivia)                               Figure A4.10 gross and net income inequalities (Ecuador) 
                        
 
Figure A4.11 gross and net income inequalities (Honduras)                      Figure A4.12 gross and net income inequalities (Paraguay) 
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Figure A4.13 Top 1 percent income shares in the target countries Figure A4.14 private credits to GDP in target countries 
        
 
Figure A4.15 Stock market capitalizations to GDP in target countries 
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